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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON NON-COOPERATIVE INVENTORY
GAMES
Evren Korpeoglu
Ph.D. in Industrial Engineering
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Alper Sen
January, 2012
In this thesis we study dierent non{cooperative inventory games. In par-
ticular, we focus on joint replenishment games and newsvendor duopoly under
asymmetric information. Chapter 1 contains introduction and motivation be-
hind the research. Chapter 2 is a preliminary chapter which introduce basic
concepts used in the thesis such as Nash equilibrium, Bayesian Nash equilibrium
and mechanism design.
In Chapter 3, we study a non-cooperative game for joint replenishment of
multiple rms that operate under an EOQ{like setting. Each rm decides whether
to replenish independently or to participate in joint replenishment, and how much
to contribute to joint ordering costs in case of participation. Joint replenishment
cycle time is set by an intermediary as the lowest cycle time that can be nanced
with the private contributions of participating rms. We consider two variants
of the participation-contribution game: in the single{stage variant, participation
and contribution decisions are made simultaneously, and, in the two-stage variant,
participating rms become common knowledge at the contribution stage. We
characterize the behavior and outcomes under undominated Nash equilibria for
the one-stage game and subgame-perfect equilibrium for the two-stage game.
In Chapter 4, we extend the private contributions game to an asymmetric
information counterpart. We assume each rm only knows the probability dis-
tribution of the other rms' adjusted demand rates (demand rate multiplied by
inventory holding cost rate). We show the existence of a pure strategy Bayesian
Nash equilibrium for the asymmetric information game and provide its charac-
terization. Finally, we conduct some numerical study to examine the impact of
information asymmetry on expected and interim values of total contributions,
cycle times and total costs.
iv
vIn Chapter 5, we study a three{stage non-cooperative joint replenishment
game. In this model, we assume that the intermediary is also a decision maker.
In the rst stage, each rm announces his contribution for the ordering cost. In
the second stage, based on the contributions, the replenishment service provider
determines a common cycle time that he can serve the rms. Finally, each rm
decides whether to be a part of the coalition and served under this cycle time or act
independently with an EOQ cost. We analyze each stage and give the conditions
for equilibrium. We show that the subgame-perfect equilibrium cycle time is not
unique. Although minimum and maximum cycle times that arise in equilibrium
straddle the ecient cycle time, in general, whether ecient cycle time can be
reached in equilibrium depends on the parameters of the joint replenishment
environment. For symmetric joint replenishment environments, we show that
whether ecient cycle time is a subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome depends
only on the number of rms and is independent of all other parameters of the
environment.
In Chapter 6, we focus on nding a mechanism that would allocate the joint
ordering costs to the rms based on their reported adjusted demand rates. We
rst provide an impossibility result showing that there is no direct mechanism that
simultaneously achieves eciency, incentive compatibility, individual rationality
and budget-balance. We then propose a general, two-parameter mechanism in
which one parameter is used to determine the joint replenishment frequency;
another is used to allocate the order costs based on rms' reports. We show
that eciency cannot be achieved in this two-parameter mechanism unless the
parameter governing the cost allocation is zero. When the two parameters are
identical (a single parameter mechanism), we nd the equilibrium share levels
and corresponding total cost. We nally investigate the eect of this parameter
on equilibrium behavior.
In Chapter 7, we study the newsboy duopoly problem under asymmetric cost
information. We extend the Lippman and McCardle [30] model of competitive
newsboys to allow for private cost information. The market demand is initially
split between two rms and the excess demand for each rm is reallocated to the
rival rm. We show the existence and uniqueness of pure strategy equilibrium
and characterize its structure. The equilibrium conditions have an interesting
recursive structure that enables an easy computation of the equilibrium order
quantities. Presence of strategic interactions creates incentives to increase order
vi
quantities for all rm types except the type that has the highest possible unit
cost, who orders the same quantity as he would as a monopolist newsboy. Con-
sequently, competition leads to higher total inventory in the industry. A rm's
equilibrium order quantity increases with a stochastic increase in the total in-
dustry demand or with an increase in his initial allocation of the total industry
demand. Finally, we provide full characterization of the equilibrium, correspond-
ing payos and comparative statics for a parametric special case with uniform
demand and linear market shares.
Keywords: Joint replenishment problem, Newsvendor problem, Game theory,
Mechanism design, Asymmetric information.
OZET
_ISB_IRL_IKC _I OLMAYAN ENVANTER OYUNLARI
UZER_INE MAKALELER
Evren Korpeoglu
Endustri Muhendisligi Bolumu, Doktora
Tez Yoneticisi: Yrd. Doc. Dr. Alper Sen
Ocak, 2012
Bu tezde isbirlikci olmayan ortak tedarik oyunlar ve asimetrik bilgi altnda
gazete satcs duopolisini de iceren degisik rekabetci envanter oyunlar in-
celenmektedir. Birinci bolum girisi ve arastrmann ardndaki motivasyonu
icermektedir. _Ikinci bolum bu tezde kullanlms Nash dengesi, Bayes Nash den-
gesi ve mekanizma tasarm gibi bir takm ekonomik konularn ksa bir ozetini
kapsamaktadr.
Ucuncu bolumde ekonomik siparis miktarna benzer bir modelde birden cok
rmann isbirlikci olmayan ortak tedarik oyunu incelenmektedir. Her rma
siparisini kendi basna m verecegine yoksa ortak tedarige mi katlacagna ve or-
tak tedarige katlrsa tedarik icin ne kadar katkda bulunacagna karar vermek-
tedir. Ortak tedarik cevrim suresi bir arac tarafndan verilen katklarla nanse
edilebilecek en dusuk cevrim suresi olarak belirlenmektedir. Bu oyun icin iki farkl
model incelenmektedir: tek asamal modelde katlma ve katk miktar kararlar
bir arada verilirken, iki asamal modelde katlan rmalar ilk asamada belirlenip
ikinci asamada ortak tedarige katlan rmalar katk miktarlarn acklamaktadr.
Bu iki model icin de rmalarn Nash dengesi altndaki davranslar ve maliyetleri
bulunmustur.
Dorduncu bolumde bir onceki bolumde bulunan bireysel katk miktar oyu-
nunun asimetrik bilgi iceren bir modeli incelenmektedir. Her rma sadece diger
rmalara ait uyarlanms talep hzlarnn (Talep hz ile envanter maliyet hznn
carpm) olaslksal bir daglmn bilmektedir. Asimetrik bilgi altndaki bu mod-
elde yaln stratejili Nash dengesinin varlg gosterilmis ve bu denge icin gerekli
olan sartlar verilmistir. Ayrca, bilgi asimetrisinin toplam katk miktar, ortak
cevrim suresi ve toplam maliyetlerin beklenen ve ara degerleri uzerine etkilerini
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incelemek icin saysal bir calsma yaplmstr.
Besinci bolumde uc asamal bir isbirlikci olmayan ortak tedarik oyunu incelen-
mektedir. Bu modelde aracnn da karar verici oldugu varsaylmaktadr. Birinci
asamada her rma siparis icin katk miktarn acklamaktadr. _Ikinci asamada ver-
ilen katk miktarlar dogrultusunda arac rmalara servis saglayacag ortak cevrim
suresini belirlemektedir. Ucuncu asamada ise verilen cevrim suresine bakan r-
malar bu cevrim suresiyle ortak tedarikten mi faydalanacaklarna yoksa ekonomik
siparis miktar altndaki maliyetle bagmsz m hareket edeceklerine karar ver-
mektedir. Bu oyunda her asama ayr ayr analiz edilip kusursuz altoyun dengesi
icin gerekli sartlar verilmistir. Ayrca dengenin essiz olmadg gosterilmistir. En
verimli cevrim suresi dengede olusabilecek cevrim surelerinin en dusugu ve en
yukseginin arasnda kalsa da dengede bu sureye ulaslp ulaslamayacag oyu-
nun parametrelerine bagldr. Butun rmalarn ozdes oldugu durumda en ver-
imli cevrim suresinin dengenin bir sonucu olup olmadg sadece oyundaki rma
saysna bagl olup diger parametrelerden bagmszdr.
Altnc bolumde rmalarn rapor ettigi uyarlanms talep hzlarna bagl olarak
ortak tedarik maliyetlerini paylastracak bir mekanizma bulmaya yogunlaslmstr.
Oncelikle verimlilik, caziplik, bireysel rasyonellik ve denk butceyi saglayan direk
bir mekanizmann mumkun olmadg gosterilmis, sonrasnda ise birinci parame-
tresi ortak tedarik frekansn ikinci parametresi ise siparis maliyetlerinin rma
raporlarna gore paylastrlmasn saglayan iki parametreli genel bir mekanizma
onerilmistir. Bu mekanizmada maliyet paylasmn kontrol eden parametrenin
sfr olmadg durumlarda verimliligin saglanamayacag gosterilmistir. _Iki parame-
trenin de esit oldugu durumda (tek parametreli bir mekanizma) dengedeki
paylasm seviyeleri ve bunlara karslk gelen toplam maliyet bulunmus ve ayrca
bu parametrenin dengedeki rma davranslarna olan etkisi incelenmistir.
Yedinci bolumde asimetrik bilgi altndaki gazete satcs duopolisi problemi
incelenmektedir. Lippman ve McCardle'daki [30] rekabetci gazete satclar mod-
eli asimetrik bilgi de icerecek sekilde genisletilmistir. Oncelikle toplam pazar
talebi iki rma arasnda paylastrldktan sonra rmalarn karslayamadklar tale-
pleri rakip rmaya atanmaktadr. Bu model icin yaln stratejili Nash dengesinin
varlg ve essiz oldugu gosterilmis ve dengenin yaps karakterize edilmistir. Denge
kosullarnn ozyinelemeli yaps dengedeki siparis miktarlarnn kolayca hesaplan-
masn saglamaktadr. Stratejik etkilesimlerin varlg tekel bir rma gibi hareket
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eden en yuksek birim maliyete sahip rma tipi dsndaki butun rma tiplerini
daha fazla siparis vermeye tesvik etmektedir. Bunun bir sonucu olarak, rekabet
endustride daha yuksek toplam envanter miktarlarna sebep olmaktadr. Bir r-
mann dengedeki siparis miktar toplam talepteki olaslksal artsla ve kendine
verilen baslangc market payndaki artsla yukselmektedir. Son olarak tekbicimli
daglm ve dogrusal market talebi paylasm altnda Nash dengesinin tam karak-
terizasyonu, karslk gelen maliyetler ve model parametrelerinin maliyetler ve
siparis miktarlar uzerine etkileri verilmistir.
Anahtar sozcukler : Ortak tedarik problemi, Gazete satcs problemi, Oyun
teorisi, Mekanizma dizayn, Asimetrik bilgi.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Inventory management is one of the most important functions in a business since
inventories usually tie up a signicant portion of a company's capital. Inven-
tory is a necessary evil as almost all rms need to position inventory at various
stages of their supply chain to satisfy customer demand. Moreover, it can help
the organization achieve economies of scale and creates a buer against demand
uncertainty. On the other hand, if not managed properly, it may lead to a huge
nancial burden for the business due to product handling, warehouse and capital
costs, obsolescence, rework and returns. Both Nike and Cisco experienced major
decrease in their stock prices due to unsuccessful inventory management. In 2001,
Nike could not establish the necessary inventory levels for its footwear line and
the result was shortages in some footwear models and surpluses in others. This in
turn cost the company over $100 million in a single quarter. Similarly, after not
being able to keep up with the demand, inated sales forecasts and the economic
downturn in 2001, Cisco had a $2.2 billion inventory write{down for the compo-
nents that were ordered but never used. This resulted in a decrease of its stock
prices from $82 to $14 in just thirteen months [40]. As these examples clearly
demonstrate, inventory management is critical for the success of a rm and this
is the motivation for the increasing amount of academic research on inventory
management in the past four decades.
Firms usually coexist with many other rms in the same market which in
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turn requires them to assess their inventory decisions more carefully considering
the competition and possible cooperation opportunities. Thus, the success of a
rm depends on taking the right decisions in the marketplace and exploiting any
potential to reduce costs. One major source of inventory competition is caused
by the demand spillovers due to the stockouts. According to a survey provided
by Proctor & Gamble [47], in case of a stockout 50% of the customers switch to
another retailer. Another study by Gruen et al. [18] combines the studies over
dierent retailers over the world with a total of 71000 customer surveys for cer-
tain FMCG products and concludes that when a stockout situation occurs, 32%
of the customers substitute brand and 34% buy the same product at another
store both of which drives inventory competition between manufacturers and re-
tailers respectively. However, it is also possible that the rms in the same market
can benet from each other. Recently, BMW started an auto-parts purchasing
partnership with Daimler to purchase more than 10 parts together and looking
for ways to expand this partnership. BMW is hoping to generate cost savings of
around 100 million euros per year in 2012 and 2013 through this venture [17].
In this thesis, we consider non{cooperative inventory games. We mainly focus
on the extensions of the economic order quantity (EOQ) problem and the news-
boy problem both of which are well{studied problems in the literature. The EOQ
model is a deterministic demand model where total cost is comprised of two parts.
The rst part is the setup or ordering cost associated with production, procure-
ment or transportation of the lot for each order. The second part is the holding
cost of inventory which includes the cost of capital, handling and warehouse costs.
Smaller lot sizes leads to lower average inventory but higher ordering costs. On
the contrary, larger lot sizes lead to lower setup costs but increase the average
inventory cost. Considering this trade{o, the rms determine the ecient lot
size. In real world, any business with a fairly stable and deterministic demand
and a well{dened setup cost may use the EOQ model since the optimal lot size
is not very sensitive to the minor demand changes.
The newsboy problem is a single period model in which a rm should decide
on order or production quantity of a perishable product which has stochastic
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demand. Each unit of the product has a purchasing or production cost and pre-
determined revenue. There is only one ordering opportunity so the rm must
decide on the inventory level before the season starts. This assumption is usually
justied by long lead times, capacity restrictions and relatively short sales seasons.
The sales level of the rm is the smaller of the demand and order quantity. At the
end of the season, the rm either has excess demand which leads to lost sales and
may be penalized by a unit lost sales cost or excess inventory which either perishes
or salvaged at a salvage value lower than the purchasing cost. The objective of the
rm is to determine the inventory level that will maximize his expected prot. At
the optimal inventory level the marginal cost is equal to marginal revenue. There
are many examples for newsboy type products in addition to the newspapers and
magazines. Fashion goods should be sold in a single season since each season
has a dierent line of clothing. Moreover, they usually have a long lead time
since most of the fashion goods are imported from overseas. Similarly, high{tech
equipment should be sold in a relatively short amount of time due to the risk of
obsolescence. Again, they may have long lead times due to capacity restrictions
of major suppliers.
One major strand of the literature on inventory theory is the joint replen-
ishment problem. Joint replenishment is the problem of coordinating or consoli-
dating the replenishment of multiple items or multiple retailers that are ordered
from the same supplier to minimize total ordering and inventory costs using the
economies of scale. In case of multiple rms or retailers, coordination requires
some type of a centralized decision making by independent rms. However, rms
that are subjects of joint replenishment may be competitors in the same market
or in some cases they may not be in communication so a cooperative solution is
not always viable. In such cases, using a non{cooperative mechanism that coor-
dinates the rms with joint replenishment potential could help them to reduce
inventory and ordering costs without a centralized decision making process. For
example, recently, Istanbul Textile and Apparel Exporters Union founded a joint
ordering platform which aims to decrease the purchasing costs of its members
by 25% [43]. This portal for joint purchasing is not only limited to textile sup-
plies but also includes provisions related to energy, logistics and communication.
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Also, Koc group of companies in Turkey has a subdivision called Zer which aims
to coordinate the purchases of dierent subgroups under Koc conglomerate and
any outside member [54]. It provides services such as purchasing raw materials,
logistics and services even for the rms that are not part of Koc group. These
examples show that there exist many non-cooperative initiatives to benet from
the advantages of joint replenishment. There is very limited research in the lit-
erature about the joint replenishment problem that use non-cooperative models.
Thus, in this thesis we attempt to ll this gap with dierent approaches to this
problem.
It is fair to assume that in systems where joint decisions have to rely on infor-
mation reported by the participants, rms may act strategically and misreport
their characteristics to improve their payos. Non{cooperative game theory ap-
proach focuses on how to characterize the equilibrium behavior of self{interested
players in games where each player's information and strategic options as well
as the outcomes that result from each combination of decisions are explicitly
specied. The non{cooperative approach enables analyses of several broad sets
of research questions: First set concerns analysis of equilibrium outcomes. How
do equilibrium outcomes for a given game relate to players' characteristics and
how do they vary across environments with dierent player characteristics? How
do equilibrium outcomes of two games compare for a given environment? How
do outcomes induced by equilibrium behavior under various alternative game
rules perform with respect to a system{optimal solution? Second set deals with
questions such as how can one design rules of the non{cooperative interaction to
achieve \better" outcomes where the notion of \better" reects concerns related
to system{optimality? As observed by Cachon and Netessine [8], in decentralized
decision making settings obtaining eciency is regarded as the exception rather
than the rule. Following this philosophy, we consider various non{cooperative
joint replenishment games that dier based on their cost allocation schemes. A
cost allocation scheme distributes the total cost among the rms based on a
reported attribute which may be the independent order frequency, cycle time,
holding cost rate or demand rate. We use some allocation schemes that deter-
mine the joint cycle time only based on monetary contributions of the rms for the
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major setup cost. We also use direct mechanisms to allocate the total cost based
on the reports from the rms. However, these reports may not reect a rm's
true characteristics since misreporting an attribute may be benecial for the rm.
Thus, a direct mechanism should enforce truth{telling among the rms which can
be achieved by using incentive compatibility. Another important property of a
mechanism is individual rationality which guarantees a non-negative prot for the
rms that participate in the mechanism. Incentive compatibility is not necessary
if monetary contributions are used to allocate the total cost allocation however
individual rationality is always essential.
In Chapter 3, we study a non{cooperative game for joint replenishment of
multiple rms that operate under a deterministic demand setting. Each rm de-
cides whether to participate in joint replenishment or to replenish independently,
and each participating rm decides how much to contribute to joint ordering
costs. Joint replenishment cycle time is set by an intermediary as the lowest
cycle time that can be nanced with the private contributions of participating
rms. We consider two participation-contribution games: in the single{stage vari-
ant, participation and contribution decisions are made simultaneously, and, in the
two-stage variant, participating rms becomes known at the contribution stage.
We characterize the behavior and outcomes under undominated Nash equilibria
for the one-stage game and subgame-perfect equilibrium for the two-stage game.
Our results show that the joint replenishment is mostly nanced by the rm or
group of rms with the highest adjusted demand rate which is the multiplication
of inventory holding cost rate and demand rate and the other rms just pay the
minimum entree fee.
An important factor in non{cooperative games is the information structure.
Information asymmetry is an essential assumption since not all of the game pa-
rameters are known by all the parties. Firms usually do not have complete in-
formation about the demand and cost parameters of the other rms in the same
market. There are companies such as Nielsen, Kantar and Ipsos which provide
market data up to an extent but even this information is not exact. Similarly, ver-
tical partnerships and manufacturer{supplier relations may involve information
asymmetry since suppliers may not be willing to share their cost information in
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order not to loose their bargaining position and the demand of the manufacturer
may not be known by the supplier. A player may know what kind of player he is
i.e., his type, but he may have only some idea about his rivals' types where the
type of a player may include any parameter such as cost or demand. Thus, in
Chapter 4, we extend the private contributions game to an asymmetric informa-
tion counterpart. We assume each rm only knows the probabilistic distribution
of the other rms' adjusted demand rates. We assume a continuous type dis-
tribution and all the other parameters are common knowledge. Consequently,
each rm decides on his contribution level without knowing the exact type of his
rivals. Asymmetric information games are modeled as Bayesian games. We show
the existence of a pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium for the asymmetric in-
formation game. We provide conditions for a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Finally,
we conduct a numerical study to examine the impact of information asymmetry
on expected and interim values of total contributions, cycle times and total costs.
Even though Chapters 3 and 4 focus on non{cooperative joint replenishment solu-
tions and the total cost under these models are lower than the decentralized total
cost, they are unable to deliver an ecient solution i.e., the centralized solution.
In Chapter 5, we study a three{stage non{cooperative joint replenishment
game aiming for a solution with higher eciency. In this model, we assume that
the intermediary is also a decision maker. In the rst stage, each rm announces
his contribution for the ordering cost. In the second stage, based on the con-
tributions, the intermediary determines a common cycle time that he can serve
the rms. Finally, each rm decides whether to be a part of the coalition and
served under this cycle time or act independently with an EOQ cost. We ana-
lyze each stage and derive the conditions for an equilibrium. We show that the
subgame{perfect equilibrium cycle time is not unique. Although the minimum
and maximum cycle times that arise in equilibrium straddle the ecient cycle
time, in general, whether ecient cycle time can be reached in equilibrium de-
pends on the parameters of the joint replenishment environment. For symmetric
joint replenishment environments, we show that whether ecient cycle time is a
subgame{perfect equilibrium outcome depends only on the number of rms and
is independent of all other parameters of the environment. Furthermore, this
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dependence on the number of rms exhibits a highly non{monotone pattern.
In Chapter 6, we consider parametric mechanisms to allocate the setup costs
associated with the joint replenishment problem and measure their performance
for dierent parameters. First, we rst provide an impossibility result showing
that there is no direct mechanism that simultaneously achieves eciency, incen-
tive compatibility, individual rationality and budget-balance. We then consider a
two{parameter mechanism where initially the rms decide on their contribution
levels. The rst parameter determines the corresponding joint replenishment fre-
quency and the second parameter governs the order cost shares. We show that a
non-cooperative joint replenishment mechanism leads to lower order frequencies
than the ecient frequency unless the second parameter is zero. Following this,
we consider a mechanism where the two parameters are equal (a single parameter
mechanism). We derive the best response equations and equilibrium conditions
for a constructive equilibrium. We characterize the equilibrium contributions and
the corresponding comparative statics.
Finally, in Chapter 7 we take a dierent direction and consider a competitive
newsboy problem under stochastic demand with asymmetric cost information.
In our model, we assume two rms where the stochastic market demand for
the product is initially allocated to the two rms by some split function. The
split function may be linear such as rm 1 gets 60% of market share and rm
2 gets 40% or it can take any form depending on the market share structure.
In case that a rm cannot satisfy his share of the market, all excess demand is
re-allocated to the other rm if the other rm has any available inventory. Thus,
while considering the amount to order or produce, a rm should also consider
the potential excess demand coming from the rival rm. This implies that the
eective demand of a rm depends on the inventory decision of the rival rm.
Hence, we have a competition between the two rms over each others unsatised
excess demands.
Similarly, information asymmetry in this setting is also a fair assumption. A
rm knows his exact cost type but only knows the distribution of his rival's cost
type since a rm may not know his rival's cost but may have an idea on their cost
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level depending on his own cost, the technological capacity of his rival or some
general market indications. Companies such as ACNielsen tracks the purchasing
and sales information of many rms and sells them to their rivals. However these
results are not always comprehensive since companies like Walmart no longer
shares their purchasing and sales information with any other company leading to
an information asymmetry between competing retailers [22]. Thus, we investigate
the impact of information asymmetry on the competitive newsboy problem. For
this model we show the existence of pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium
under fairly general assumptions on demand distribution and split function. This
is followed by a characterization of the equilibrium and proof of its uniqueness
under a continuous and strictly increasing probability distribution function for
the demand and a deterministic, increasing split function. Comparative statics
are also derived. Lastly, we provide the full characterization of the equilibrium,
corresponding payos and comparative statics for the case of uniform demand.
In the following chapter, we summarize some important game theory concepts
we use throughout the thesis such as Nash equilibrium, Bayesian games and
mechanism design.
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Chapter 2
GAME THEORY REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
Game theory concepts are used in other disciplines for over fty years but its use
in operations management is relatively new. Game theory provides some powerful
tools to improve on the classical views of the inventory management area. This
chapter reviews some of the concepts we use throughout the thesis. However, we
do not attempt to provide a comrehensive review of the game theory concepts
here and only review the material relevant to the thesis. This chapter is heavily
based on Fudenberg and Tirole [16].
2.2 Denition of a game
A game has three important features: the set of rational players i 2 N where
N = 1; 2; ::; n, the set of pure strategies for each player si 2 Si where S =
S1      Sn is the strategy space and a payo function for each player ui(s)
where s = (s1; ::; sn).
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The players may choose their strategies simultaneously or sequentially de-
pending on the game form. When the players act simultaneously we have a
normal form game and when they act sequentially we have an extensive form
game. However, each normal form game can be expressed as an extensive form
game where decision points are played simultaneously. One of the major assump-
tions is the rationality of the player. A rational player would try to maximize his
payo regardless of other circumstances. Without the rationality assumption, it
is impossible to predict a player's move so game theoretic notions cannot nd an
answer. Another important assumption is the common knowledge assumption
which states that each player knows the set of players, their strategy sets and
the corresponding payos. In other words, as Fudenberg and Tirole [16] state
\Each player knows the structure of the normal form game and know that their
opponents know it, and know that their opponents know that they know, and so
on ad innitum."
2.2.1 Mixed Strategies
A mixed strategy  i is a probability distribution over strategy set Si of a player
i. We denote the mixed strategy space of player i by 	i and 	 = 	1     	n.
Player i's payo for a mixed strategy prole  is:
X
s2S
 Y
j2N
 j(sj)
!
ui(s):
Roughly speaking, we can think of a mixed strategy as a randomization of all
strategies of a player since being unpredictable may benet the player. Clearly,
mixed strategies also include pure strategies.
2.2.2 Dominated Strategies
In order to predict the outcome of a game, one of the useful tools is elimination
of dominated strategies. We can dene a dominated strategy as follows:
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Denition 2.1. A pure strategy si is strictly dominated if there exists a mixed
strategy  i 2 	i such that
ui( i; s i) > ui(si; s i) 8s i 2 S i
where  i denotes the set of players other than player i.
A rational player would never use a dominated strategy since using an undom-
inated strategy would guarantee a higher payo. Thus, iterated elimination of
the dominated strategies is a common tool that is used for dominated strategies
for renement. It proceeds by eliminating dominated strategies and considering
the new strategy space. This process continues until none of the strategy points
in the current set is dominated.
2.2.3 Best Response functions
Another important concept in game theory is the best response functions. Assume
that all the players play before player i and player i can observe their strategies.
Now, a best response can be thought as the best possible strategy of player i with
the knowledge of other player's strategies.
Denition 2.2. Player i's best response (function) to the strategies s i of the
other players is the strategy si that maximizes player i's payo ui(si; s i) i.e.,
si = argmaxsi ui(si; s i):
2.2.4 Nash Equilibrium
Using the best response functions we obtain our rst important equilibrium con-
cept which is the famous Nash Equilibrium.
Denition 2.3. A strategy prole (s1; s

2; :::; s

n) is a Nash equilibrium of the game
if si is a best response to s

 i for all i = 1; 2; :::; n i.e.,
ui(s

i ; s

 i)  ui(si; s i) 8i 2 N; 8si 2 Si:
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A Nash equilibrium is a point in strategy space where none of the players could
prot from unilaterally changing his strategy. It is a point where the strategies
of each player is a best response to the strategies of the other players. Nash [39]
shows that there exists at least one Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies for all
games. However, a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies does not always exist. In
this thesis, we use pure strategy equilibria and prove the corresponding existence
theorem when necessary.
In order to prove the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, we need
some further denitions. Vives [50] states that a binary relation  on a nonempty
space S is a partial order if it is transitive, reexive and anti-symmetric. A
supremum (inmum) of S is a least upper bound (greatest lower bound). A lattice
is a partially ordered set (S;) in which any two elements has a supremum and
an inmum and it is complete if every nonempty subset of S has a supremum and
an inmum in S. Any compact (closed and bounded) interval in real line with
the usual order or product of compact intervals with vector order is a complete
lattice.
A function u is supermodular if u(x1; x2)+u(y1; y2)  u(x1; y2)+u(y1; x2) for
all (x1; x2)  (y1; y2). A twice continuously dierentiable function ui(s1; ::; sn) is
supermodular i @2ui=@si@sj  0 for all si; sj where i 6= j [8]. The corresponding
game is supermodular if the payos of all the players are supermodular. In a
supermodular game, a player's best response is increasing in the strategies of
other players.
Topkis [48] states that a game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if the
strategy prole S is a complete lattice, the joint payo function u is upper{
semicontinuos and the payo function of each player is supermodular.
There can be many equilibria in a game. A good renement for the Nash
equilibrium in case of multiple equilibrium is a dominant{strategy equilibrium. A
dominant{strategy equilibrium is an equilibrium point that survives the iterated
elimination of dominated strategies which was explained previously.
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2.2.5 Extensive Form Games
A game may contain more than one stage. In this case each stage is played
sequentially in an extensive form game. An extensive form can be thought as
a decision tree where at each stage or decision node the corresponding players
decide on their new strategies and these strategies are observable by all players.
The outcome or payo is determined after the nal stage. A strategy in an
extensive form consists of the actions at all the decision points.
Assume that we have T stages in a game. At any stage t, the players know
the history ht of the actions by all the players. Thus, we can assume from the
stage t on there is game on its right which can be denoted by  (ht). These games
are called the subgames. Thus, the strategy prole in the subgame (sjht) is just
a restriction of the original prole s using the history of the game until t.
A good example of the games in extensive form is the Stackelberg game where
there are two stages and players act sequentially. There is a leader which plays
in the rst stage and there is a follower which plays in the second stage after
observing the action of the leader. Thus, the leader chooses the best possible
strategy considering the best response of the follower. Most of the vertical supply
chain games between suppliers and manufacturer or manufacturers and retailers
are formed of Stackelberg games and the leader is usually the party with more
competitive power or the party that prepares the purchasing contract.
The equilibrium concept used in extensive form games is the subgame perfect
equilibrium. As the name implies, a strategy prole is in subgame perfect equi-
librium if at any stage the corresponding subgame played with the same prole
is a Nash equilibrium.
Denition 2.4. A strategy prole s of a multi-stage game with observed actions
is a sub-game perfect equilibrium if at every decision node t the restricted prole
(sjht) is a Nash equilibrium of the restricted game  (ht).
We use the subgame perfect equilibrium concept in Chapter 3.
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2.3 Bayesian Games
Most of the games studied in the supply chain management literature assume that
all the rms involved in the game have common knowledge about the payo func-
tions of all the rms. This type of games are called the full information games.
The games where all the information is not common knowledge are called in-
complete (asymmetric) information games. These games are also called Bayesian
games.
Usually, in incomplete information games, the players do not know the payo
functions of other players. Nevertheless, each player has some kind of indication
for his payo function which we call the type of the player. Players' types  =
(1; ::; n) are drawn from a probability distribution f(1; ::; n) over the type space
 = 1      n. The major assumption of the Bayesian games is that the
type distributions of the players are common knowledge, i.e., each player knows
his own type but only knows the distribution of the type of his opponents. Thus,
i is only observed by player i and we denote f( iji) as the conditional type
distribution of other players for given i. This assumption is viable since each rm
in a market may estimate the parameters of rival rms based on their own cost,
the cost of technology required for production and potential market research.
In case of Bayesian games, a pure strategy of player i is a function si : i ! Si
from the type space to the strategy space of player i.
For each realization of types  the ex-post payo function of player i is
ui((si(i); s i( i)); ). Thus, the interim payo function of player i is:
Ui(si; i; s i) =
Z
 i
ui((si(i); s i( i)); )f( iji)d i:
The payo function of player i can be thought as some kind of expectation over
the types of other players given the conditional probability distribution of the
rivals' types.
Similarly, we can dene the ex{ante payo of player i, Ui, for a given strat-
egy prole (si; s i) as the expected payo of player i over all type realizations
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including his own:
Ui(si; s i) =
Z

ui((si(i); s i( i)); )f()d:
2.3.1 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
Denition 2.5. A strategy prole s() is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium if for all
i 2 N
Ui(si ; s i)  Ui(si; s i) 8si 2 Sii ;
where Sii is the set of maps from i to Si. Since each type has positive probability,
this is equivalent to
Ui(s

i ; i; s

 i)  Ui(si; i; s i) 8si 2 Si; 8i 2 i
The proof for the existence of pure strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibrium is
more tedious than its full information counterpart and is given in the Chapters
4 and 7. We insist on pure strategy equilibriums since it is not straightforward
to implement a mixed strategy equilibrium in real life situations.
2.4 Mechanism Design
The objective of mechanism design is to implement a given allocation of resources
or costs when the relevant information is not common knowledge in the economy.
A mechanism is basically a specication of how economic decisions are determined
as a function of the information that is known by the players.
In a mechanism design problem, we usually have a resource to allocate. As in
the Bayesian games, each player has a type which is drawn from a probabilistic
distribution. Depending on his type, a player sends a message to the mechanism
and based on these messages the mechanism allocates the resource. Thus, the
mechanism is a function which maps the messages to an allocation scheme.
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Mechanism design problem usually consists of three steps. In step 1, the
mechanism is designed. In step 2, the players accept or reject the mechanism.
A player who rejects the mechanism gets some exogenously specied reservation
utility. In step 3, the players play the game specied by the mechanism.
A direct mechanism is a mechanism where each players sends his true type
as his message. A truth{telling strategy is to report true information about
preferences for all preference possibilities. A direct mechanism should satisfy
incentive compatibility and individual rationality.
Denition 2.6. A mechanism is incentive compatible if for any player i 2 N
truth-telling is the dominant-strategy.
Thus, incentive compatibility is essential for players to reveal their true types.
Denition 2.7. A mechanism is individually rational if for any player i 2 N the
mechanism's resource allocation provides a payo level that is at least as much
as his reservation utility.
Thus, individual rationality is required for a player to participate in the mech-
anism. Finally, we give an important result about the mechanism design problem
which states that any resource allocation is possible using only direct mechanisms.
Theorem 2.1. Revelation Principle (Dasgupta et al. [12]): Any equilibrium
outcome of an arbitrary mechanism can be replicated by an incentive-compatible
direct mechanism.
Revelation Principle guarantees that one can only focus on direct mechanism
and not be distracted by any other mechanism.
2.5 Game Theory Applications
There is a signicant amount of existing research using game theory models in in-
ventory and supply chain management. Leng and Parlar [28] provide an excellent
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review of more than 130 papers that use game theoretic models and summarize
them in ve categories including inventory games with xed unit purchase cost,
inventory games with quantity discounts, production and pricing competition,
games with other attributes and games with joint decisions on inventory, produc-
tion/pricing and other attributes. Dror and Hartman [13] provide another survey
which mainly concentrates on the cooperative inventory games and explain some
of the important concepts such as Shapley value and core allocations.
There are many papers that explain how game theory is used to study in-
ventory, supply chain and operations management problems. Both Cachon and
Netessine [8] and Chinchulum et al. [10] summarize the tools of game theory that
can be used for competitive and cooperative models. These papers mainly focus
on the existence and uniqueness of pure strategy Nash equilibrium and cooper-
ative games. In addition to a game theory review, Erhun and Keskinocak [14]
explain game theory can be used in traditional supply chain contracting models
such as revenue sharing, buyback and quantity discount contracts and two{part
taris. Li et al. [29] give a more economic perspective and provides extentions of
the well-known operations management and information systems problems using
game theory.
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Chapter 3
A PRIVATE CONTRIBUTIONS
GAME FOR JOINT
REPLENISHMENT
3.1 Introduction
One of the most fundamental trade{os in operations is between inventory holding
costs and ordering costs as they both change as a function of lot sizes used
in production, transportation or procurement. Larger lot sizes lead to higher
inventory costs, while smaller lot sizes result in higher ordering costs. Beginning
with Harris's [20] study of classical economic order quantity (EOQ), a vast body
of literature examined these trade{os. A second major strand in this literature
focused on the joint replenishment problem { exploring opportunities to exploit
the economies of scale by consolidating or coordinating replenishment of dierent
items or locations to minimize total ordering and inventory costs. For recent
surveys of these two strands of literature the reader is referred to the reviews by
Jans and Degraeve [23] on lot sizing, and by Aksoy and Erenguc [1] and Khouja
and Goyal [26] on the joint replenishment problem.
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When joint replenishment involves a group of items or locations that are
not controlled centrally, issues arise regarding sharing of joint costs among the
parties. In a series of recent papers, Meca et al. [35], Hartman and Dror [21],
Anily and Haviv [2] and Zhang [56] analyze cooperative game theory formulations
to investigate whether a fair allocation of total costs is possible and if so, how.
Meca et al. [35] show that it is possible to obtain the minimum total joint cost
when the rms share their order frequencies. They propose a cost allocation
mechanism which distributes the total replenishment cost in proportion to the
square of individual order frequencies and show that this allocation is in the core
of the game, i.e., no coalition can decrease its costs by defecting from the grand
coalition. Minner [38] studies a similar problem using a bargaining model which
has only two rms, excludes inventory holding costs and uses net present value
rather than average costs.
In this chapter, we study joint replenishment in the context of non{cooperative
games. It is well{known that, in systems where joint decisions have to rely on
information reported by the participants, rms may act strategically and misre-
port their characteristics. In the last two decades, game theory has been applied
in the analysis of a variety of supply{chain related problems (see Cachon and
Netessine [8]; Leng and Parlar [28]; Chinchulum et al. [10] for recent compre-
hensive surveys). Central question of non{cooperative game theory approach is
characterization of equilibrium behavior of self{interested players in games where
each player's information and strategic options as well as the outcomes that result
from each combination of decisions are explicitly specied.
Game theoretic formulations of the joint replenishment problem seem to have
adopted almost exclusively the paradigm of cooperative games with transferable
utility. Fiestras-Janeior et al. [15] and Dror and Hartman [13] provide excellent
surveys of cooperative game theory applications in centralized inventory manage-
ment. Despite dozens of papers reviewed in Fiestras-Janeior et al. [15] and Dror
and Hartman [13] using cooperative game formulations, non-cooperative analysis
of joint inventory problems is still in its infancy with many interesting problems
that remain to be explored using the machinery of non-cooperative game theory.
In fact, Bauso et al. [5] and Meca et al. [34] are the only two exceptions that
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look at the joint replenishment problem from a non{cooperative point of view.
Bauso et al. [5] study a nite horizon, periodic setting in which multiple
rms need to determine their order quantities in each period to satisfy their
deterministic, time varying customer demands. The xed order cost is shared
among multiple rms that order in the same period. Bauso et al. [5] show that
this game admits a set of pure strategy Nash equilibria, one of which is Pareto
optimal. The authors present a consensus protocol that leads the rms converge
to one of Nash equilibria, but not necessarily a Pareto optimal one.
Meca et al. [34] (MGB in the sequel) is more closely related to our work. MGB
studies a non{cooperative reporting game where stand{alone order frequencies of
the rms are observable but not veriable. Each rm reports an order frequency
(that may be dierent from its true order frequency) and the joint order frequency
is determined to minimize the total joint costs based on all reports. Each rm
incurs holding cost individually and pays a share of the joint replenishment cost
in proportion to the squares of reported order frequencies. MGB shows that,
while this rule leads to core allocations under cooperative formulations, it en-
tails signicant misreporting and inecient joint decisions in a non{cooperative
framework.
In this chapter, we consider n rms with arbitrary inventory holding cost and
demand rates. The rms' characteristics are common knowledge, but they are
not veriable. Each rm decides whether to participate in joint replenishment
or to replenish independently, and each participating rm reports the level of his
private contribution to the joint ordering costs. An intermediary determines the
joint cycle time. The intermediary selects the lowest joint cycle time that can be
nanced with the participating rms' contributions.
We consider two variants of our basic game with respect to the timeline of par-
ticipation and contribution decisions. In the single{stage game, each rm makes
participation and contribution decisions simultaneously. In this game we seek
to characterize the Nash equilibria in undominated strategies. In the two-stage
game, the set of rms participating rms becomes known before each participat-
ing rm decides how much to contribute. The equilibrium notion we use for the
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two{stage game is subgame{perfect Nash equilibrium (SPE).
The games we study diers from the one in MGB in several important ways
with respect to messages the rms can use and with respect to the outcome func-
tions that specify how joint decisions and individual cost shares are determined
based on rms' messages. MGB considers a game where rms' messages are their
stand{alone order frequencies. We study games where each rm decides whether
to replenish independently or to participate in joint replenishment and then, if
he participates, reports the level of his private contribution to the joint ordering
cost. With respect to the outcomes functions, while the joint frequency decision
in MGB is the ecient joint decision assuming truthful reporting by the rms, in
our game joint replenishment frequency is determined to cover the replenishment
cost based on the private contributions of participating rms. A participating
rm's replenishment cost depends on all the reports through a proportional shar-
ing rule in MGB, whereas, in our setting, it is determined by his report directly.
For the one{stage game, we nd that equilibrium behavior and outcomes are
determined by a simple property of joint replenishment environment: If there
is a single rm with the lowest stand{alone cycle time, then there is a unique
undominated Nash equilibrium. For the two{stage game with a positive but
small minimum required contribution, participation by all rms is a dominant{
strategy equilibrium in the participation stage. Subgame{perfect equilibrium
path is unique if and only if the lowest stand{alone cycle time among the rms
is strictly less than the second{lowest stand{alone cycle time. For both games,
if there are multiple rms with the lowest stand{alone cycle time, there are mul-
tiple equilibria. However, the only indeterminacy caused by multiple equilibria
concerns how a given aggregate cost share (which is unique) is divided among
participating rms with the lowest stand{alone cycle time. Aggregate contribu-
tions, joint cycle time, aggregate cost rates, as well as cost rates for rms whose
stand{alone cycle times are higher than the lowest stand{alone cycle time are
all unique. Some of the proofs are given in the chapter as they are necessary to
follow the analysis and the rest of the proofs are contained in the Appendix A.
21
3.2 The Model and Preliminaries
We consider a stylized EOQ environment with a set of rms N = f1; :::; ng.
Demand rate for rm j is constant and deterministic at j per unit of time. Time
rate of inventory holding cost for rm j is j per unit. Major ordering cost is xed
at  per order regardless of order size. We assume minor ordering costs (ordering
costs associated with rms included in an order) are zero. 1 Although each rm
is characterized by two parameters (j; j), an alternative representation (j; j),
obtained by a re{parametrization where j = jj, will be convenient in all the
settings that we consider below. For lack of a more natural term, we refer to the
parameter  as the adjusted demand rate. We assume a strictly positive lower
bound,  > 0,for the adjusted demand rates, so that j   for all j 2 N to
rule out trivial replenishment environments where either the demand rate or the
holding cost rate is zero.
For j 2 N , the ratio
j = j=
X
k2N
k; (3.1)
will prove useful to simplify some comparisons in the sequel.
In a stylized replenishment problem the objective is to minimize the total cost
rate, denoted C, i.e., the sum of replenishment cost rate (R) and holding cost
rate (H): C = R + H. The decision variable can be taken as order cycle time,
t, or order frequency, f = 1=t (number of orders per time unit). We take cycle
time as the decision variable in the sequel.
We use upper{case letters, N;M;L etc., to refer to sets of rms, and use the
lower{case version of the same letter for the cardinality of a set. The letters i; j; k
are used for rm indices. We label the rms so that 1  2  : : :  n. This
ordering of rm indices is retained for subsets of N . For M  N , denote the
1Following a stylized EOQ environment, such as one given in Zipkin (2000, x3.2), it is
assumed that the outside supplier that replenishes the orders has no capacity restrictions,
delivers the complete order at once after a deterministic lead time and has perfect yield. It
is also assumed that the outside supplier is not a strategic player. The rms aim to minimize
their long{run average costs over time and backorders are not allowed.
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set of rms in M with the highest values of the parameter  by L(M) = fj 2
M jj  i for all i 2Mg.
We denote vectors by lower{case letters in bold typeface. For a generic
m tuple x = (x1; : : : ; xm) and j 2 f1; : : : ;mg, the notation (y;x j) stands
for the vector x with its jth entry xj replaced by y, and the (m   1)-tuple x j
stands for the vector x with its jth entry xj removed.
For an endogenous variable X, by XaM we refer to the value of X when the set
of rms is M and replenishment operations are governed by a 2 fc; d; gg, where c
stands for centralized, d stands for decentralized (or independent) replenishment,
and g stands for joint replenishment under rules of the non{cooperative game g.
For instance, T cM is the joint cycle time of the rms in M when replenishment is
centralized. When the set M is a singleton, e.g., M = fjg, we use Xaj instead of
Xafjg. When we need to refer to the value of an endogenous variable X
a
M faced by
rm j 2M we use XaMj. Thus, for instance, RcMj is the replenishment cost faced
by rm j 2M when the rms in M replenish jointly.
The vector e = (N; ;;) summarizes the essential data of the inventory
environment.
3.2.1 Independent (decentralized) replenishment
When the replenishment of the items is controlled by rms operating indepen-
dently, rm j's total cost rate (Cj) is the sum of replenishment cost rate (Rj)
and the holding cost rate (Hj):
Cj(t) = Rj(t) +Hj(t) =

t
+
t
2
j: (3.2)
It is well known that rm j's optimal cycle time is T dj =
p
2=j. Hence, optimal
frequency and optimal order quantity are F dj =
p
j=2 and Q
d
j = j
p
2=j,
respectively. This leads to a replenishment cost rate of Rdj =
p
j=2. Firm
j's holding cost rate is also Hdj =
p
j=2. Thus rm j's total cost per unit
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of time is Cdj =
p
2j. The aggregate total cost rates for n rms under inde-
pendent replenishment are CdN =
P
k2N
p
2k, and R
d
N = H
d
N =
P
k2N
p
k=2.
3.2.2 Centralized joint replenishment
Ecient joint replenishment requires the replenishment decisions to be taken
centrally to minimize the aggregate total cost. It is well known that when there
are no minor setup costs, all rms will be replenished in each cycle leading to a
common cycle time (see, for example, Meca et al. [35]). The aggregate cost for
n rms as function of the common cycle time t can be written as
CN(t) = RN(t) +HN(t) =

t
+
t
2
X
k2N
k : (3.3)
The optimal cycle time and the corresponding optimal frequency are T cN =p
2 =
P
k2N k and F
c
N =
pP
k2N k=2, respectively. Then, the optimal cost
rates are CcN =
p
2
P
k2N k, and R
c
N = H
c
N = C
c
N=2: At each cycle, rm j
orders QcNj = j T
c
N .
3.2.3 MGB: a direct mechanism for joint replenishment
MGB considers a a direct mechanism where the message set of each player co-
incides with the set of all possible characteristics a player may have and the
outcome function assigns the core allocation for the environment reported by the
players. Specically, the rms' stand{alone order frequencies are used as the mes-
sage space { each rm reports an order frequency that may be dierent from its
true order frequency. Each rm j either reports a positive frequency fj and joins
the coalition for joint replenishment or reports fj = 0 and orders independently.
Each rm incurs holding cost individually and the joint replenishment cost is
allocated by a proportional sharing rule whereby rms share the joint ordering
cost in proportion to the squares of reported order frequencies. For any prole
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of reported frequencies (f1; : : : ; fn), if the number of rms reporting strictly pos-
itive frequencies is one or less, all rms replenish independently. With two or
more rms reporting positive frequencies, the joint frequency is determined as
the ecient frequency for the reported stand{alone frequencies.
However, as MGB nd, equilibrium behavior in this game entails signicant
misreporting. The authors show that the game has multiple equilibria. The strat-
egy prole (f1; : : : ; fn) = (0; : : : ; 0) is always an equilibrium resulting in all rms
replenishing independently. An equilibrium (dubbed \constructive equilibrium"
by the authors) in which all rms participate in joint replenishment exists if, and
only if, the rms are suciently homogeneous, i.e., if and only if
n <
2
2n  1 : (3.4)
With straightforward translation of MGB's notation to our setting, when a con-
structive equilibrium exists, it yields the following cycle time and aggregate total
cost:
TMGBN =
s
2(2n  1)P
k2N k
=
p
2n  1T cN ; (3.5)
and
CMGBN =
s
2n2
P
k2N k
(2n  1) =
np
2n  1C
c
N : (3.6)
Although the rules of the MGB game would give rise to core allocations with
desirable eciency and fairness properties under truthful reporting, under non{
cooperative behavior, we get substantial eciency loss. In the remainder of this
chapter, we investigate the equilibrium outcomes and whether more ecient out-
comes can be achieved under an alternative set of rules governing the interaction
of the potential participants in joint replenishment.
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3.3 One{Stage private contributions game for
joint replenishment
The participation{contribution game we consider have the following elements:
each rm makes two decisions: (1) whether to replenish independently or to par-
ticipate in joint replenishment, and (2) how much to contribute to joint ordering
cost in case of participation. We assume a small but strictly positive lower bound
 on the contributions for participation in joint replenishment.2 Specically, we
assume
0 <  <  =
p
=2=n: (3.7)
Formally, the strategy set of players is represented by non{negative real numbers,
M = R+. A message rj from player j codes the participation and contribution
decisions of rm j as follows: If r < , rms j stays out and replenishes inde-
pendently, if rj  , it represents time rate of private contribution to the joint
ordering cost.
We denote the vector of messages of the n rms r = (r1; : : : ; rn). The set of
rms who selected to participate in joint replenishment are denoted by M(r) =
fi 2 N j ri  g. For M  N , the tuple rM collects the components of the
vector r that correspond to the coordinates in M .
Players move simultaneously and each decides his message. For any message
prole r, the intermediary selects the lowest cycle time that can be nanced with
the aggregate collection from the participating rms
P
k2M(r) rk, i.e.,
(r) =
P
k2M(r) rk
: (3.8)
2The assumed bound on  is tighter than needed for the characterization results we present
to hold. However, assuming weaker bounds amounts to assuming that the intermediary has
more detailed information on the rm-specic details of the replenishment environment, specif-
ically, about the parameter vector . The bound  involves minimal information about the
environment, namely, n;  and . Furthermore, under weaker bounds, equilibrium characteri-
zation involves complications with many cases and subcases to be considered. If the minimum
contribution  were to be completely independent of the parameter vector , one could always
nd replenishment environments where, in the unique equilibrium, no rm participates in joint
replenishment.
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Implicit in the intermediary's decision rule is an assumption regarding the
structure of information held by the rms and the intermediary. The intermediary
cannot make use of rm{specic information beyond the contribution decisions
reported by individual rms. To be able to decide the joint cycle time, she also
needs to know the xed ordering cost , in addition to the private contributions
from the participating rms (and, hence, the set of participating rms).
For given n tuple of messages r, the outcome is determined as follows: If
rj < , rm j replenishes independently, and his cost is C
d
j . All rms in M(r)
replenish together with joint cycle time (r) selected by the intermediary, and
rm j 2M(r) pays rj per unit of time as his contribution to joint replenishment
cost. 3 A participating rm's replenishment cost rate (Rj) is determined directly
by his private contribution, Rj = rj, while his holding cost rate (Hj) depends on
the joint cycle time, Hj = j(r)=2.
The rules of the private contributions mechanism are common knowledge.
The parameters of the replenishment environment, i.e., the elements of the list
(;;), are also common knowledge among the rms (but not veriable).
We can now state the total cost per unit of time for rm j, denoted j, as a
function of the rms' messages:
j(r) =
8<:
p
2j if rj < ;
rj +
1
2
j (r) if rj  :
(3.9)
Taking other rms' strategies r j as given, rm j's decision problem is
min
rj
j(r);
and his best response function, denoted j is
j(r j) = argmin
rj
j(rj; r j):
3Operationally, the payments for replenishment can be made at the time of the ordering
with rm j 2M(z) paying rjM(z)(r) independent of his order size. Or, rm j can pay a ow
of rj per unit of time without any additional payment at replenishment points.
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A Nash equilibrium is a prole r = (r1; : : : ; r

n) such that r

j = j(r

 j) for all j 2
N . A strategy y is said to strictly dominate strategy x for player j if j(y; r j) <
j(x; r j) for all (n   1) tuple r j of other players' strategies. A strategy y is
said to weakly dominate strategy x for player j if j(y; r j)  j(x; r j) for all
(n 1) tuple r j of other players' strategies, with strict inequality for at least one
r j. A strategy x is said to be an undominated strategy for player j if there is no
other strategy that weakly dominates it. A prole of strategies r = (r1; : : : ; r

m)
is a Nash equilibrium in undominated strategies or undominated Nash equilibrium
(UNE) if rj is an undominated strategy for player j.
Substituting the rule that determines the joint cycle time, rm j's total cost
per unit becomes:
j(r) = j(rj; r j) =
8<:
p
2j if rj < ;
rj +
j
2(rj+
P
k2M(r)nfjg rk)
if rj  :
(3.10)
Before we proceed, we collect several observations each with simple proofs.
Claim 3.1. For all replenishment environments, any strategy prole r with
M(r) = ;, that is, rj <  for all j 2 N , is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Given that other rms are not participating, no strategy r   yields a
better cost to a player than the cost he gets from independent replenishment.
Claim 3.2. If r is a Nash equilibrium, then M(r) 2 f;; Ng. That is, unless r
yields full participation or no participation, it cannot be a Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Suppose M(r) is a non{empty strict subset of N , and consider a rm
j 2 N nM(r). Since j =2 M(r) player's cost is Cdj . Let w =
P
k2M(r) rk. Since
M(r) 6= ;, it must be that w > 0: If player j deviates from rj to Rdj he gets
j(R
d
j ; r j) = R
d
j +
j
2(Rdj + w)
< Rdj +
j
2(Rdj )
= 2Rdj = C
d
j = j(rj; r j): (3.11)
where the inequality follows from the fact that w > 0, and subsequent equalities
follow from the facts Rdj =
p
j=2 and C
d
j = 2R
d
j .
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Claim 3.3. Any strategy r^j <  is weakly dominated by the strategy ~rj = R
d
j .
Proof: This follows from observing that the cost strategy r^j yields is exactly
Cdj =
p
2j while the strategy ~rj yields a cost that is equal to C
d
j when other
players all stay out of joint replenishment, and a cost that is strictly better in all
other cases. 
Claim 3.4. Any strategy r^j > R
d
j is strictly dominated by the strategy ~rj = R
d
j .
Proof: Let w =
P
k2M(r)nfjg rk. Since j(r; r j) = j(r; w) = r +
j
2(r+w)
is
strictly convex in r, and since the cross{partial
@2j
@r@w
= 
(r+w)3
> 0, it follows
from the Implicit Function Theorem that r(w) = argminr j(r; w) is unique and
strictly decreasing in w. Thus, for w > 0, we get
r(w) < r(0) = Rdj < r^j;
which implies, because j(r; w) is strictly convex in r, that
j(r(w); w) < j(R
d
j ; w) < j(r^j; w):
Hence Rdj strictly dominates r^j. 
From Claims 3.3 and 3.4 it follows that the set of undominated strategies is the
interval [; Rdj ]. From Claims 3.1 and 3.3 it follows that if a Nash equilibrium in
undominated strategies exists, it involves full participation in joint replenishment.
We record these observations in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1. If r is a Nash equilibrium in undominated strategies, then
1. M(r) = N and
2. rj 2 [; Rdj ].
It remains to characterize the ner details of structure of best response func-
tions and the equilibrium contribution levels. The foregoing observations greatly
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simplify our task in that they allow us to focus on the second{piece of the cost
function and take M(r) = N in the remainder of our investigation. That is,
j(r j) = argmin
rj
rj +
j
2(rj +
P
k2Nnfjg rk)
:
In order to nd the best response of rm j, we take the derivative of j(rj; r j)
with respect to rj and re{arrange terms:
@j
@rj
= 1  j
2(rj +
P
k2Nnfjg rk)
2
: (3.12)
Solving @j=@rj = 0, and incorporating the minimum contribution requirement,
we get:
j(r j) = max
8<:;
r
j
2
 
X
k2Nnfjg
rk
9=; : (3.13)
Rewriting (3.13), we obtain:
j(r j) =
(
Rdj  
P
k2Nnfjg rk; if
P
k2Nnfjg rk  Rdj   ;
; if
P
k2Nnfjg rk > R
d
j   :
(3.14)
which states that rm j's best response is to contribute such that the aggregate
contributions are equal to rm j's stand{alone ordering cost, if the aggregate
contributions of other rms are less than rm j's stand{alone ordering cost minus
the minimum required amount, and contribute the minimum required amount,
otherwise. If rms in N n fjg each contributed , rm j's best response would
be to contribute Rdj   (n  1) leading to an aggregate contribution of Rdj from n
rms and a cycle time N = T
d
j . Note that R
d
j   (n  1) =
p
j=2  (n  1)
is strictly larger than  since  <
p
=2=n p=2=n and   j. For every
dollar of contribution from rms in N nfjg, rm j reduces his contribution dollar
for dollar until he reaches the minimum required contribution.
The rst pieces of the piecewise{linear best response functions in (3.14)
have the same slope (i.e.,  1) and their intercepts (Rdj for rm j) are ordered.
Equilibrium lies in the intersection of best response functions (i.e., solution of
rj = j(
P
k2Nnfjg rk) for all j).
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In equilibrium, aggregate contributions must be Rdn = maxj2N R
d
j . Otherwise,
if aggregate contributions were such that Rdn 
P
j2N rj = R
d
n 
P
j2Nnfmg rj rn =
 > 0, rm n would increase his contribution from rn to rn+, and using (3.17),
this would lead his total cost to decrease from 2Rdn+
2=(Rdn  ) 
P
j2Nnfng rj
to 2Rdn  
P
j2Nnfng rj.
In the next proposition we provide a complete characterization of the Nash
equilibria in undominated strategies.
Proposition 3.2. In the private contributions joint replenishment game with
 <
p
=2=n:
1. A prole of strategies r = (r1; : : : ; r

n `; r

n `+1; : : : r

n) is a Nash equilibrium
in undominated strategies (UNE) if and only if
(a) rj =  for all j 2 N n L(N), and
(b) (rn `+1; : : : r

n) 2n
x 2 R`jxi  ; for i = 1; : : : ; `; and
P
i2L(N) xi =
p
n=2  (n  `)
o
.
2. The equilibrium is unique if and only if L(N) is a singleton, i.e., if and
only if n 1 < n. In the unique equilibrium, rj =  for j = 1; : : : ; n   1
and rn = R
d
n   (n  1).
3. In all equilibria, aggregate contributions and the joint cycle time are unique:
(a) Aggregate contributions:
P
k2N r

k =
p
n=2 = R
d
n
(b) Cycle time: T gN = N(r
) =
p
2=n = T
d
n :
4. Equilibrium aggregate cost rates are also unique:
(a) Aggregate replenishment cost: RgN =
P
k2N r

k =
p
n=2 = R
d
n
(b) Aggregate holding cost: HgN = (
P
k2N k)
p
=2n
(c) Aggregate total cost: CgN =
p
=2n
 
n +
P
k2N k

.
5. In equilibrium rm j faces the following cost rates
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(a) Replenishment cost: RgNj =  if j 2 N n L(N), and RgNj 2 [; Rdn  
(n  1)] if j 2 L(N).
(b) Holding cost: HgNj = j
p
=2n
(c) Total cost: CgNj = +j
p

2n
if j 2 N nL(N), and CgNj 2 [
p
n=2+
;
p
n=2 +R
d
n   (n  1)] if j 2 L(N).
Equilibrium cycle time depends on the 2n-vector (1; :::; n; 1; :::; n) of the
rms' characteristics only through n { it is invariant to the number of rms
and to the ner details of the rms' characteristics as long as n remains xed.
Similarly, equilibrium total cost depends only on two statistics, namely n andP
k2N k, of the rms' characteristics.
In the absence of a minimum contribution requirement (i.e., if  = 0), the
order cost is paid by the rms in L(N). If the set L(N) is a singleton, i.e.,
L(N) = fng, in the unique Nash equilibrium, rm n (the rm with the highest
stand{alone replenishment rate in N) pays  per order and incurs a total cost
equal to his stand{alone cost. Other rms ride free and enjoy free deliveries.
A free{rider's equilibrium payo is better than his stand{alone payo since he
does not contribute to the ordering cost and the joint cycle time is strictly better
than his stand{alone cycle time. When there are multiple rms with the highest
stand{alone replenishment rate, we have multiple equilibria. In some of these
equilibria, free{riding can be at its extreme { one of the rms in L(N) nances
the entire replenishment cost and others ride free which may also mean that the
small rms leave the bigger share of the ordering cost to the larger rms. In any
equilibrium that involves more than one contributor, all rms are strictly better
o compared to independent replenishment.
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3.4 Two-stage private contributions game for
joint replenishment
Next, we investigate a two{stage model where we separate the participation and
contribution decisions to two stages with the following time line. In stage 1, rms
move simultaneously and each rm decides whether to replenish jointly through
an intermediary or independently. Formally, each rm chooses an action z 2
f\in", \out"g where \in" stands for participation in joint replenishment through
the intermediary and \out" stands for replenishing independently. We denote the
vector of rst{stage actions of the n rms by z = (z1; : : : ; zn), the set of rms who
selected to participate in joint replenishment by M(z) = fi 2 N j zi = \in"g.
If a rm plays \out" in stage 1, he replenishes independently. In stage 2, the
set of participating rms, M = M(z), becomes common knowledge and rms
in M simultaneously submit their time rate of private contributions to the joint
ordering cost. Firm j's time rate of private contribution is denoted by rj. Again,
we restrict rj to be at least  with the same properties as in the previous section.
For any prole r of private contributions submitted by the rms in M , all rms
in M replenish together with joint cycle time M(r) selected by the intermediary.
Given the contributions r = (r1; : : : ; rm) submitted by rms in M , the in-
termediary selects the lowest cycle time that can be nanced with the aggregate
collection
P
k2M rk, i.e.,
M(r) =
P
k2M rk
: (3.15)
Let g() denote the two{stage private contributions joint replenishment game
with minimum contribution  and let g(;M) denote the second stage of the
game with participating rms M . Let NE
 
g(;M)

be the set of Nash equi-
libria in game g(;M). A subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) (Selten [45]) for
the two{stage game is a prole of strategies (z; r(M(z)) that induces a Nash
equilibrium in every subgame { including the subgames that are not reached due
to rst{stage actions.
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3.4.1 Stage 2: Equilibrium contributions in subgame
g(;M)
A participating rm's replenishment cost rate is determined directly by his private
contribution, Rj = rj, while his holding cost rate depends on the joint cycle time,
Hj = jM(r)=2. Hence, total cost per unit of time for rm j, denoted j, as a
function of the private contributions is
j(r) = rj +
1
2
j M(r): (3.16)
Let g(;M) represent the private contributions joint replenishment game with
minimum contribution  among participating rms M .
In this section we will use the index set f1; : : : ;mg instead of fi1; : : : ; img for
the set of participating rms M  N . A participating rm's replenishment cost
rate is determined directly by his private contribution, Rj = rj, while his holding
cost rate depends on the joint cycle time, Hj = jM(r)=2. Hence, total cost per
unit of time for rm j, denoted j, as a function of the private contributions is
j(r) = rj +
1
2
j M(r): (3.17)
Taking other rms' contributions r j as given, rm j's optimization problem is
minrj j(r), and his best response function is j(r j) = argminrj j(rj; r j).
A Nash equilibrium is a prole r = (r1; : : : ; r

m) such that r

j = j(r

 j) for all
j 2 M . Noting that M(r) and rm j's cost depends on r j only throughP
k2Mnfjg rk, aggregate contributions to joint replenishment from the other rms,
we re{write rm j's objective function as:
j(rj;
X
k2Mnfjg
rk) = rj +
j
2(rj +
P
k2Mnfjg rk)
: (3.18)
The best response function of this stage is the same as the one{stage game
for N = M . In the next proposition we provide a complete characterization of
the Nash equilibria of the game g(;M).
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Proposition 3.3. In the private contributions joint replenishment game g(;M)
with M = f1; : : : ;mg and  < p=2=n, the Nash equilibrium NE g(;M) is
the Nash equilibrium of the one{stage game with M = N .
Proof: By denition M 6= ;. Thus, for any M we can treat this as a one{
stage game where N =M . Thus, the results of the one{stage game when all the
rms participate in the joint replenishment holds here. 
3.4.2 Stage 1: Equilibrium participation
If a rm plays \out" in stage 1, he acts independently and selects his optimal
stand{alone cycle time T dj and incurs a total cost rate C
d
j =
p
2j. For a rm
who selects \in", the payo depends on the set of other rms who participate in
joint replenishment and on the equilibrium bidding strategies in stage 2. If rm
j is the only rm who selects \in", in the resulting subgame g(; fjg) there is
a unique bidding equilibrium: rm j submits a contribution equal to his stand{
alone replenishment cost Rdj =
p
j=2, and incurs a total cost rate C
d
j =
p
2j.
When there are two or more rms inM but L(M) is a singleton, we have a unique
equilibrium in stage 2. In cases where L(M) has multiple rms, we have multiple
equilibria in stage 2. Although the stage{2 payo for a player in M n L(M) is
unique (same in all equilibria), for the players in L(M), the payo to participation
depends on which of the stage{2 equilibria is expected to be played. Formally,
for j 2 N , rm j's payo in the participation stage is:
j(zj; z j) =
8<:Cdj if zj = \out"fj(r) j r 2 NE g ;M(z)g if zj = \in": (3.19)
In the discussion of rst{stage strategies it will be necessary to keep track of
the rm indices more carefully in the set N and in the subsets M(z) and
L(M(z)). Thus, we use subscripted indices M(z) = fi1; ::; im `; im `+1; ::; img,
and L(M(z)) = fim `+1; ::; img.
Using part 5.(c) of Proposition 3.1, we can write the rst{stage game payos
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as:
j(zj; z j) =
8>>><>>>:
p
2j if zj = \out" or M(z) = fjg
 + j
p
=2im if j 2M(z) n L(M(z))
^; such that ^ 2 [;] if j 2 L(M(z))
(3.20)
where [;] with  =  +
p
im=2 and  =
p
2im   (m   1) denotes the
closed interval for the second{stage payos for rms in L(M(z)) as any value in
this interval can arise as an equilibrium outcome in stage 2.
Proposition 3.4. For private contribution games g() with 0 <  <
p
=2=n,
the strategy prole z = (z1 ; : : : ; z

n), where z

j = \in" for all j 2 N , is a
dominant{strategy equilibrium in the participation stage.
3.4.3 Subgame{Perfect Equilibria
The following proposition characterizes the SPE of the two{stage game. We omit
the proof as it is straightforward from Propositions 3.3 and 3.4 above.
Proposition 3.5. Let 0 <  <
p
=2=n in the second{stage private contribu-
tions game. SPE of the two{stage game have the following properties:
1. On the SPE path, all rms participate in stage 1 and play a strategy prole
in NE
 
g(;N)

in stage 2. SPE path is unique if and only if n > n 1.
2. SPE outcomes: Cycle time and aggregate cost rates are unique. Equilibrium
payos of individual rms are unique if and only if n > n 1. Otherwise,
while the payos of rms in fj 2 N jj < ng are unique, equilibrium
payo for a rm in the set fj 2 N jj = ng varies across equilibrium
plays.
(a) Cycle time: T gN =
p
2=n:
(b) Aggregate total cost: CgN =
p
=2n
 
n +
P
k2N k

:
3. In subgames o the SPE path, rms in M ( N play a strategy prole in
NE
 
g(;M)

.
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Several remarks are in order on the role of minimum contributions, sub{game
perfection and the two{stage structure of the game. These two features play
complementary roles to reduce the set of outcomes to a unique one with full
participation.
Without subgame perfection renement, Nash equilibrium outcomes of the
two{stage game include outcomes that involve participation by a strictly proper
subset of the rms. All Nash equilibria that are not subgame{perfect are sup-
ported by non{Nash contribution behavior in the second{stage games that are
not reached. For example, a strategy prole in which all rms stay out in the
participation stage is a Nash equilibrium of the two{stage game. Similarly, one
can obtain an arbitrary strict subset M of N as the Nash equilibrium set of par-
ticipants in the rst stage by using second{stage strategies rj =  for all j 2 M 0
and for all M 0 6=M . With these contribution strategies, the resulting cycle time
=(m0) would be too large since  is small and the cost for rm j would be
 1
2
j
m0 >
p
2j i.e., resulting cost would be higher than his stand{alone cost,
Cdj . Subgame perfection eliminates such Nash equilibria in the two{stage game
by requiring that in every subgame, including the ones not reached, players use
Nash equilibrium strategies.
While a minimum contribution requirement in the contribution stage limits
free{riders' advantage to some extent, its real signicance is due to its role in elim-
inating a plethora of subgame{perfect equilibria in the two{stage game. Among
these equilibria is an equilibrium with no participation in joint replenishment.
In absence of a minimum contribution requirement, at least one rm would be
indierent between participation and staying out, and we would lose the domi-
nant strategy property of rst stage equilibrium. To take an example, consider
environments with strictly ordered s, i.e., 1 <    < n. For this case, we have
a unique Nash equilibrium in every subgame M  N , and in this equilibrium,
the rm with the highest , gets his stand{alone payo. Firm j is indierent
between the stage 1 strategies \in" and \out" if the rms in fj + 1; : : : ; ng all
choose \out". Thus, the set of rst{stage equilibria have the following form: for
any k 2 N , rms f1; : : : ; k   1g select \in" and rms fk; : : : ; ng select \out". In
particular, there exists an sub{game perfect equilibrium in which all rms choose
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to stay \out".
3.5 Comparison of cycle times and aggregate
costs
We can now perform a four{way comparison of cycle times and aggregate total
costs under the four modes of joint replenishment: independent, centralized, and
non{cooperative joint replenishment under the private contribution game and
the direct revelation game studied in MGB. Since both one{stage and two{stage
game has the same equilibrium cycle times and agregate costs we do not consider
them separately.
As noted above, the equilibrium cycle time depends on the details of the re-
plenishment environment only through n, the maximum of the n s. Similarly,
equilibrium total cost depends only on two statistics, namely n and
P
k2N k,
of the rms' characteristics. For comparisons of cycle times and aggregate costs
we obtain a further simplication. Namely, the comparisons depend on the ratios
j = j=
P
k2N k, rather than the levels of the parameters. Note that the order-
ing of these n ratios is the same as that of the js, that is, n = maxfj : j 2 Ng.
Furthermore, n takes values in the interval [1=n; 1], and the two limits are ob-
tained for n rms with common s and for n = 1, respectively. In particular,
n < 1 for n  2.
Straightforward algebraic manipulations yield the following ordering of the
cycle times under independent, centralized and non{cooperative replenishment:
T d1  T d2      T dn = T gN = T cN=
p
n > T
c
N : (3.21)
For comparison of aggregate costs, after similar algebraic manipulations, we get
CdN >
 p
n + 1=
p
n

=2
X
k2N
p
k
!
CdN = C
g
N (3.22)
=

1
2
p
n + 1=
p
n

CcN > C
c
N :
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To explore how the degree of dispersion in rm characteristics aects the ratio
of aggregate cost under cooperative replenishment to that under the participation
ante contribution game, we observe that the ratio
CgN
CcN
=

1
2
p
n + 1=
p
n

is strictly decreasing in n. Thus, for xed n, the ratio is largest when the rms
have a common . In this case, the ratio becomes
CgN
CcN
=

1
2
 p
n+ 1=
p
n

;
which increases indenitely with the number of rms.
Finally we compare the equilibrium cycle times and total cost rates under the
private contribution game and the MGB direct revelation game for environments
where the MGB game has an equilibrium with full participation. Recall, from
(3.4) above, that full participation under the MGB game requires n < 2=(2n 1).
Under this restriction, using (3.4)
TMGBN =
p
2n  1T cN =
p
2n  1
p
nT
g
n > T
g
n
since n  1=n > 1= (2n  1) for n > 1. The condition for existence of an
equilibrium with full participation under the MGB game yields the following
upper bound: p
2T gN > T
MGB
N :
To compare the aggregate total cost rates that obtain in the constructive equi-
librium of the MGB game and the undominated Nash equilibrium of the private
contributions game we use (3.6) and (3.22) to get
CMGBN =
np
2n  1C
c
N =
np
2n  1
2p
n + 1=
p
n
CgN ;
Hence,
CMGBN
CgN
=
2np
2n  1
1p
n + 1=
p
n
: (3.23)
For xed n, the right{hand{side of (3.23) is strictly increasing in n, and, it
reaches its minimum and maximum when n = 1=n and n = 2=(2n   1), re-
spectively. Substituting these values for n and simplifying we get the following
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bounds:
2np
2n  1
1p
n+ 1=
p
n
<
CMGBN
CgN
<
2
p
2n
2n+ 1
: (3.24)
To establish that the lower bound is strictly greater than 1, we note the fact that
x(n) = 2np
2n 1
1p
n+1=
p
n
is strictly increasing in n and x(2) = 1:0866. Finally, taking
limits of the lower and upper bounds, we nd that as n increases indenitely, the
lower and upper bounds both converge to
p
2. That is, for large n, total cost
under the direct mechanism studied in MGB is more than 40% higher than the
total cost under the private contribution mechanism. We conclude by noting
that the comparisons would be much more dramatic for situations in which the
players' adjusted demand shares are more dispersed than condition (3.4) allows.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we consider a non{cooperative private contributions game for
joint replenishment of n rms that operate under an innite horizon determin-
istic demand model. Firms may replenish independently or participate in joint
replenishment. In case of participation, the rms should decide how much to
contribute to the joint ordering cost. The joint cycle time is determined by an
intermediary as the lowest cycle time that can be achieved using the collected
contributions. We study two variations of this problem: in the single{stage vari-
ant, participation and contribution decisions are made simultaneously, and, in the
two-stage variant, participating rms becomes known at the contribution stage.
We characterize the behavior and outcomes under undominated Nash equilibria
for the one-stage game and subgame-perfect equilibrium for the two-stage game.
Our results show that the joint replenishment is mostly nanced by the rm or
group of rms with the highest adjusted demand rate which is the multiplication
of inventory holding cost rate and demand rate and the other rms just pay the
minimum entree fee. However, even this result is better than the MGB result in
most of the cases.
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In the following chapter, we explore an extension of the model in this chap-
ter to study situations where the rms are asymmetrically informed about each
other's  values and characterize the Bayesian equilibrium, along with a numer-
ical study that investigates the impact of information asymmetry on equilibrium
contributions.
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Chapter 4
PRIVATE CONTRIBUTIONS
GAME WITH ASYMMETRIC
INFORMATION
4.1 Introduction
An important assumption used in the analysis of non-cooperative games is that
all information is common knowledge. This assumption is used in many of the
articles in supply chain management literature, as well as in Chapter 3. How-
ever, information asymmetries exist in many practical settings due to lack of
communication or incentives of hiding information especially among competing
rms. Neglecting the impact of incomplete information among dierent parties
may misguide the decision makers in supply chain which would aect the overall
performance of the business. Moreover, the results of the Chapter 3 indicate that
in equilibrium the rm with the highest adjusted demand pays for most of the
replenishment cost (all of it if the minimum contribution is 0). Thus, if a rm
knows that he does not have the highest adjusted demand rate, he tends to ride
free. However, if we have asymmetric information i.e., the rms do not know the
ranking of demands, then we may expect positive contributions from the rms
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with lower adjusted demand rates. Thus, examining the eects of asymmetric
information is important.
We extend the one{stage game in Chapter 3 and introduce private informa-
tion regarding adjusted demand rates. In this case, we assume that the minimum
necessary contribution is 0 to focus only on the role of asymmetric information
where each rm's adjusted demand can take values from a continuum of types.
Each rm learns its type prior to announcing its contribution level, but does
not reveal this information to other rms. Our solution concept in this case is
Bayesian Nash equilibrium. A Bayesian Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium
where each player, given its type, selects a best response against the average best
responses of the competing players. We show the existence of a pure{strategy
Bayesian Nash equilibrium and derive the necessary equilibrium conditions. In
this case, the gain from the contribution game is due to the fact that more in-
formation about the demand rates is making its way to the joint replenishment
decisions of the intermediary. A numerical study is conducted to show that the
performance of the competitive solution behaves similar to the case of full infor-
mation as n increases, but information asymmetry tends to oer improvements
as n and variability in demand rates increase.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we simplify
the model in Chapter 3 for the case of full information and derive the equilibrium
conditions. In Section 4.3, we model the competitive game under asymmetric in-
formation, show the equilibrium existence and derive the equilibrium conditions.
In Section 4.4, we report the ndings of a numerical study that compares the full
information and asymmetric information models to the decentralized model. The
proofs for the propositions are contained in the Appendix B.
4.2 Preliminaries
We consider a stylized EOQ environment with a set of rms N = f1; :::; ng
(jN j = n). Each rm is facing a constant deterministic demand with rate j per
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unit of time. Inventory holding cost rate is j per unit per unit of time. Major
ordering cost is xed at  per order regardless of order size and we assume minor
ordering costs are zero. We dene j = jj, which will be convenient in all the
settings that we consider below. We will refer j as adjusted demand rate. We
assume that j > 0 to rule out trivial replenishment environments where either
the demand rate or the holding cost rate is zero. We label the rms so that
1  2  : : :  n. Let L = fj 2 N jj = ng and ` = jLj. We follow the same
notation as the Chapter 3 where we also show the optimal cycle times and total
costs for both independent and centralized models.
We now briey review the model and results for the competitive game. This
is simply the one{stage game described in Chapter 3 with minimum contribution
 = 0. The following mechanism is proposed. There is an intermediary who
has a simple role of coordinating the replenishment. Each rm submits a private
contribution rj to the intermediary. This contribution species the amount of
money the rm will be paying per unit of time for the joint replenishment service.
Based on these contributions, the intermediary determines the minimum feasible
cycle length. Let r1; r2; :::; rn be the contributions that are submitted by rms.
Then the cycle length that is determined by the intermediary will be
t =
Pn
k=1 rk
:
Proposition 3.2 in Chapter 3 can be used in this game by setting  = 0.
Proposition 4.1. In the private contributions joint replenishment game,
1. A prole of strategies r = (r1; : : : ; r

n `; r

n `+1; : : : r

n) is a NE if and only
if
(a) rj = 0 for all j 2 N n L, and
(b) (rn `+1; : : : r

n) 2
n
x 2 R` j Pi2L xi =pn=2o.
2. The equilibrium is unique if and only if L is a singleton, i.e., if and only
if n 1 < n. In the unique equilibrium, rj = 0 for j = 1; : : : ; n   1 and
rn =
p
n=2.
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3. In all equilibria, aggregate contributions and the joint cycle time are unique:
(a) Aggregate contributions:
P
j2N r

j =
p
n=2 = R
d
n
(b) Cycle time: T f =
p
2=n.
4. Equilibrium aggregate cost rates are also unique:
(a) Aggregate replenishment cost: R f =
P
j2N r

j =
p
n=2
(b) Aggregate holding cost: Hf = (
P
j2N j)
p
=2n
(c) Aggregate total cost: Cf =
p
=2n

n +
P
j2N j

.
5. In equilibrium rm j faces the following cost rates
(a) Replenishment cost: R fj = 0 if j 2 N n L, and R fj 2 [0;
p
n=2] if
j 2 L.
(b) Holding cost: Hfj = j
p
=2n
(c) Total cost: Cfj = j
p
=2n if j 2 N nL, and Cfj 2 [
p
n=2;
p
2n]
if j 2 L.
The proposition gives the equilibrium cycle times and total costs for the non{
cooperative joint replenishment game. Thus, we can move to the non{cooperative
joint replenishment game with asymmetric information.
4.3 Asymmetric Information
We now turn our attention to the case of private information. We assume that
each rm's adjusted demand rate j is an independent draw from a common
continuous prior distribution function F with support A = [; ] with 0 <  <
 < +1 and density function f . Note that this captures having uncertainty on
demand rate or inventory holding cost rate (given that the other is same across
rms) or on both demand rate and inventory holding cost rate.
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We rst review the impact of uncertainty of adjusted demand rates on in-
dependent replenishment, cooperative joint replenishment and non{cooperative
joint replenishment under full information. In the case of independent replenish-
ment, each rm learns its adjusted demand rate (type) prior to determining its
cycle length. This leads to the following expected cycle length, expected aggre-
gate total cost and expected aggregate replenishment cost expressions:
E[T dj ] =
Z
A
p
2=f()d; 8j 2 N;
E[Cd] = n
Z
A
p
2f()d;
E[Rd] =
1
2
E[Cd]:
In the case of joint ordering with cooperation, we assume that adjusted de-
mand rates of all rms are known prior to establishing the joint replenishment
cycle length. Under this assumption, expected joint cycle length, expected ag-
gregate total cost and expected aggregate replenishment cost can be calculated
as follows:
E[T c] =
Z
An
s
2P
j2N j
fn()d;
E[Cc] =
Z
An
s
2
X
j2N
j f
n()d;
E[Rc] =
1
2
E[Cc]
where An is the nth Cartesian power of the interval A,  = (1; ::; n) and
fn() =
Q
j2N f(j).
Under non{cooperative joint replenishment, we adopt the game in Chapter
3 which is briey reviewed in Section 4.2. First, each rm learns its adjusted
demand rate (type). Then the rms submit their private contributions that spec-
ify their payment rate for the replenishment service. Based on the contributions,
the intermediary determines the minimum cycle length of the joint replenishment
such that would nance the xed cost . Finally, the rms incur their costs ac-
cording to this cycle length. If the rms reveal their types to other rms before
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they disclose their contributions, then we have a full information game. Note
that the equilibrium described in Proposition 4.1 is determined by the largest
adjusted demand rate. Since adjusted demand rates are independent and iden-
tically distributed random variables, this correspond to (n) = maxj2N j , the
largest order statistic. Thus we have the following expressions for the expected
joint cycle length, expected aggregate replenishment cost, and expected aggregate
total cost:
E[T f ] = n
Z
A
r
2

f()[F ()]n 1d; (4.1)
E[Rf ] = n
Z
A
r

2
f()[F ()]n 1d; (4.2)
E[Cf ] = n!
Z 

Z n

:::
Z 2

X
j2N
j
p
=2nf
n()d+ E[Rf ] (4.3)
The expressions in (4.1) and (4.2) are due to the fact that largest order statistic
(n) has a probability density function equal to nf()[F ()]
n 1. The expression
in (4.3) is due to the fact that
P
j2N j
p
=2maxj2N j =
P
j2N (j)
p
=2(n)
and (1); (2); : : : ; (n) have a joint density n!f
n().
If the rms do not reveal their type, then we have an asymmetric information
game which is the main topic of this chapter. Let rj : A!  be the contribution
function where  = [0; r] and rj(j) is the contribution that rm j makes if its
type is j. We assume an upper bound r =
p
2 on the action space since a
contribution level higher than this value gives a payo worse than the stand{alone
payo regardless of the replenishment rate realizations. Moreover, we exclude
negative contributions. Then, for a given  the intermediary will set the cycle
length
t() =
Pn
k=1 rj(j)
:
Consider a rm j with type j. Denote r j( j) as the vector of contributions
of the rms except that of rm j under realization  j. The payo for rm j
under this realization can be written as
j(rj; r j; j; j) =
1
2
jt(j; j) + rj(j); (4.4)
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and the expected payo for this rm is
j(rj(j); r j) =
Z
An 1
(rj; r j; j; j)fn 1( j)d j
=
1
2
j
Z
An 1
1Pn
k=1 rj(j)
fn 1( j)d j + rj(j): (4.5)
We establish the existence of a pure{strategy Nash equilibrium with the next
proposition (All proofs are provided in Appendix).
Proposition 4.2. A pure{strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists for the joint
replenishment game under asymmetric information.
The next proposition characterizes the Bayesian Nash equilibrium for the
asymmetric information game.
Proposition 4.3. Any collection of functions (r1(1); r

2(2); :::; r

n(n)) that sat-
isfy (4.6) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.Z
An 1
1
(r1(1) + r2(2) + :::+ rn(n))2
f n 1( j)d j =
2
j
; for all j 2 N: (4.6)
As stated in Proposition 4.3, nding an equilibrium requires solving n func-
tional equations simultaneously.
The characterization in (4.6) of Proposition 4.3 allows multiple equilibria with
dierent contribution functions for each player. However, if we restrict ourselves
to symmetric equilibrium, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1. The symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium r satises the followingZ
An 1
1
(r(j) +
P
i6=j r
(i))2
f n 1( j)d j =
2
j
for all j: (4.7)
Now consider the symmetric equilibrium r. For a given realization  =
(1; ::; n), the cycle length that is set by the intermediary is given as
T a() =
P
j2N r
(j)
:
48
This leads to an aggregate total cost expression as follows
Ca() =
1
2

P
j2N jP
j2N r
(j)
+
X
j2N
r(j):
Therefore expected cycle length, expected replenishment cost, and expected
aggregate total cost rate can be written as:
E[T a] =
Z
An
P
j2N r
(j)
fn() d;
E[Ra] = n
Z 

r()f()d; and
E[Ca] =
1
2

Z
An
P
j2N jP
j2N r
(j)
fn() d+ E[Ra]:
4.4 Numerical Study
We conduct a computational study to understand the impact of competition
and information asymmetry on rm behavior and total costs. We rst start
with understanding equilibrium contributions under non{cooperative asymmetric
information game. In Figure 4.1, we assume that the adjusted demand rate  has
a discrete uniform distribution between  = 1 and  = 5. The xed cost  = 10.
We consider only the symmetric equilibrium. The gure shows the contribution
of a single rm as a function of its adjusted demand rate when there are 1, 2, 3,
or 4 rms with 1{rm case corresponding to independent ordering.
Clearly, a rm's contribution increases in equilibrium as its adjusted demand
rate increase regardless of the number of rms participating in joint replenish-
ment. Also, as expected, the rms reduce their contributions as there are more
rms in the joint replenishment. The marginal reductions, as also expected, are
diminishing in the number of rms.
Figure 4.2 shows the impact of asymmetric information on equilibrium under
the same settings when there are 2 rms. The solid line in Figure 4.2 represents
the expected contribution by a rm as a function of its own adjusted demand
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Figure 4.1: Equilibrium contribution vs. demand rate with 1, 2, 3 and 4 rms
under asymmetric information
rate, given that it knows the adjusted demand rates of other rms in the joint
replenishment program (full information). The dotted line shows the equilibrium
contributions under asymmetric information.
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Asymmetric Info
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Figure 4.2: The graph of contribution vs. demand rate for two rms under full
and asymmetric information
For lower values of adjusted demand rate, a rm that is not informed about
its rivals' adjusted demand rates would contribute more than what it would con-
tribute on the average under full information. However, the full information con-
tribution surpass asymmetric information for higher levels of adjusted demand
rate.
Figure 4.3 shows the impact of asymmetric information on equilibrium under
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the same settings for 3 rms. We observe that the rate of increase of contributions
is even higher for 3 rms and for lower adjusted demand values asymmetric
information contributions are closer to full information contributions.
2 3 4 5
Α
1
2
3
4
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r
Asymmetric Info
Full Info
Figure 4.3: The graph of contribution vs. demand rate for three rms under full
and asymmetric information
In order to understand the impact of competition and information asymmetry
on cycle times, aggregate contributions to replenishment service and aggregate
total costs, we carried out a more detailed study in Table 4.1. We assume that the
adjusted demand rate of each rm is independently and identically distributed
with a discrete uniform distribution in the interval [ ; +] with 51 points.
The mean  takes on 3 values, 3, 6 and 9.  takes on various values up to 2=3's
of the mean. We consider cases with 2, 3, and 4 players. In order to provide
a benchmark, we also show the results for cooperative joint replenishment and
independent ordering. Since cooperative joint replenishment leads to lowest ag-
gregate total costs, we use its expected aggregate replenishment cost, expected
cycle length and expected aggregate total costs in Columns 4-6. of Table 4.1.
Columns 7-9, 10-12, 13-15 show the percentage deviation from the base case,
of independent ordering, non{cooperative joint replenishment under asymmetric
information and non{cooperative joint replenishment under full information, re-
spectively. In Table 4.1 we provide ex{ante performance comparisons, i.e., if Xy
is the performance variable X's performance under policy y, we report
100 E[X
y]  E[Xc]
E[Xc]
:
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As also demonstrated in Section 3.5, independent ordering leads to higher
cycle times, and higher aggregate costs than cooperative joint ordering. The
gaps increase as the number of rms n increases. Using the results in Section 3.5,
when  = 0, the gap can be represented as
p
n 1 where n denotes the number of
rms. While the mean demand has no eect, increasing the uncertainty (captured
by ) reduces the gaps in costs and increases the gap in cycle times.
As expected, under asymmetric information, rms contribute less than what
they would in a cooperative setting. This leads to a cycle length larger than the
cooperative (and optimal) case. As a result, aggregate total costs are also higher.
The gap increases as the number of rms increase. Increasing uncertainty leads
to expected aggregate contributions that are closer to the cooperative case. The
expected aggregate total costs also decline as uncertainty increases. The impact
of (scaled) uncertainty is more pronounced, when the mean demands are larger.
Expected aggregate contributions under full information are larger than those
under the asymmetric information case. This leads to cycle times closer the
cooperative case and a better expected aggregate total cost performance. The
performance of non{cooperative joint ordering under full information compared
to asymmetric information (and compared to cooperative joint ordering) improves
as uncertainty increases.
Figure 4.4: Ex-ante performance of cycle times vs. = for n = 2
We can also see the comparison of independent, asymmetric information and
full information ex-ante cycle times with respect to the = ratio for 2 and 3
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Figure 4.5: Ex-ante performance of cycle times vs. = for n = 3
rm cases in Figures 4.4 and 4.5. These comparisons are given as a percentage of
the ecient cycle times. = ratio gives an idea about the variance of the type
distributions. We see that for both gures as = increases, the full information
cycle time decreases but asymmetric information cycle time increases.
Figure 4.6: Ex-ante performance of total costs vs. = for n = 2
We also compare the expected total cost under independent, full information
and asymmetric information cases in Figures 4.6 and 4.7. The performance of
asymmetric information case is slightly worse than that of the full information
case but both outperforms the independent ordering case. For asymmetric infor-
mation, even though as = ratio increases the cycle time increases, we see that
the total cost decreases.
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Figure 4.7: Ex-ante performance of total costs vs. = for n = 3
It can be observed both from the table and the gures that the costs for
asymmetric information model are getting closer to optimal as  increases while
in fact cycle time is getting further away from the optimal.
In Table 4.2, we provide interim performance comparisons, i.e., if Xy is the
performance variable X's performance under policy y, we report
100 E

Xy  Xc
Xc

:
Figure 4.8: Interim performance of cycle times vs. = for n = 2
The results are mostly similar to those obtained in Table 4.1. However, the
uncertainty now has a less pronounced impact on performance gaps. In addition,
while increasing uncertainty consistently leads to better expected aggregate to-
tal cost performance in Table 4.1, this is not the case in Table 4.2. For n = 2,
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Figure 4.9: Interim performance of cycle times vs. = for n = 3
increasing uncertainty leads to worse performance for non-cooperative joint re-
plenishment under asymmetric information.
Figures 4.8 and 4.9 show that for asymmetric information contrary to the
ex-ante case, the cycle time decreases as the = ratio increases. Moreover,
the cycle time for full information case also decreases and the cycle time for the
independent case increases.
For the total cost comparison shown in Figures 4.10 for the asymmetric infor-
mation case we observe that the total cost slowly increases as the ratio increases.
However, in Figure 4.11 we see that it has a similar structure to ex-ante case but
the decrease in total cost with respect to = is slower.
Figure 4.10: Interim performance of total costs vs. = for n = 2
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Figure 4.11: Interim performance of total costs vs. = for n = 3
4.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we extend the game in Chapter 3 to incorporate the asymmetric
information on adjusted demands of the rms. We do not assume any mini-
mum contribution level and consider a one{stage game. Even though low type
rms tend to contribute more, we see that the on average full information costs
are lower than the asymmetric information costs. Moreover, we do not observe
signicant improvements in the total contribution levels due to information asym-
metry. Finally, when we increase the variance of the type distribution, we see
that the ex-ante cycle time for asymmetric information increases for the case with
two rms. In both full information and asymmetric information cases, the private
contribution game performs better as the variance increases. However, there is
still a gap between the ecient total costs and the equilibrium total costs.
In the next chapter, the investigate a three{stage game for joint replenishment
where intermediary is also a decision maker and analyze the implications of this
assumption and observe whether the ecient cycle time is attainable in this
setting.
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Table 4.1: Ex-ante Performance Comparisons
Cooperative Independent Non-cooperative AI Non-cooperative FI
n   E[Rc] E[Tc] E[Cc] E[Rd] E[Tdj ] E[Cd] E[Ra] E[Ta] E[Ca] E[Rf ] E[Tf ] E[Cf ]
2 3 0 5.477 1.826 10.955 41.42 41.42 41.42 -29.29 41.42 6.07 -29.29 41.42 6.07
0.5 5.474 1.829 10.948 41.34 41.68 41.34 -29.08 41.51 6.05 -27.32 37.64 5.16
1 5.464 1.839 10.928 41.07 42.51 41.07 -28.43 41.78 5.97 -25.41 34.19 4.42
1.5 5.447 1.858 10.893 40.59 44.09 40.59 -27.32 42.29 5.84 -23.53 30.93 3.80
2 5.421 1.888 10.842 39.85 46.93 39.84 -25.74 43.16 5.60 -21.65 27.73 3.28
6 0 7.746 1.291 15.492 41.42 41.42 41.42 -29.29 41.42 6.07 -29.29 41.42 6.07
0.5 7.745 1.292 15.490 41.40 41.49 41.40 -29.24 41.44 6.06 -28.30 39.48 5.59
1 7.741 1.293 15.483 41.34 41.68 41.34 -29.08 41.51 6.04 -27.32 37.64 5.16
1.5 7.735 1.296 15.471 41.23 42.02 41.23 -28.81 41.62 6.02 -26.36 35.88 4.77
2 7.727 1.301 15.454 41.07 42.51 41.07 -28.43 41.78 5.97 -25.41 34.19 4.42
3 7.703 1.314 15.405 40.59 44.09 40.59 -27.32 42.29 5.84 -23.53 30.93 3.80
4 7.666 1.335 15.333 39.84 46.93 39.85 -25.74 43.16 5.60 -21.65 27.73 3.28
9 0 9.487 1.054 18.974 41.42 41.42 41.42 -29.29 41.42 6.07 -29.29 41.42 6.07
0.5 9.486 1.054 18.972 41.41 41.45 41.41 -29.27 41.43 6.06 -28.63 40.11 5.74
1 9.484 1.055 18.969 41.38 41.54 41.38 -29.19 41.46 6.06 -27.97 38.85 5.44
1.5 9.481 1.056 18.962 41.34 41.68 41.34 -29.08 41.51 6.04 -27.32 37.64 5.16
2 9.477 1.058 18.953 41.27 41.89 41.27 -28.91 41.58 6.03 -26.68 36.46 4.90
3 9.464 1.062 18.927 41.07 42.51 41.07 -28.43 41.78 5.97 -25.41 34.19 4.42
4.5 9.434 1.073 18.867 40.59 44.09 40.59 -27.32 42.29 5.84 -23.53 30.93 3.80
6 9.389 1.090 18.779 39.84 46.93 39.85 -25.74 43.16 5.60 -21.65 27.73 3.28
3 3 0 6.708 1.491 13.416 73.20 73.21 73.21 -42.27 73.21 15.47 -42.27 73.21 15.47
0.5 6.706 1.493 13.411 73.07 73.63 73.07 -41.89 73.20 15.38 -39.87 66.32 13.25
1 6.697 1.498 13.395 72.63 74.98 72.63 -40.80 73.20 15.08 -37.56 60.19 11.41
1.5 6.683 1.508 13.367 71.86 77.55 71.86 -39.02 73.20 14.53 -35.30 54.56 9.86
2 6.663 1.523 13.326 70.66 82.13 70.66 -36.77 73.21 13.64 -33.09 49.22 8.56
6 0 9.487 1.054 18.974 73.21 73.21 73.21 -42.27 73.21 15.47 -42.26 73.21 15.47
0.5 9.486 1.054 18.972 73.17 73.31 73.17 -42.17 73.20 15.45 -41.05 69.65 14.30
1 9.483 1.055 18.966 73.06 73.63 73.07 -41.90 73.20 15.38 -39.87 66.32 13.25
1.5 9.478 1.057 18.956 72.89 74.17 72.89 -41.43 73.20 15.26 -38.70 63.18 12.29
2 9.471 1.059 18.943 72.63 74.98 72.63 -40.80 73.20 15.08 -37.56 60.19 11.41
3 9.452 1.066 18.903 71.86 77.55 71.86 -39.02 73.20 14.53 -35.30 54.56 9.86
4 9.423 1.077 18.846 70.66 82.13 70.66 -36.77 73.21 13.64 -33.09 49.22 8.56
9 0 11.619 0.861 23.238 73.21 73.20 73.20 -42.26 73.20 15.47 -42.26 73.20 15.47
0.5 11.618 0.861 23.237 73.19 73.25 73.19 -42.22 73.20 15.46 -41.45 70.81 14.68
1 11.617 0.861 23.234 73.14 73.39 73.14 -42.10 73.20 15.43 -40.65 68.52 13.94
1.5 11.614 0.862 23.229 73.06 73.63 73.06 -41.90 73.21 15.38 -39.87 66.32 13.25
2 11.611 0.863 23.221 72.95 73.97 72.95 -41.61 73.20 15.30 -39.09 64.21 12.60
3 11.600 0.865 23.200 72.63 74.98 72.63 -40.80 73.20 15.08 -37.56 60.19 11.41
4.5 11.576 0.871 23.152 71.86 77.55 71.86 -39.02 73.20 14.53 -35.30 54.56 9.86
6 11.541 0.879 23.082 70.66 82.13 70.66 -36.77 73.21 13.64 -33.09 49.22 8.56
4 3 0 7.746 1.291 15.492 100.00 100.00 100.00 -50.00 100.00 25.00 -50.00 100.00 25.00
0.5 7.744 1.292 15.487 99.81 100.57 99.81 -49.49 99.81 24.79 -47.47 90.38 21.48
1 7.736 1.296 15.472 99.23 102.40 99.23 -48.00 99.22 24.12 -45.05 81.96 18.59
1.5 7.724 1.302 15.448 98.19 105.88 98.19 -45.77 98.15 22.92 -42.71 74.39 16.17
2 7.706 1.312 15.412 96.57 112.11 96.57 -43.36 96.68 21.20 -40.42 67.39 14.13
6 0 10.954 0.913 21.909 100.00 100.00 100.00 -50.00 100.00 25.00 -50.00 100.00 25.00
0.5 10.954 0.913 21.907 99.95 100.14 99.95 -49.87 99.95 24.95 -48.72 95.01 23.15
1 10.951 0.914 21.902 99.81 100.57 99.81 -49.49 99.81 24.79 -47.47 90.38 21.48
1.5 10.947 0.915 21.893 99.57 101.31 99.57 -48.86 99.57 24.51 -46.25 86.05 19.97
2 10.941 0.916 21.881 99.23 102.39 99.23 -48.00 99.22 24.12 -45.05 81.96 18.59
3 10.923 0.921 21.846 98.19 105.88 98.19 -45.77 98.15 22.92 -42.71 74.39 16.17
4 10.898 0.928 21.795 96.57 112.11 96.57 -43.36 96.68 21.20 -40.42 67.39 14.13
9 0 13.416 0.745 26.833 100.00 100.00 100.00 -50.00 100.00 25.00 -50.00 100.00 25.00
0.5 13.416 0.745 26.832 99.98 100.06 99.98 -49.94 99.98 24.98 -49.14 96.63 23.75
1 13.415 0.746 26.829 99.92 100.25 99.92 -49.77 99.92 24.91 -48.30 93.43 22.58
1.5 13.412 0.746 26.824 99.81 100.57 99.81 -49.49 99.81 24.79 -47.47 90.38 21.48
2 13.409 0.747 26.818 99.66 101.03 99.66 -49.09 99.66 24.62 -46.65 87.46 20.46
3 13.399 0.748 26.799 99.23 102.39 99.23 -48.00 99.22 24.12 -45.05 81.96 18.59
4.5 13.378 0.752 26.756 98.19 105.88 98.19 -45.77 98.15 22.92 -42.71 74.39 16.17
6 13.347 0.758 26.694 96.57 112.11 96.57 -43.36 96.67 21.20 -40.42 67.39 14.13
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Table 4.2: Interim Performance Comparisons
Cooperative Independent Non-cooperative AI Non-cooperative FI
n   E[Rc] E[Tc] E[Cc] E[Rd] E[Tdj ] E[Cd] E[Ra] E[Ta] E[Ca] E[Rf ] E[Tf ] E[Cf ]
2 3 0 5.477 1.826 10.955 41.42 41.42 41.42 -29.29 41.42 6.07 -29.29 41.42 6.07
0.5 5.474 1.829 10.948 41.34 41.68 41.34 -29.16 41.34 6.09 -27.32 37.64 5.16
1 5.464 1.839 10.928 41.07 42.51 41.07 -28.77 41.07 6.15 -25.39 34.21 4.41
1.5 5.447 1.858 10.893 40.58 44.07 40.58 -28.09 40.59 6.25 -23.46 31.01 3.77
2 5.421 1.888 10.842 39.80 46.83 39.80 -27.08 39.83 6.37 -21.48 27.93 3.22
6 0 7.746 1.291 15.492 41.42 41.42 41.42 -29.29 41.42 6.07 -29.29 41.42 6.07
0.5 7.745 1.292 15.490 41.40 41.49 41.40 -29.26 41.40 6.07 -28.30 39.48 5.59
1 7.741 1.293 15.483 41.34 41.68 41.34 -29.16 41.34 6.09 -27.32 37.64 5.16
1.5 7.735 1.296 15.471 41.23 42.02 41.23 -29.00 41.23 6.11 -26.36 35.89 4.77
2 7.727 1.301 15.454 41.07 42.51 41.07 -28.77 41.07 6.15 -25.39 34.21 4.41
3 7.703 1.314 15.405 40.58 44.07 40.58 -28.09 40.59 6.25 -23.46 31.01 3.77
4 7.666 1.335 15.333 39.80 46.83 39.80 -27.08 39.83 6.37 -21.48 27.93 3.22
9 0 9.487 1.054 18.974 41.42 41.42 41.42 -29.29 41.42 6.07 -29.29 41.42 6.07
0.5 9.486 1.054 18.972 41.41 41.45 41.41 -29.28 41.41 6.07 -28.63 40.11 5.74
1 9.484 1.055 18.969 41.38 41.54 41.38 -29.23 41.38 6.08 -27.97 38.86 5.44
1.5 9.481 1.056 18.962 41.34 41.68 41.34 -29.16 41.34 6.09 -27.32 37.64 5.16
2 9.477 1.058 18.953 41.27 41.89 41.27 -29.06 41.27 6.10 -26.68 36.47 4.89
3 9.464 1.062 18.927 41.07 42.51 41.07 -28.77 41.07 6.15 -25.39 34.21 4.41
4.5 9.434 1.073 18.867 40.58 44.07 40.58 -28.09 40.59 6.25 -23.46 31.01 3.77
6 9.389 1.090 18.779 39.80 46.83 39.80 -27.08 39.83 6.37 -21.48 27.93 3.22
3 3 0 6.708 1.491 13.416 73.21 73.21 73.21 -42.27 73.21 15.47 -42.27 73.21 15.47
0.5 6.706 1.493 13.411 73.06 73.63 73.06 -41.99 72.93 15.47 -39.86 66.34 13.24
1 6.697 1.498 13.395 72.63 74.97 72.63 -41.16 72.06 15.45 -37.52 60.28 11.38
1.5 6.683 1.508 13.367 71.84 77.51 71.84 -39.80 70.55 15.37 -35.20 54.78 9.79
2 6.663 1.523 13.326 70.59 81.97 70.59 -38.07 68.33 15.13 -32.85 49.69 8.42
6 0 9.487 1.054 18.974 73.21 73.21 73.21 -42.27 73.21 15.47 -42.27 73.21 15.47
0.5 9.486 1.054 18.972 73.17 73.31 73.17 -42.20 73.14 15.47 -41.05 69.66 14.30
1 9.483 1.055 18.966 73.06 73.63 73.06 -41.99 72.93 15.47 -39.86 66.34 13.24
1.5 9.478 1.057 18.956 72.89 74.17 72.89 -41.64 72.57 15.46 -38.68 63.23 12.27
2 9.471 1.059 18.943 72.63 74.97 72.63 -41.16 72.06 15.45 -37.52 60.28 11.38
3 9.452 1.066 18.903 71.84 77.51 71.84 -39.80 70.55 15.37 -35.20 54.78 9.79
4 9.423 1.077 18.846 70.59 81.97 70.59 -38.07 68.33 15.13 -32.85 49.69 8.42
9 0 11.619 0.861 23.238 73.21 73.21 73.21 -42.27 73.21 15.47 -42.27 73.21 15.47
0.5 11.618 0.861 23.237 73.19 73.25 73.19 -42.23 73.17 15.47 -41.45 70.81 14.68
1 11.617 0.861 23.234 73.14 73.39 73.14 -42.14 73.08 15.47 -40.65 68.53 13.94
1.5 11.614 0.862 23.229 73.06 73.63 73.06 -41.99 72.93 15.47 -39.86 66.34 13.24
2 11.611 0.863 23.221 72.95 73.97 72.95 -41.77 72.70 15.47 -39.07 64.24 12.59
3 11.600 0.865 23.200 72.63 74.97 72.63 -41.16 72.06 15.45 -37.52 60.28 11.38
4.5 11.576 0.871 23.152 71.84 77.51 71.84 -39.80 70.55 15.37 -35.20 54.78 9.79
6 11.541 0.879 23.082 70.59 81.97 70.59 -38.07 68.33 15.13 -32.85 49.69 8.42
4 3 0 7.746 1.291 15.492 100.00 100.00 100.00 -50.00 100.00 25.00 -50.00 100.00 25.00
0.5 7.744 1.292 15.487 99.81 100.57 99.81 -49.58 99.43 24.93 -47.46 90.41 21.47
1 7.736 1.296 15.472 99.22 102.39 99.22 -48.36 97.71 24.67 -45.01 82.09 18.54
1.5 7.724 1.302 15.448 98.17 105.83 98.17 -46.51 94.77 24.13 -42.59 74.71 16.06
2 7.706 1.312 15.412 96.49 111.90 96.49 -44.53 90.87 23.17 -40.18 68.03 13.92
6 0 10.954 0.913 21.909 100.00 100.00 100.00 -50.00 100.00 25.00 -50.00 100.00 25.00
0.5 10.954 0.913 21.907 99.95 100.14 99.95 -49.89 99.86 24.98 -48.72 95.02 23.15
1 10.951 0.914 21.902 99.81 100.57 99.81 -49.58 99.43 24.93 -47.46 90.41 21.47
1.5 10.947 0.915 21.893 99.57 101.31 99.57 -49.06 98.72 24.83 -46.23 86.12 19.94
2 10.941 0.916 21.881 99.22 102.39 99.22 -48.36 97.71 24.67 -45.01 82.09 18.54
3 10.923 0.921 21.846 98.17 105.83 98.17 -46.51 94.77 24.13 -42.59 74.71 16.06
4 10.898 0.928 21.795 96.49 111.90 96.49 -44.53 90.87 23.17 -40.18 68.03 13.92
9 0 13.416 0.745 26.833 100.00 100.00 100.00 -50.00 100.00 25.00 -50.00 100.00 25.00
0.5 13.416 0.745 26.832 99.98 100.06 99.98 -49.95 99.94 24.99 -49.14 96.63 23.75
1 13.415 0.746 26.829 99.92 100.25 99.92 -49.81 99.75 24.97 -48.30 93.44 22.57
1.5 13.412 0.746 26.824 99.81 100.57 99.81 -49.58 99.43 24.93 -47.46 90.41 21.47
2 13.409 0.747 26.818 99.66 101.03 99.66 -49.26 98.99 24.87 -46.64 87.51 20.44
3 13.399 0.748 26.799 99.22 102.39 99.22 -48.36 97.71 24.67 -45.01 82.09 18.54
4.5 13.378 0.752 26.756 98.17 105.83 98.17 -46.51 94.77 24.13 -42.59 74.71 16.06
6 13.347 0.758 26.694 96.49 111.90 96.49 -44.53 90.87 23.17 -40.18 68.03 13.92
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Chapter 5
A THREE-STAGE GAME FOR
JOINT REPLENISHMENT
WITH PRIVATE
CONTRIBUTIONS
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter we study a three{stage non{cooperative game of joint replen-
ishment where the intermediary is also a decision maker. We follow the same
direction as the other chapters and consider non{cooperative behavior. Our goal
is to understand what the impact of a prot-maximizer intermediary on equilib-
rium behavior is and whether this new approach would lead to equilibrium total
cost levels closer to ecient total cost.
We consider n rms with arbitrary inventory holding cost and demand rates,
which are publicly known by all parties in the game. Each rm bids how much
he is willing to contribute for the replenishment to an intermediary, henceforth
referred to as the \replenishment service provider" (RSP) to prevent confusion
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with the intermediary in the previous chapters which is not a decision maker.
The RSP may be a transportation service provider if the setup costs are due
to transportation, or a manufacturing company if the setup costs are due to
switchovers in manufacturing. The RSP sets the order frequency to maximize her
prots and the rms are allowed to opt out consequently. Since this is a multi-
stage game, we analyze the characteristics of the subgame{perfect equilibrium
outcomes.
In this chapter, we show that the subgame{perfect equilibrium cycle time is
not unique. Additional cycle times { including ineciently low and ineciently
high cycle times { can arise as subgame{perfect equilibrium outcomes. Although
the minimum and maximum cycle times that arise in equilibrium straddle the
ecient cycle time, in general, whether ecient cycle time can be reached in
equilibrium depends on the parameters of the joint replenishment environment.
For symmetric joint replenishment environments, whether ecient cycle time is
a subgame{perfect equilibrium outcome depends only on the number of rms {
it is independent of all other parameters of the environment. Furthermore, this
dependence on the number of rms exhibits a highly non{monotone pattern {
e.g. ecient joint replenishment is possible with three rms but not with four
rms; eleven rms cannot cooperate eciently but twelve rms can, etc. All the
proofs are contained in the Appendix C.
5.2 The Model and Preliminaries
We consider a stylized EOQ environment with a set of rms N = f1; :::; ng.
Demand rate for rm j is constant and deterministic at j per unit of time.
Time rate of inventory holding cost for rm j is j per unit. Major ordering
cost is xed at  per order regardless of order size. We assume minor ordering
costs are zero. Although each rm is characterized by two parameters (j; j),
an alternative representation (j; j), obtained by a re{parametrization where
j = jj, will be convenient in all the settings that we consider below. We
assume a strictly positive lower bound  > 0 such that j   for all j 2 N to
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rule out trivial replenishment environments where either the demand rate or the
holding cost rate is zero.
We investigate a three{stage model where rst, the rms simultaneously de-
clare their private contributions for each replenishment cycle. Then, the RSP
selects a cycle time to maximize her prot, and each rm is allowed to opt out
if they are not satised with the RSP's cycle time oer. The time line of the
game is as follows. In stage 1, rms move simultaneously and each rm j 2 N
announces his private contribution rj. In stage 2, the RSP decides on the cycle
time T that will maximize her prot for given contributions. In stage 3, rms
again move simultaneously and each rm chooses an action ! 2 f0; 1g where 0
denotes \Out" and 1 denotes \In". We denote the vector of third{stage actions
of the n rms by ! = (!1; !2; :::; !n). If rm j plays 1 in the third stage, he
accepts the cycle time T and is served by the RSP with cost rj +
1
2
jT which
the sum of his contribution and the corresponding inventory holding cost. If he
plays 0, he replenishes independently with cost Cdj =
p
2j which is the EOQ
or stand{alone cost. We denote the set of rms that choose to be served by the
RSP in stage 3 as M.
Second{stage subgames are parameterized by the vector of contributions r =
(r1; ::; rn) that may be selected by the rms in the rst stage. Similarly, the third{
stage subgames are parameterized by the actions of the players in the preceding
stages, that is, by (r; T ). We denote rm j's third{stage strategy as a function
that assigns an action in f0; 1g to every third{stage subgame (r; T ): !j(r; T ) 2
f0; 1g: Similarly, a strategy for the RSP species a cycle time T (r) for each
second{stage subgame r. A subgame{perfect equilibrium for the three{stage
game is a prole of strategies that induces a Nash equilibrium in every subgame
{including the subgames not reached due to actions taken in previous stages.
We start with some observations on the equilibrium strategies in the third{ and
second{stage subgames.
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5.2.1 Stage 3: Participation
In a generic third{stage subgame (r; T ), rm j's total cost rate, denoted
 j(r; T;!), is:
 j(r; T;!) =
( p
2j if !j = 0;
rj +
1
2
jT if !j = 1:
(5.1)
Once the RSP's cycle time T is xed, rm j's cost rate depends only on his
rst{stage contribution rj and his third{stage action !j. Hence his optimal third{
stage action depends only on rj and the RSP's cycle time choice T . Suppressing
the obvious dependence on exogenous model variables  and , we dene
!j (rj; T ) = 1 , rj +
1
2
jT 
p
2j ; (5.2)
and
 j (rj) = maxfT j !j (rj; T ) = 1g = 2
s
2
j
  2 rj
j
: (5.3)
By denition,  j (rj) is the threshold cycle time below which the rm j plays 1
given his price, i.e., !j (rj; T ) = 1, T   j (rj)).  j (rj) is the highest acceptable
cycle time oer for rm j. Since  j is non{decreasing with T , any cycle time oer
above j will be rejected.
Two straightforward properties of rm j's threshold cycle time,  j (rj), are
worth noting. First,  j (0) = 2
q
2
j
= 2T dj , i.e., twice his stand{alone cycle
time. Thus, rm j's third{stage response will be \out" if T exceeds 2T dj . Second,
 j (rj) < 0 if rj exceeds
p
2j = 2r
d
j , i.e., his stand{alone per{unit replenishment
price. Hence, rm j's optimal third{stage response will also be \out" if his rst{
stage contribution rj exceeds 2r
d
j .
To summarize, for all third{stage subgames (r; T ), the equilibrium strategies
are given by the vector !(r; T ) = (!1(r1; T ); !

2(r2; T ); :::; !

n(rn; T )).
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5.2.2 Stage 2: RSP's cycle time decision
In a second{stage subgame r, the RSP's prot, denoted by RSP (r; T;!), antici-
pating the rms' optimal behavior in stage 3, is
RSP (r; T;!
(r; T )) =
nX
k=1
rk!

k(rk; T ) 

T
: (5.4)
which is the sum of all the contributions from the rms accepting the cycle time
oer minus the average serving cost. Thus, the RSP's optimization problem in
the second{stage subgame r is
max
T
nX
k=1
rk !

k(rk; T ) 

T
: (5.5)
In equilibrium, the RSP's optimal cycle time decision in subgame r is
T (r) = argmax
T
nX
k=1
rk !

k(rk; T ) 

T
: (5.6)
To simplify the explicit characterization of T (r) we introduce a ctitious
player n + 1 with rn+1 = 0, n+1 = 0, !

n+1(rn+1; T ) = 0, and 

n+1(rn+1) = 1.
We rst note that any nite T that exceeds maxj2N  j (rj) yields zero revenue
for the RSP since all rms stay out in stage 3. Thus such T yields negative
prot for the RSP and it is dominated by  n+1 which guarantees zero prot.
Second, any T that falls strictly between two consecutive thresholds, say  i (ri)
and  j (rj) > 

i (ri), is strictly dominated by 

j (rj) since 

j (rj) yields the same
revenue as T but costs less than T . Therefore, the RSP selects either one of the
rms' threshold cycle times as her cycle time and serves all rms with higher
threshold cycle times or selects  n+1 =1 and does not serve any rm. Thus, the
optimal cycle time oer of the RSP in stage 2 given the bids r (the maximizer of
(5.5)) can be written formally as
T (r) = f ` (r`)j ` = arg max
j2f1;:::;n+1g
X
kjk (rk)j (rj)
rk   
 j (rj)
g: (5.7)
If the RSP is indierent between several threshold cycle times we assume that
she selects the lowest among these cycle times.
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5.2.3 Stage 1: Private Contribution
In stage 1, each rm j decides on the replenishment bid rj that will minimize his
cost. Stage 1 payo of rm j taking the equilibrium behavior in later stages into
account becomes:
 j(rj; r j) =
1
2
j T (rj; r j) + rj =
( p
2j if j(rj)  T (rj; r j);
1
2
j T (rj; r j) + rj if j(rj) > T (rj; r j):
(5.8)
By taking the second and third stage responses into account, any rst{stage
contribution rj that exceeds 2r
d
j is dominated by rj = 0 for rm j.
Each rm j's payo depends on other rms' bids r j only through  j =
(1(r1); ::; j 1(rj 1); j+1(rj+1); ::; n(rn); n+1(rn+1)). Given that the RSP's op-
timal behavior is to select one of i(ri), i 6= j or j(rj), rm j's best response
problem reduces to selecting a price to induce the RSP to choose a cycle time in
(j(rj);  j) that is best from rm j's point of view. If rj induces the RSP to
select j(rj), by denition, rm j's payo is his stand{alone payo.
5.2.4 Subgame{Perfect Equilibrium
We collect the observations above in the following proposition that characterizes
the subgame{perfect equilibria of the three{stage game.
Proposition 5.1. A strategy prole (r; T (r);!(r; T )) is a subgame{perfect
equilibrium if and only if the following conditions are satised
i. !j (r; T ) = 1 , rj + 12jT 
p
2j ; 8j 2 N ,
ii. T (r) = f ` (r`)j ` = argmaxj
P
kjk (rk)j (rj) r k   =

j (rj)g,
iii. (a) 8 i; j 2 N such that ri > 0 and  i (ri )  2T dj
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rj +
P
k 6=j;k (rk)i (ri ) r

k
 1
2
j(

i (r

i )  T (r)) + = i (ri ) if  i (ri )   j (rj )  T (r);
or  j (r

j )  T (r)   i (ri );P
k 6=j;k (rk)i (ri ) r

k
 1
2
j

i (r

i ) 
p
2j + =

i (r

i ) if 

j (r

j )  T (r);
(b)
P
j2N r

j !

j (r
; T (r)) = =T (r).
Condition iii(b), shows that in equilibrium the RSP makes zero prot (The
RSP serves for a xed fee). This is straightforward since for any r vector if
the RSP makes a positive prot, then at least one of the rms may reduce his
contribution and still get the same cycle time.
For any rm, inducing his own  results in the same payo with the stand{
alone payo thus he will be indierent between choosing "in" or "out" in the
third stage. However, a rm is forced to induce his own  if there is no better
alternative i.e., all the other  levels result in worse payos. A rm may induce
the  of another rm by adjusting his contribution level r however this depends on
the system parameters and the actions of the other players. Thus, in equilibrium
none of the rms should want to change his current  level and induce a  other
than the equilibrium. Condition iii(a) guarantees that none of the rms has any
incentive to do so.
A wide range of equilibria is possible under Proposition 5.1. Each equilibrium
involves a \coalition" of rms that accept to be served by the RSP by playing
\In" in stage 3 of the game. Next, we characterize the minimum and maximum
cycle times that can be obtained for a given coalition.
Proposition 5.2. The minimum and maximum SPE cycle times for a given
coalition S are given by
TminS =
p
2
P
j2S
p
j  
q
(
P
j2S
p
j)2  
P
j2S jP
j2S j
; (5.9)
TmaxS = min
8<:minj2S
(
2
s
2
j
)
;
p
2K
P
j2S
p
j +
q
(
P
j2S
p
j)2  
P
j2S jP
j2S j
9=; :(5.10)
The minimum equilibrium cycle time in Proposition 5.2 is supported by rst
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stage contributions rj = 0 for j =2 S and rj =
p
2j   12jTminS for j 2 S.
In particular, for S = fig we see that Tminfig = T di is an SPE outcome. In this
equilibrium, rm i nances the order cost and other rms either ride free or
replenish independently. Similarly, the maximum cycle time is supported as an
SPE outcome by the rst stage bids rj =
p
2Kj  12jTmaxS for j 2 S and rj = 0
for j =2 S.
We can now characterize the minimum and maximum SPE cycle times that
can be obtained in Game 2. We dene Pk as the set of rms in N with the k
smallest j where 1  k  n = jN j (i.e., Pn = N).
Proposition 5.3. The minimum and maximum SPE cycle times that can be
obtained in Game 2 are given by
Tmin =
p
2
P
j2N
p
j  
q
(
P
j2N
p
j)2  
P
j2N jP
j2N j
; (5.11)
Tmax = max
1kn
8<:p2
P
j2Pk
p
j +
q
(
P
j2Pk
p
j)2  
P
j2Pk jP
j2Pk j
9=; : (5.12)
Using  (N) =
P
i;j2N; i 6=j ij, T
min; TmaxN and T
c
N can be written as
Tmin =
p
2P
j2N j +
p
2 (N)
;
TmaxN = min
(
2
r
2
n
;
p
2KP
j2N j  
p
2 (N)
)
;
T cN =
p
2qP
j2N 
2
j
:
Since j > 0 for all j 2 N , we have (
P
j2N j)
2 >
P
j2N 
2
j . Thus,
P
j2N j p
2 (N) <
qP
j2N 
2
j <
P
j2N j+
p
2 (N). We also have n=2 <
qP
j2N 
2
j .
Therefore, TCN is in the interval [T
min; TmaxN ]. Since T
max  TmaxN , we establish
that TCN is in the interval [T
min; Tmax].
The observation above may suggest a conjecture that any cycle time in the
interval [Tmin; Tmax], in particular the ecient cycle time T cN , can arise as an SPE
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outcome. However, in general, this is not the case; the SPE cycle times do not
form a connected interval and the ecient cycle time may or may not be an SPE
outcome.
We demonstrate this using symmetric joint replenishment environments where
i =  and i =  for all i 2 N . For this setting the ecient, minimum
and maximum SPE cycle times are 1p
n
q
2

,
p
n pn 1p
n
q
2

, and
p
n+
p
n 1p
n
q
2

,
respectively. Asymptotically, both ecient and minimum SPE cycle times go to
zero and the maximum SPE cycle time approaches twice the stand{alone cycle
time.
We seek necessary and sucient conditions for the ecient cycle time T cN to
arise as an SPE outcome. In Proposition 5.4, we show that, for symmetric joint
replenishment environments, whether ecient cycle time is a subgame{perfect
equilibrium outcome depends only on the number of rms { it is independent of
all other parameters of the environment.
Proposition 5.4. For all symmetric joint replenishment environments with n
rms, ecient cycle time T cN is an SPE outcome if and only if
(b(n) bb(n)c)(1  1
2
p
n
)(1+
1
n  bb(n)c) 
1
4(1  b(n) bb(n)c
n bb(n)c (1  12pn))
 0; (5.13)
where
b(n) =
n
2
p
n  1 : (5.14)
Interestingly, this dependence on the number of rms exhibits a highly non{
monotone pattern { e.g. ecient joint replenishment is possible with three rms
but not with four rms; eleven rms cannot cooperate eciently but twelve rms
can, etc. The set of industry sizes for which ecient joint replenishment arises
as an SPE outcome for n less than 100 is as follows: f2, 3, 12, 13, 14, 15, 30,
31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96,
97, 98, 99g. Although the ecient cycle time and minimum SPE cycle time
asymptotically converge, the ecient cycle time is not guaranteed to be an SPE.
For any N such that the T cN is (respectively, is not) an SPE outcome, there existsbN with j bN j > jN j such that T cbN is not (respectively, is) an SPE outcome, i.e.,
SPE property of the ecient cycle time oscillates indenitely.
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5.3 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we considered a three{stage non{cooperative joint replenishment
game where the intermediary is also a decision maker. In the rst stage the
rms announce their contribution levels. In the second stage, the intermediary
announces the cycle time he is willing to provide given the contributions and in
the nal stage the rms announce whether they will joint the coalition or act
independently. We see that this game leads to many equilibrium cycle times
and a list of conditions that the contributions should satisfy for an equilibrium.
The minimum cycle time that as the result of the equilibrium is smaller than
the ecient cycle time and the maximum cycle time larger than any stand{alone
cycle time of the rms. At the minimum and maximum, all the rms served
by the intermediary have cost levels equal to their stand{alone costs. Moreover,
we show that for the identical rms case, whether the ecient cycle time is an
outcome of the game depends only on the number of rms.
In the next chapter, we consider direct and parametric mechanisms for non{
cooperative joint replenishment.
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Chapter 6
DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF
MECHANISMS FOR
DECENTRALIZED JOINT
REPLENISHMENT
6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters we have considered direct contribution schemes for -
nancing the setup or transportation costs. The rms announce only a per order
monetary contribution to an intermediary and intermediary decides on the cycle
time. In Chapters 3 and 4 intermediary is not a prot maximizer. In Chapter 5
intermediary is also a player in the game and tries to maximize his prot. We
observed that the rst approach never leads to an ecient joint cycle time and
the second approach may lead to an ecient cycle time depending on the number
of rms.
In this chapter, instead of relying on direct contribution methods, we consider
direct and parametric mechanisms that will allocate the setup costs associated
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with the joint replenishment problem and investigate their performance for dif-
ferent parameters.
We generalize the non{cooperative reporting game studied by Meca et al. [34]
(MGB in the sequel) which is embedded in the cooperative joint replenishment
game where stand-alone order frequencies of the rms are observable but not
veriable. Each rm reports an order frequency (that may be dierent from its
true order frequency) and the joint order frequency is determined to minimize
the total joint costs based on all the reports. Each rm incurs holding cost
individually and pays a share of the joint replenishment cost in proportion to
the squares of reported order frequencies as in Meca et al. [35]. MGB show
that, while this rule leads to core allocations under cooperative formulations, it
entails signicant misreporting and inecient joint decisions in a non-cooperative
framework. The authors show that the game has multiple equilibria. In one
equilibrium none of the rms participate in joint replenishment. If the rms are
suciently homogeneous, there also exists a (unique) \constructive equilibrium"
(an equilibrium in which all rms participate in joint replenishment).
In this chapter, we study the mechanism design problem for the joint re-
plenishment of decentralized rms which have private information about their
adjusted demand rates. We rst use a direct mechanism where each rm reports
an adjusted demand rate and joint replenishment cycle time and allocation of the
joint order costs between the rms are decided based on these reports. We show
that a direct mechanism which satises the eciency, incentive compatibility and
individual rationality constraints cannot satisfy the budget{balance constraint,
i.e., a truth telling direct mechanism cannot nance the joint replenishment for
ecient cycle times. Next, we study other mechanisms and generalize the non{
cooperative reporting game studied by MGB where stand-alone order frequencies
of the rms are observable but not veriable. While the mechanism in MGB
determines the joint order frequency and the order cost allocation both based
on the squares of the reported stand{alone order frequencies, we use a general
formulation in which two separate parameters govern these decisions. For this
two{parameter sharing mechanism, we show that the joint frequency is always
lower than the ecient frequency unless the order cost is allocated uniformly. We
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then study the one-parameter mechanism, where the parameters are same. This
is a generalization of the game considered in MGB which uses a parameter value
2. We nd the conditions necessary and for a constructive equilibrium and char-
acterize this equilibrium. We also provide necessary conditions for convexity at
the equilibrium point. We analyze the comparative statics of the one{parameter
model and show that using smaller values of this single parameter leads to bet-
ter mechanisms in terms of fairness and eciency. All proofs as well as detailed
derivations are contained in the Appendix D.
6.2 The Model and Preliminaries
We consider a stylized EOQ environment with a set of rms N = f1; :::; ng.
Demand rate for rm i is constant and deterministic at i per unit of time.
Inventory holding cost per unit time for rm i is i per unit. We denote the
adjusted demand rate of rm i as i = ii. We assume that adjusted demand
rates are strictly positive, i > 0 for all i 2 N to rule out trivial replenishment
environments where either the demand rate or the holding cost rate is zero. Major
ordering cost is xed at  per order regardless of order size. Minor ordering costs
(ordering costs associated with rms included in an order) are assumed to be
zero. We assume that the outside supplier that replenishes the orders has innite
capacity. The rms aim to minimize their long{run average costs over time and
backorders are not allowed.
In any setting, the objective is to minimize the total cost rate, denoted by C,
i.e., the sum of replenishment cost rate (R) and holding cost rate (H): C = R+H.
The decision variable can be taken as order cycle time, t, or order frequency,
f = 1=t (number of orders per time unit). We take frequency as the decision
variable in the sequel.
Vectors are denoted by lower{case letters in bold typeface. For a generic
m tuple vector x = (x1; : : : ; xm) and i 2 f1; : : : ;mg, the notation (y;x i) stands
for the vector x with its ith entry xi replaced by y, and the (m   1)-tuple x i
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stands for the vector x with its ith entry xi removed which in our case includes
all the rms but rm i.
For an endogenous variable X, by XaM we refer to the value of X when the set
of rms isM and replenishment operations are governed by a 2 fc; d; dm; 2p; 1pg,
where c stands for centralized, d stands for decentralized (or independent) re-
plenishment, dm stands direct mechanism for joint replenishment, 2p stands for
two{parameter mechanism and 1p stands for the single{parameter mechanism.
For instance, T cM is the joint cycle time of the rms in M when replenishment is
centralized. When the set M is a singleton, e.g., M = fig, we use Xai instead
of Xafjg. Exceptions to this notation are used for fi, the optimal frequency of
the decentralized replenishment for rm i and for f, the optimal frequency of
centralized replenishment.
6.2.1 Independent (decentralized) replenishment
When the replenishment of the items is controlled by rms operating indepen-
dently, rm i's total cost rate (Ci) is the sum of replenishment cost rate (Ri) and
the holding cost rate (Hi):
Ci(f) = Ri(f) +Hi(f) = f +
i
2f
: (6.1)
Using the rst order condition and convexity, it can be found that rm i's optimal
frequency is fi =
p
i=2. With this frequency, optimal replenishment cost rate
and optimal inventory holding cost rate are equal at Rdi = H
d
i = fi. The
aggregate total cost rate for all rms under independent replenishment is therefore
CdN =
P
i2N 2fi.
6.2.2 Centralized joint replenishment
When all rms cooperate, they order with a joint order frequency to achieve the
eciency. [35] show that when there are no minor setup costs, it is optimal for all
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rms to be replenished in each cycle and this leads to a common order frequency.
Denoting the joint order frequency by f , the total cost under cooperation is given
by
CN(f) = RN(f) +HN(f) = f +
P
i2N i
2f
= f + 
P
i2N f
2
i
f
:
Using the rst order condition, we obtain the ecient frequency as
f = (f 21 + :::+ f
2
n)
1=2
. The ecient total cost is then CcN = 2f.
We use the proportional rule of [35] which simply allocates the order costs
based on the proportion of adjusted demand rate of rm i to the sum of adjusted
demand rates. This rule is in the core of the cooperative game. With this
proportional rule, the cost share of rm i is i= (1 + :::+ n). Since, f
2
i =
i=(2), we can rewrite the cost share as f
2
i = (f
2
1 + :::+ f
2
n). Thus the cost of
rm i under cooperation is given by
Cci = 2
f 2ip
f 21 + :::+ f
2
n
:
6.3 Direct Mechanisms
We consider the design of a mechanism for the joint replenishment problem. A
mechanism is a specication of how economic decisions should be taken for a set of
players who are privately informed about their preferences based on the messages
they provide to an intermediary. Mechanism design problem usually consists of
three steps. In step 1, the mechanism is designed. In step 2, the players accept
or reject the mechanism. If a rm rejects the mechanism, it gets an exogenously
specied reservation utility. In step 3, the players play the game specied by the
mechanism and economic outcomes and payos for each player are determined.
A mechanism is ecient if it maximizes the sum of player's payos. A truth{
telling strategy is to report true information about preferences, for all possible
preferences. A mechanism is incentive compatible if for any player, truth{telling
is a dominant{strategy. A mechanism is individually rational if for any player the
mechanism leads to a payo that is at least as much as his reservation utility. A
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direct mechanism is a mechanism where each player sends a message regarding
his preference.
We consider designing a mechanism to allocate the jointly incurred setup costs.
We assume that each rm's adjusted demand rate, i for rm i, is observable, but
not veriable. Each rm's reservation utility is equal to its independent optimal
ordering cost, Cdi = 2fi for rm i. We consider a direct mechanism, therefore
rms report their adjusted demand rates simultaneously and the joint cycle time
and the allocation of joint setup costs is accomplished using these reports. An
ecient mechanism for this problem should generate total costs to be equal to
the total costs for the centralized problem, i.e., 2f where f = (f 21 + :::+ f
2
n)
1=2
is the optimal frequency for the centralized problem. A necessary condition for a
mechanism in this setting is budget{balance. This condition requires that the sum
of allocations through the mechanism should nance the joint setup or ordering
cost. The main question that we investigate in this section is whether there is a
direct mechanism for the joint replenishment problem that is ecient, incentive
compatible, individually rational and budget{balanced.
Let ^i be rm i's report of its adjusted demand rate (which can be dierent
from the true adjusted demand rate i) and let ^ = (^1; ^2; : : : ; ^n) be the
vector of reported adjusted demand rates. We denote i(^i; ^ i) to be the setup
cost allocated to rm i if its own reported adjusted demand rate is ^i and its
competitors' reported adjusted demand rates are given by the vector ^ i. Since
rms' adjusted demand rates are not veriable, the allocation function should
be identical for all rms, i.e., i =  for all i = 1; 2; : : : ; n. In this setting, the
allocation function  alone denes the direct mechanism that we use for the joint
replenishment problem. Since we are pursuing a mechanism to achieve eciency,
we use
q
2P
i2N ^i
for the cycle time. Note that if all the rms report their adjusted
demand rates truthfully i.e. ^i = i for all i 2 N this formulation would give the
ecient cycle time.
The cost of rm i as a function of its own report ^i and competing rms'
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reports ^ i can be written as
Cdmi (^i; ^ i) =
1
2
i
s
2
^i +
P
j 6=i ^j
+ (^i; ^ i)
s
(^i +
P
j 6=i ^j)
2
=
r

2
i(^i +
X
j 6=i
^j)
 1=2 +
r
1
2
(^i; ^ i)(^i +
X
j 6=i
^j)
1=2:
The rst equation on the right hand side is the average inventory holding cost
of rm i which is found by multiplying i=2 by the joint cycle time calculated
using the reported adjusted demand rates. The second equation is the average
replenishment cost share of rm i which is determined by multiplying the share
function i(^i; ^ i) by the average order cost.
The next proposition states that does not exist a function , thus no direct
mechanism, that simultaneously satises the eciency, incentive compatibility,
individual rationality and budget balance constraints (All proofs are provided in
Appendix).
Proposition 6.1. There is no direct mechanism for the joint replenishment prob-
lem that simultaneously satises eciency, incentive compatibility, individual ra-
tionality and budget balance constraints.
Given this impossibility result for direct mechanisms, we explore alternative
mechanisms and investigate their eciency in the next two sections.
6.4 Two{Parameter Mechanisms
In the previous section we showed that there is no truth{telling direct mechanism
that can achieve eciency, individual rationality and budget{balance simultane-
ously. In this section we consider a class of indirect mechanisms and investigate
their ability to reach an ecient outcome. We again assume that adjusted de-
mand rates, thus independent frequencies are observable by all rms, but not
veriable. We assume that each rm reports a frequency denoted by s^i for rm
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i and a mechanism determines the joint order frequency and the allocation of
the setup cost based on these reports. We consider a two{parameter mechanism
where one parameter (  0) governs the joint order frequency decision and an-
other parameters (  0) governs the allocation decision. In particular, the joint
frequency under the two parameter mechanism is

s^1 + :::+ s^

n
1=
, and replen-
ishment setup cost share of rm i is s^i =
 
s^1 + :::+ s^

n

. Since we allocate all of
the setup cost using the parameter , the budget{balance condition is trivially
satised for this mechanism.
Using these values we can easily nd the total cost rate C2pi for rm i as
C2pi (s^) =
1
2
i
 X
j2N
s^ j
!  1

+
s^ i
P
j2N s^

j
 1
P
j2N s^

j
: (6.2)
The rst term on the right hand side of (6.2) is the average inventory holding cost
and is found by multiplying adjusted demand rate i (the demand rate multiplied
by the holding cost rate) by the joint order frequency. The second term is the
time averaged order cost that is allocated to rm i. Note that the cost of rm
i depends on its reported frequency as well as its rivals'. Therefore, we have a
non{cooperative game where each rm's strategy is its reported frequency and
we can use Nash equilibrium as a solution concept.
In order to nd the best response function of rm i to the strategies of other
rms, we obtain the rst order condition. Denoting the equilibrium strategy
vector as s = fs1; ::; sng, the rst order condition at the equilibrium is given by:
@C2pi (s^)
@s^i

s^=s
=  1
2
is
 1
i
 X
j2N
sj
!  1

 1
  s2 1i
 X
j2N
sj
! 1

 X
j2N
sj
! 2
+ s 1i
 X
j2N
sj
! 1

 X
j2N
sj
! 1
+ s+ 1i
 X
j2N
sj
! 1

 1 X
j2N
sj
! 1
= 0:
We can simplify this equation by multiplying by  1s1 i
P
j2N s

j
2 P
j2N s

j
1  1

and substituting for f 2i = i=2 which yields
f2i s
 
i
0@X
j2N
sj
1A20@X
j2N
sj
1A  2 = 
0@X
j2N
sj
1A0@X
j2N
sj
1A+ si
0@X
j2N
sj
1A  si
0@X
j2N
sj
1A :
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By rearranging the terms, we obtain
f2i = s
 
i
0@X
j2N
sj
1A 10@X
j2N
sj
1A
2+

+si
0@X
j2N
sj
1A 10@X
j2N
sj
1A 2 s2 i
0@X
j2N
sj
1A
2+

0@X
j2N
sj
1A 2
(6.3)
This implicit function gives the equilibrium reported frequencies si, but no fur-
ther simplication is possible and a closed form solution for the equilibrium is
not available. However, we can determine the performance (with respect to its
ability to reach the ecient solution) of the two{parameter mechanism by the
following proposition.
Proposition 6.2. The ratio of the ecient frequency and the equilibrium fre-
quency under the two{parameter mechanism is given by:0B@ (Pi2N f 2i )1=2P
i2N s

i
1=
1CA
2
= 1+
 X
i2N
si
! 2

 
2
X
i6=j
si s

j +
X
i6=j
s+i s
 
j +
X
i6=j;j 6=k
si s

js
 
k
!
:
(6.4)
Proposition 6.2 shows that unless  = 0, the ecient joint frequency is always
larger than the joint frequency in the constructive equilibrium (if it exists) which
in turn implies that cooperative solutions would give smaller costs for all rms.
This is formally given in the following corollary.
Corollary 6.1. For the two{parameter allocation mechanism, the joint frequency
is always less than the ecient frequency unless the order cost allocation param-
eter  = 0, i.e., the order cost is allocated uniformly.
However, an equilibrium under a uniform cost allocation is not guaranteed as
we will show next.
A special case: (; ) = (2; 0)
We consider a two{parameter mechanism with joint frequency parameter as ( =
2) and sharing parameter as ( = 0) which corresponds to a uniform sharing
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(replenishment cost share of rm i = 1=n).
In this case, the payo for rm i is:
C2pi (s^) =
1
n

 X
j2N
s^2j
! 1
2
+
i
2
 X
j2N
s^2j
!  1
2
=

n
0@ X
j2N
s^2j
! 1
2
+ nf 2i
 X
j2N
s^2j
!  1
2
1A :
First order condition for optimal response is:
@C1pi (s^)
@s^i

s^=s
=
si
n
0@ X
j2N
s2j
!  1
2
  nf 2i
 X
j2N
s2j
!  3
2
1A
=
si
n
 X
j2N
s2j
!  3
2
 
s2i +
X
j 6=i
s2j   nf 2i
!
= 0:
We obtain the best responses as s2i = nf
2
i  
P
j 6=i s
2
j and derive the equilibrium
frequency as X
j2N
s2j = n
X
j2N
f 2j   (n  1)
X
j2N
s2j
)
X
j2N
s2j =
X
j2N
f 2j
)
sX
j2N
s2j =
sX
j2N
f 2j
) f = f;
which is equal to the cooperative joint frequency. However, the major drawback
here is, in order to have an equilibrium, all rms should have the same stand{
alone frequency f since using the best response function of rm i we should have
 Pj2N s2j = nf 2i which is true for all i 2 N . Otherwise, there is no constructive
equilibrium and each rm replenishes independently.
Since further analysis of the two{parameter mechanisms is not tractable, in
the next section, we explore one parameter mechanisms in detail.
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6.5 One{Parameter Mechanisms
In this section, we consider a single parameter mechanism where we set the value
of the parameters for determining the joint order frequency and allocating the
ordering costs equal to each other. When we assume that  = , the resulting
cost function for a given vector of reports s^ is
C1pi (s^) = fi
 X
j2N
s^j
!  1

+ s^i
 X
j2N
s^j
! 1

 1
:
In this case, equation (6.3) simplies to
f 2i = 
 X
j2N
sj
! 2

+ si (1  )
 X
j2N
sj
! 2

 1
; (6.5)
and (6.4) can be written as0B@ (Pi2N f2i )1=2P
i2N s

i
1=
1CA
2
= 1 +
 X
i2N
si
! 2

0@2X
i 6=j
si s

j + (n  1)
X
i2N
s2i + 2(n  2)
X
i 6=j
si s

j
1A
= 1 +
 X
i2N
si
! 2
(n  1)
0@X
i2N
s2i + 2
X
i;j2N;i 6=j
si s

j
1A
= 1 + (n  1): (6.6)
Denoting the joint frequency in equilibrium f =
P
i2N s

i
1=
, we obtain
f
f
=
p
(n  1) + 1; (6.7)
which shows that the deviation of the equilibrium joint frequency from the ef-
cient joint frequency depends only on the parameter  and n. In particular,
f > f for all  > 0 and f=f is an increasing function of . This means that
the one parameter mechanisms are never perfectly ecient in general, but their
eciency improves as  gets smaller.
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Best Response Functions
In order to nd the equilibrium allocation in the model, we rst obtain the best
response function for rm i. The expression in (6.6) can be written as: P
j2N f
2
j
(n  1) + 1
! 
2
=
X
j2N
sj : (6.8)
Therefore, the best response of rm i is given by
si =
 P
j2N f
2
j
(n  1) + 1
! 
2
 
X
j2Nnfig
sj ; for i = 1; : : : ; n: (6.9)
Constructive Equilibrium
Clearly, there can be equilibria in which a rm reports 0 and stays out of the joint
replenishment. However, since our focus is eciency, we are mainly interested in
constructive equilibria where each rm reports a positive frequency.
We can use the best response functions (6.8) in (6.5) and re{arrange the terms
to get the following equality for the equilibrium reports:
si =

P
j2N f
2
j   ((n  1) + 1) f 2i
((n  1) + 1) (   1)
 P
j2N f
2
j
(n  1) + 1
!=2 1
: (6.10)
If   1, the argument in (6.10) is positive if and only if Pj2N f 2j   ((n  1) + 1)f 2i  0.
On the other hand, if  < 1, the argument in (6.10) is positive if and only if

P
j2N f
2
j   ((n  1) + 1)f 2i < 0. We formalize these conditions in the follow-
ing proposition without proof.
Proposition 6.3. The necessary and sucient condition for a constructive equi-
librium for the one{parameter mechanism is given by
f 2iP
j2N f
2
j
 
(n  1) + 1 for all i = 1; : : : ; n;
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if   1, and
f 2iP
j2N f
2
j
>

(n  1) + 1 for all i = 1; : : : ; n;
if  < 1.
Proposition 6.3 shows that the constructive equilibrium exists if rms' stand{
alone optimal frequencies are close to each other. In fact, one can simplify the con-
ditions in Proposition 6.3 such that the maximum (minimum) frequency among
n frequencies should have a bounded from above (below) for  > 1 ( < 1). Thus,
instead of n conditions for each case, we can guarantee constructive equilibrium
with only one condition using the following corollary.
Corollary 6.2. The necessary and sucient condition for a constructive equilib-
rium for the one{parameter mechanism is given by
maxj2N f 2jP
j2N f
2
j
 
(n  1) + 1 ;
if   1, and
minj2N f 2jP
j2N f
2
j
>

(n  1) + 1 ;
if  < 1.
Convexity of Payo Function
In order to show that the the solution in (6.10) is in fact the equilibrium, we
need to show that the payo function is convex at this point. We provide the
conditions for this in the following proposition.
Proposition 6.4. The cost function is convex at (6.10) and the solution in (6.10)
is a Nash equilibrium if and only if

X
j2N
f 2j   (   2) ((n  1) + 1) f 2i  0; for all i = 1; : : : ; n: (6.11)
An consequence of this result is that for  > 3, we do not have convexity at
the equilibrium point regardless of the frequency distribution and for   2 we
always have convexity.
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Equilibrium Payos
For the single parameter joint replenishment mechanism, the cost of rm i in
equilibrium can be found by using the equilibrium reports s = fs1; ::; sng.
C1pi (s) = f
2
i
 X
j2N
sj
!  1

+ si
 X
j2N
sj
! 1

 1
:
In equilibrium, using (6.8) and (6.10):
C1pi (s) = f
2
i
 P
j2N f
2
j
(n  1) + 1
!  1
2
+ 

P
j2N f
2
j   ((n  1) + 1) f 2i
((n  1) + 1) (   1)
 P
j2N f
2
j
(n  1) + 1
!  1
2
:
Taking the terms to
P
j2N f
2
j
(n 1)+1
  1
2
parenthesis and rearranging the terms gives
the equilibrium cost of rm i as:
C1pi (s) = 
 

P
j2N f
2
j + (   2) ((n  1) + 1) f 2i
((n  1) + 1) (   1)
! P
j2N f
2
j
(n  1) + 1
!  1
2
:
Summing over all the rms, we obtain the total cost as
C1pN (s) =
X
j2N
C1pj (s) = 

n+ (   2) ((n  1) + 1)
   1
 P
j2N f
2
j
(n  1) + 1
! 1
2
;
and the cost ratio of rm i is given by
C1pi (s)
C1pN (s)
=
 

P
j2N f
2
j + (   2) ((n  1) + 1) f 2i
n+ (   2) ((n  1) + 1)
! X
j2N
f 2j
! 1
:
A special case:  = 2
A special case of our one{parameter mechanisms is the mechanism used in [34]
where the parameter is  = 2. In this case, the necessary and sucient condition
for a constructive equilibrium given in Proposition 6.3 simplies to
f 2i 
2
2n  3
X
j 6=i
f 2j ; for all i = 1; 2; : : : ; n:
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as is also shown in Theorem 2 of [34]. The equilibrium joint frequency simplies
to:
f =
1p
2n  1f < f:
The cost of rm i in this case is:
C1pi = 
 
2
P
j2N f
2
j
(2(n  1) + 1)
! P
j2N f
2
j
2(n  1) + 1
!  1
2
= 2
 P
j2N f
2
j
2(n  1) + 1
! 1
2
;
which shows that each rm has the same cost under joint replenishment regardless
of their stand{alone frequencies or adjusted demand rates.
Impact of  and Comparative Statics
We now investigate how the equilibrium behavior and eciency change as a func-
tion of  and stand{alone frequencies. For this purpose we obtain the comparative
statics for the game.
First remember that Equation (6.7) states f
f
=
p
(n  1) + 1, and therefore
we know that the eciency of the one parameter mechanism improves as  gets
smaller. One can also derive an expression for the dierence between reported
frequencies of two rms i, k with fi > fk as follows:
si   sk =
f 2k   f 2i
(   1)
 P
j2N f
2
j
(n  1) + 1
!=2 1
; (6.12)
which shows that for  > 1, we have si < sj. Therefore, the rm with higher
stand{alone frequency reports a lower frequency than a rm with lower stand{
alone frequency. For  < 1, the rm with higher stand{alone frequency reports a
higher frequency. A similar expression can be derived for equilibrium cost of two
rms as follows:
C1pi   C1pk = 

(   2)(f 2i   f 2k )
(   1)
 P
j2N f
2
j
(n  1) + 1
!  1
2
: (6.13)
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Equation (6.13) can be used to show that for 1 <  < 2, C1pi < C
1p
k , i.e., the
rm with higher stand{alone frequency has a lower equilibrium cost. For 1 < 
or  > 2, the reverse is true and we have C1pi > C
1p
k .
We demonstrate these results in a test problem with three rms with
(f1; f2; f3)=(0:95; 1; 1:05) in Figures 6.1 and 6.2 as  varies between 0 and 3.
Note that the ecient joint frequency for this problem is f  = 1:733. Figure
6.1 shows the equilibrium frequency reports and resulting joint frequency as a
function of . Notice that we have a region of  for which there is no constructive
equilibrium.
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Figure 6.1: Reported Frequencies and Equilibrium Joint frequency as a function
of  for (f1; f2; f3)=(0:95; 1; 1:05)
Corresponding costs (as a percentage of total ecient costs) for each rm
and total costs are shown in Figure 6.2. Since the equilibrium joint frequency ap-
proaches the ecient joint frequency as  gets smaller, total costs also approaches
to the ecient total costs in this direction. Also notice that in the rst region
of  which contains constructive equilibrium ( < 1), the equilibrium cost of a
higher stand{alone frequency (or higher adjusted demand rate) rm is always
larger than the equilibrium cost of a rm with a lower stand{alone frequency.
This simple sense of \fairness" is not guaranteed in the second region ( > 1).
84
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Ξ
30
40
50
60
Ci
1 p
CNc
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Ξ
110
120
130
140
150
CN
1 p
CNc
Figure 6.2: Equilibrium individual costs and total cost as a percentage of ecient
cost as a function of  for (f1; f2; f3)=(0:95; 1; 1:05)
Based on the equations (6.7), (6.12), and (6.13), and Figures 6.1 and 6.2, we
can conclude that, if one can guarantee a constructive equilibrium, using smaller
values of  than 2 (as used in [34]) is more desirable from an eciency and fairness
perspective.
Figures 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 show equilibrium reported frequencies, individual
rm costs and total costs, respectively, for two other test problems: (f1; f2; f3) =
(0:9; 1; 1:1) and (f1; f2; f3) = (1; 1:05; 1:1). The results are similar to the results
for the rst problem, except that the region for which no constructive equilibrium
can be obtained expands (shrinks) as stand{alone frequencies get closer to (further
away from) each other.
It is also important to understand how a rm's equilibrium frequency report
changes as its own true stand{alone frequency or its competitor's stand{alone
frequency changes. We can derive the partial derivative of the equilibrium re-
ported frequency of rm i, si with respect to its own stand{alone frequency fi as
follows:
@si
@fi
=
fisi
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Similarly, the partial derivative with respect to a rival rm j's true frequency is
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Figure 6.3: Reported frequencies as a function of  for (f1; f2; f3) = (0:9; 1; 1:1)
and (f1; f2; f3) = (1; 1:05; 1:1)
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Figure 6.4: Equilibrium rms costs as a percentage of ecient cost as a function
of  for (f1; f2; f3) = (0:9; 1; 1:1) and (f1; f2; f3) = (1; 1:05; 1:1)
Corresponding changes in equilibrium costs are given by the following
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In Figure 6.6, we compute the comparative statics given in (6.14) and (6.15)
for the test problem with (f1; f2; f3)=(0:95; 1; 1:05). Figure 6.6 shows that when
 < 1, the rm should report higher frequencies as its true frequency increases.
This is in contrast to the second region of constructive equilibrium, where the
rm report lower frequency as its true frequency increases. For the same problem,
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Figure 6.5: Equilibrium total cost as a percentage of ecient cost as a function
of  for for (f1; f2; f3) = (0:9; 1; 1:1) and (f1; f2; f3) = (1; 1:05; 1:1)
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Figure 6.6: Rate of change of rm 1's equilibrium reports with f1 and f2 as a
function of  for (f1; f2; f3)=(0:95; 1; 1:05)
the comparative statics given in (6.16) and (6.17) are shown in Figure 6.7. Figure
6.7 shows that equilibrium cost for a rm is increasing in its own frequency and
decreasing in its rival's frequency when  < 1 and and the signs are reversed
when  > 1. The results in Figures 6.6 and 6.7 conrm that using  < 1 leads to
a more desirable mechanism in terms of fairness.
One can also consider the eect of an additional rm, rm n + 1, entering
the joint replenishment, to the reported frequency of rm i. For brevity, we only
consider the dierence of the th power of the reported frequencies.
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(
P
j2N f
2
j + f
2
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Figure 6.7: Rate of change of rm 1's cost with f1 and f2 as a function of  for
(f1; f2; f3)=(0:95; 1; 1:05)
Correspondingly, the change in equilibrium costs can be shown as follows
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6.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we consider jointly replenishing multiple, decentralized rms un-
der an EOQ like environment. We assume that the adjusted demand rates are
observable, but not veriable and therefore investigate the use of direct and indi-
rect mechanisms to determine a joint replenishment frequency and allocate setup
costs. First, we show that there is no direct mechanism that is ecient, incentive
compatible, individually rational, and budget{balanced. Hence, we explore indi-
rect mechanisms where each rm reports its stand{alone replenishment frequency
and propose general, two{parameter mechanisms in which one parameter governs
the joint frequency decision and the other governs the setup cost allocation. We
show that it is not possible to achieve eciency unless the setup costs are allo-
cated uniformly. When these two parameters are equal, we derive conditions for
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the constructive equilibrium and characterize the equilibrium and comparative
statics. We show that mechanisms with smaller values of this single parameter
leads to more ecient outcomes and are more defendable in terms of fairness.
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Chapter 7
NEWSBOY DUOPOLY WITH
ASYMMETRIC
INFORMATION
7.1 Introduction
The newsboy problem has played a central role at the conceptual foundations
of stochastic inventory theory, and variants of it have been used in analysis of
decision problems { such as capacity, allocation and overbooking { under demand
uncertainty. In the classical newsboy problem, a rm facing uncertain demand
orders a quantity of a perishable item prior to observing demand. If the de-
mand realization is less than the ordered quantity, then the rm will have excess
inventory in hand that will perish. If demand turns out to be more than the
ordered quantity, then the rm will miss the opportunity of additional prot. In
the well{known characterization, the optimal order quantity, which balances the
marginal expected cost of ordering one more unit against the marginal expected
revenue from satisfying an additional demand, is a critical quantile of the demand
distribution.
In the standard newsboy model, strategic interactions are assumed away by
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taking the demand faced by a rm as a model primitive. In many practical
situations, however, the details of the market interaction does matter for the
order quantity decisions. Some or all of a rm's unsatised demand can be
served by other rms oering substitutes; and, vice versa, a rm may be able
to sell more than its initial market share in case the rival rm is understocked.
Under such conditions, a rm's payo depends on rival rms', as well as its own,
order quantities and appropriate analysis of optimal inventory decisions requires a
game theoretic approach. The resulting model, dubbed the competitive newsboy
model, has been studied in the literature starting with the seminal works of
Parlar [44], who study the case where the rms' initial demands are statistically
independent, and Lippman and McCradle [30], who study the cases where the
demands faced by competing rms are derived from a general class of rationing
rules applied to the total industry demand.
A natural extension of the competitive newsboy analysis involves incorpo-
rating information asymmetry. Asymmetric information adds a new dimension
to the competitive newsboy problem. Firms may be asymmetrically informed
in a competitive newsboy setting due to two broad reasons. The rms may be
privately informed about their cost and/or revenue structures. Alternatively,
there may be asymmetric information regarding the market demand. Alternative
specications for the key structural elements { e.g., the nature of information
asymmetry, the structure of the market and rm demands { span a number of
interesting classes of models. Among these are models of newsboy oligopoly, and
models that allow arbitrary statistical dependence in rm demands, and in cost
structures.
In this chapter, we study the competitive newsboy problem with asymmetric
cost information. The competitive newsboy model we study is built on Parlar
[44] and Lippman and McCardle [30]. The industry demand is random. There
are two rms among whom the industry demand is split. Each rm has private
information about their costs. If the demand that is allocated to one rm exceeds
the order quantity of that rm, a portion of the excess demand spills over to the
rival rm. As standard in analysis of games of incomplete information, we use
the Bayesian{Nash equilibrium as the solution concept. In a Bayesian{Nash
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equilibrium each player's strategy is a best response against the strategies of the
competing players.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 7.2, we review the
related literature. In Section 7.3, we introduce a model of inventory competition
under asymmetric information. Section 7.4 presents our main results on the
characterization of equilibrium and comparative statics analysis. We present the
full characterization of equilibrium in a parametric version of the model under
uniform demand distribution and a linear split rule in Section 7.5. All proofs as
well as detailed derivations are contained in the Appendix E.
7.2 Literature Review
The literature on multiple item inventory problem with substitution dates back
to the paper by Mcgillivray and Silver [33]. However, the role of competition
has not been studied until the pioneering work of Parlar [44]. Parlar studies a
competitive newsboy problem with two rms managing two substitutable items
facing independent demands. A deterministic fraction of unsatised demand for
each item can be substituted to the other item, if that item has excess stock. It
is shown that a unique Nash equilibrium exists. It is also shown that total prots
of two competing rms are less than that would have been obtained if they were
to cooperate. [51] and Karjalainen [25] generalize the results of Parlar for the 3
and n rms cases, respectively.
Lippman and McCardle [30] consider the competitive newsboy problem un-
der a general setting with respect to how initial demands are generated and how
excess demand is reallocated. It is assumed that each rm's initial demand is a
result of an allocation of the industry demand which is a random variable. In
deterministic rules, a specic deterministic function of the industry demand is
allocated to each rm in competition. In stochastic rules, a rm's initial alloca-
tion depends on the outcome of a random variable (independent demands as in
[44] can be shown to be a special case of stochastic splitting). If a rm's initial
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demand exceeds its order quantity, a non{decreasing function of the excess de-
mand is reallocated to each other rm. Lippman and McCardle [30] show the
existence of an equilibrium in the general setting. For the case of symmetric
rms and continuous distributions of eective demand for each rm, they also
show the uniqueness of the equilibrium. For the case of two rms, they show that
competition leads to higher inventory in the system.
Netessine and Rudi [41] characterize the equilibrium for the case of n rms
when the initial demands follow a multi{variate continuous distribution and ex-
cess demands spill over fractionally to other rms. The uniqueness of the equi-
librium is shown with further conditions and a comparison of centralized and
competitive order quantities is provided.
Mahajan and Van Ryzin [32] study a model where the rms' demands are
generated by a dynamic process { heterogeneous consumers arrive sequentially
and choose a vendor based on a utility maximization criterion and availability
at the time of their arrival. They characterize the equilibrium and show its
uniqueness for the case of symmetric rms. They also show that competition
leads to overstocking.
Serin [46] considers the possibility of a Stackelberg game in the competitive
newsboy problem. She considers both Nash equilibrium solutions and Stackelberg
equilibrium solution and gives conditions under which these two lead to the same
inventory levels.
Anupindi and Bassok [3] study the impact of competition and centralization
among two retailers on the performance of a supplier in the upper echelon. Under
the optimal wholesale pricing mechanism, they show that there is a threshold for
the level of substitution, above which the supplier may prefer a decentralized
system.
There are other papers in operations literature where competition carries on
for multiple periods and backordering is possible. In Hall and Porteus [19] and Liu
et al. [31], two rms compete on product availability which impacts the market
share in future periods. However, within each period that is modeled as a newsboy
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problem, no substitution occurs. Netessine et al. [42] model substitution to a
competing rm in the current period as well as backordering in future periods.
We restricted our literature review on the horizontal inventory competition
where the competition is between the parties in the same echelon. There is a
growing body of operations literature where inventory competition takes place
between dierent echelons in the supply chain (vertical inventory competition).
These models are usually solved using a principal-agent model and menu of con-
tracts that the leader party oers to the follower. Examples include Cachon [7],
Cachon and Zipkin [9], Corbett [11], Zhang et al. [55] and Kostamis and Duenyas
[27].
Jiang et al. [24] consider a horizontal inventory competition setting under
asymmetric demand information. They use an absolute regret minimization ob-
jective from the robust optimization literature. They show the existence of the
equilibrium and give a close form solution. Yan and Zhao [53] also consider
the asymmetric demand information in a decentralized inventory-sharing system
consisting of a manufacturer and two independent retailers.
Our model focuses on horizontal inventory competition model under asym-
metric cost information. In a recent paper, Wu and Parlar [52] study the games
of asymmetric information with inventory management applications. They re-
view static and dynamic games under asymmetric information. They extend the
Parlar [44] model for each dierent setting they use. They only give the equi-
librium conditions however do not focus on the existence and uniqueness of the
equilibrium. They also do not pursue a detailed investigation of the equilibrium.
Our model in spirit is similar to Parlar [44] and Lippman and McCardle [30].
We extend the model in Lippman and McCardle [30] for the case of non{identical
rms and asymmetric cost information. We show the existence of an equilibrium
and show its uniqueness under fairly general assumptions.
The asymmetric information newsboy duopoly game we study can be trans-
formed to a supermodular game. Supermodular games were rst introduced by
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Topkis [48] who show that there exists at least one pure strategy Nash equi-
librium in a full information supermodular game. Milgrom and Roberts [37]
show that a large class of games in economics literature are supermodular and
thus have equilibrium. Supermodularity is also used recently to study games in
operations literature. Examples include [30], [6] and [7]. Vives [50] uses super-
modularity to show the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium for compact
action spaces and complete separable metric type spaces. This work is recently
extended by Athey [4] to include a larger class of type and strategy spaces which
satisfy the single crossing condition. Van Zandt and Vives [49] shows the ex-
istence of Bayesian{Nash equilibrium for supermodular asymmetric information
games when type sets are discrete and action sets are continuous. Our model of
asymmetric information newsboy duopoly is an instance of the general class of
incomplete information games studied in [49].
7.3 A Model of Newsboy Duopoly
We consider an industry served by two rms i = 1; 2 that oer two substitutable
items. Throughout, we assume that the two rms are risk{neutral.
7.3.1 Industry and Firm Demands
The total industry demand D is a continuous positive random variable with an
everywhere positive density function g(): Thus, the distribution function G(),
and the survival function G(), where G(x) = 1 G(x) = Pr(D  x), are strictly
monotonic.
As in Lippman and McCardle [30], demand faced by each rm is determined
in a two-step rationing process. First, for any realization, d, of random market
demand, initial market shares of the two rms are determined by a deterministic
function s such that rm 1's initial market share is s(d) and that of rm 2 is
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s^(d) = d s(d). The share function s satises 0  s(d)  d for all d. To guarantee
that both market shares are non{decreasing in market demand realization, we
assume 0  s0(d)  1.
A given initial market share function s induces random demands faced by
rm 1, D1 = s(D), and rm 2, D2 = s^(D) = D   s(D). By construction, the
initial demands faced by the two rms, (D1; D2), are comonotonic since both are
deterministic monotone functions of the industry demand.
In the second step, given realized market demand and the order quantities of
the two rms, if rm j is stocked out, then some portion, ai, of rm j's underage
goes to rm i. Thus, the eective demand Ri for rm i is the sum of initial
allocation and the reallocation:
Ri(Qj) = Di + ai(Dj  Qj)+:
where (x)+ denotes maxfx; 0g and ai 2 [0; 1] for i = 1; 2 is the demand substi-
tution rate from rm j to i and is assumed to be deterministic. For notational
simplicity, we suppress the dependence of the eective demand on other argu-
ments. The eective demand of rm i, Ri, is a continuous random variable and
its distribution is induced by the distributions of initial demands.
As a rst attempt to incorporate private information into the competitive
newsboy problem, we take the two items produced by the two rms as perfect
substitutes: a1 = a2 = 1. Despite obvious reduction in model dimensions and
notational economy that come with this assumption, this is not without loss
of generality. We leave many interesting and important issues related to ner
details of the substitution possibilities to future work. However, our main ndings
(equilibrium existence and qualitative features of the equilibrium) are not aected
by this assumption1.
1For example, by taking share functions parameterized by the substitution parameters,
z1(D; a1) = s(D) + a1s^(D) and z2(D; a2) = s^(D) + a2s(D), the analysis below can be ex-
tended to the more general case.
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7.3.2 Cost and Information Structures
Firm i pays a unit cost for the items that he purchases. We take the type set
of rm i, denoted Ci, as the set of values his unit cost can take. Firm i's type
is governed by a probability measure pi over Ci. Type distributions of the two
rms are independent. Each rm observes his own cost prior to deciding his order
quantity, but he does not observe the other rm's cost. From rm j's perspective,
rm i's unit cost is a random variable Ci with support Ci and distribution pi.
In this chapter, we focus on the case with discrete type sets. Specically, the
unit cost of each rm can take one of two values, i.e., Ci = fciL; ciHg with ciL <
ciH . We assume that rm 1's unit cost is c1H with probability p1(c1H) = p and c1L
with probability p1(c1L) = 1 p1(c1H) = (1 p ) and rm 2's unit cost is c2H with
probability p2(c2H) = q and c2L with probability p2(c2L) = 1  p2(c2H) = (1  q).
With appropriate relabeling of the players, we take c1H  c2H :
We assume that salvage prices and back{order costs are 0. (The analysis can
easily be extended to relax this assumption.) We also assume, without loss of
generality, that each rm earns a normalized revenue of 1 per unit of good he
sells. This normalization can be achieved by changing the unit of measurement
for costs. Under this normalization, we have c2H  1. In fact, all our results
remain unchanged if one were to take per unit revenues, instead of unit costs, as
the source of private information.
Finally, all elements of the model except the cost realizations such as split func-
tion, unit revenues and total market demand distributions are common knowledge
at the time the order quantity decisions are made.
7.3.3 Actions, Strategies and Payos
For each player i the order quantities are the action sets, Qi = [0; Qi], where Qi
is the optimal order quantity of rm i assuming that he gets all of the industry
97
demand D with the smallest possible value of ci. Finally, rm i's expected payo
is i : Q C ! < where C = C1  C2 and Q = Q1 Q2.
A pure strategy for player i is a function which maps his type into his action
set, Qi : Ci ! Qi where Qi(ci) is the strategy choice for type ci of player i. Player
i's interim2 expected payo i is his expected prot conditional on his realized
type ci and order quantity Q, when his rival follows the strategy Qj():
i(ci; Q) = ECj [i(Q;Qj(Cj); ci)] =
X
cj2Cj
pj(cj)i(Q;Qj(cj); ci);
where, conditional on Cj = cj,
i(Q;Qj(cj); ci) = ERi(Qj(cj))

minfRi(Qj(cj)); Qg
  ciQ
is the player's ex post prot when his unit cost is ci and his order quantity Q.
7.4 Equilibrium Order Quantities
A strategy prole Q = (Q1(); Q

2()) is a Bayesian{Nash equilibrium if, for each
player i, and each type ci 2 Ci of player i,
Qi (ci) 2 arg max
Q2Qi
X
cj2Cj
pj(cj)i(Q;Qj(cj); ci):
Let QiL = Qi(ciL) be the order quantity of player i if his cost is ciL and
let QiH = Qi(ciH) be the order quantity of player i if his cost is ciH . Let
(Q1L; Q

1H ; Q

2L; Q

2H) denote a Bayesian{Nash equilibrium. Interim expected
2The terms ex ante, interim and ex post refer to conditioning with respect to the realizations
of rm types. Throughout, demand remains uncertain. That is, no new information becomes
available about market demand, and, thus, all expressions are ex ante with respect to demand.
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payos conditional on own cost realizations are:
1(c1L; Q1L) = q E[minfR1(Q2H); Q1Lg] + (1  q)E[minfR1(Q2L); Q1Lg]  c1LQ1L;
1(c1H ; Q1H) = q E[minfR1(Q2H); Q1Hg] + (1  q)E[minfR1(Q2L); Q1Hg]  c1HQ1H ;
2(c2L; Q2L) = pE[minfR2(Q1H); Q2Lg] + (1  p)E[minfR2(Q1L); Q2Lg]  c2LQ2L;
2(c2H ; Q2H) = pE[minfR2(Q1H); Q2Hg] + (1  q)E[minfR2(Q1L); Q2Hg]  c2HQ2H :
A standard property used in newsboy models is that @ER[minfR;Qg]=@Q =
Pr(R  Q): Thus, taking the derivative of each type's payo with respect to
his action, the Bayesian{Nash equilibrium order quantities (Q1L; Q

1H ; Q

2L; Q

2H)
satisfy the following conditions:
q Pr(R1(Q2H)  Q1L) + (1  q)Pr(R1(Q2L)  Q1L)  c1L = 0; (7.1)
q Pr(R1(Q2H)  Q1H) + (1  q)Pr(R1(Q2L)  Q1H)  c1H = 0; (7.2)
pPr(R2(Q1H)  Q2L) + (1  p)Pr(R2(Q1L)  Q2L)  c2L = 0; (7.3)
pPr(R2(Q1H)  Q2H) + (1  p)Pr(R2(Q1L)  Q2H)  c2H = 0: (7.4)
7.4.1 Equilibrium Existence
Van Zandt and Vives [49] show the existence of Bayesian{Nash equilibrium for
supermodular asymmetric information games when type sets are discrete and
action sets are continua. Our model of asymmetric information newsboy duopoly
is an instance of the general class of incomplete information games studied in Van
Zandt and Vives [49]. To establish the existence of pure strategy equilibrium we
verify that the equilibrium existence conditions in Van Zandt and Vives [49]
are satised in our setting. These conditions are: (i) the payo function i is
supermodular in Qi, (ii) it has increasing dierences in (Qi; Qj), and (iii) it has
increasing dierences in (Qi; ti), where ti =  ci.
Theorem 7.1. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists for the newsboy duopoly
game with asymmetric information.
Equilibrium exists under more general assumptions than we make. For in-
stance, the theorem above is valid for arbitrary type sets, not only discrete types
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since the existence theorem in Van Zandt and Vives [49] can be generalized for
any type set. Furthermore, as noted by Lippman and McCardle [30] in their
model of complete information, the existence of equilibrium does not require any
assumption on the split functions, or on the joint distribution of the initial de-
mands.
7.4.2 Preliminary Observations on the Equilibrium
In characterizing the structure of equilibrium, some preliminary remarks will be
useful. We start with some observations on the best response functions. We
then examine optimal order quantities in the absence of strategic interactions to
establish a baseline.
Our rst claim exploits the assumption that the split functions s() and s^()
are deterministic and increasing, thus invertible.
Claim 7.1. minfs 1(x); s^ 1(y)g  x+ y  maxfs 1(x); s^ 1(y)g.
The best response functions of the two types of rm 1, (Q1L(Q2L; Q2H); Q

1H(Q2L; Q2H)),
and those of rm 2, (Q2L(Q1L; Q1H); Q

2H(Q1L; Q1H)), solve:
q Pr(R1(Q2H)  Q1L) + (1  q)Pr(R1(Q2L)  Q1L)  c1L = 0;
q Pr(R1(Q2H)  Q1H) + (1  q)Pr(R1(Q2L)  Q1H)  c1H = 0;
p Pr(R2(Q1H)  Q2L) + (1  p)Pr(R2(Q1L)  Q2L)  c2L = 0;
p Pr(R2(Q1H)  Q2H) + (1  p)Pr(R2(Q1L)  Q2H)  c2H = 0:
Since Ri(Q) and, hence, Pr(Ri(Q)  Qi) are non{increasing in Q, best response
functions for both types of both players are non{increasing in both arguments.
Stand{alone order quantities in the absence of competitive interactions will
play a useful role as a baseline. We denote by (Qo1L; Q
o
1H ; Q
o
2L; Q
o
2H) the vector
of optimal order quantities for the case with no spillovers (i.e., no competitive
interaction).
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Lemma 7.1. The vector of stand{alone order quantities (Qo1L; Q
o
1H ; Q
o
2L; Q
o
2H) is
the unique solution to the system of equations:
Pr(D1  Q1L) = c1L; P r(D1  Q1H) = c1H ;
P r(D2  Q2L) = c2L; P r(D2  Q2H) = c2H :
The ranking of optimal order quantities of the two types of a player is straight-
forward { the higher a rms' unit cost the lower his stand{alone order quantity:
Qo1L  Qo1H and Qo2L  Qo2H .
In contrast, comparison of the order quantities across rms is complicated by
the fact that relative rankings of the rms' market shares and unit costs are not a
priori restricted. In general, depending on the relative orderings of market shares
and unit costs, all rankings of the four order quantities (Qo1L; Q
o
1H ; Q
o
2L; Q
o
2H) that
are compatible with the orderings Qo1L  Qo1H and Qo2L  Qo2H are possible.
One needs further assumptions on market shares and unit costs to be able to
rank the stand{alone order quantities of the two rms. For example, if unit costs
and initial market shares are perfectly negatively correlated (so that the initial
market share of the rm with the lower unit cost exceeds that of the rm with
higher unit cost for all demand realizations) then stand{alone order quantities
are ordered in the same way as initial market shares.
Note, on the other hand, that stock{out levels, (Pr(Di  Qoix) : i 2 f1; 2g; x 2
fL;Hg), are ordered the same way as the unit costs. This simple observation,
combined with our assumption that initial demands of the two rms are mono-
tone functions of a common market demand, allows a complete ordering of the
transformed order quantities:
Claim 7.2. For x; y 2 fL;Hg, c1x  c2y if and only if s 1(Qo1x)  s^ 1(Qo2y):
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Returning to the analysis of the equilibrium conditions, we rst note an ob-
servation on the stock{out probability of rm i with order level Qi. For rm 1:
Pr(R1(Q2)  Q1) = Pr(D1 + (D2  Q2)+  Q1)
= Pr(s(D) + (s^(D) Q2)+  Q1)
= Pr(D  s^ 1(Q2); D  Q1 +Q2) + Pr(D  s^ 1(Q2); D  s 1(Q1)):
Similarly, for rm 2:
Pr(R2(Q1)  Q2) = Pr(D2 + (D1  Q1)+  Q2)
= Pr(s^(D) + (s(D) Q1)+  Q2)
= Pr(D  s 1(Q1); D  Q2 +Q1) + Pr(D  s 1(Q1); D  s^ 1(Q2)):
Second, we observe that low{cost type of each player orders a larger quantity
than his high{cost type in equilibrium.
Claim 7.3. (i) Q1L > Q

1H , (ii) Q

2L > Q

2H .
Using stand{alone order quantities as a baseline, the next claim shows that
order quantities strictly less than the stand{alone order quantities are dominated.
Thus, presence of spillovers leads to order quantities that are no less than the
order quantities without spillovers. This means that competition does not lead
to a decrease in total industry inventory.
Claim 7.4. (i) Q1L  Qo1L, (ii) Q1H  Qo1H , (iii) Q2L  Qo2L, (iv) Q2H  Qo2H .
The following lemma identies a useful boundary condition that ties the equi-
librium order quantity of one of the players to the stand{alone order quantity for
the high{cost type of that player.
Lemma 7.2. In a Bayesian{Nash equilibrium either (i) Q2H = Q
o
2H or (ii)
Q1H = Q
o
1H .
Next, equilibrium order quantities of high{cost types of the two rms are
ordered up to transformation by initial market shares:
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Lemma 7.3. If c1H  c2H , then s 1(Q1H)  s^ 1(Q2H).
Finally, in equilibrium, the rm with highest possible unit cost orders his
optimal quantity under no competition.
Lemma 7.4. If c1H  c2H , then Q2H = Qo2H = s^(G
 1
(c2H)).
When c1H = c2H , high{cost types of both rms order their optimal quantities
under no competition, i.e., Q2H = Q
o
2H and Q

1H = Q
o
1H .
As a nal observation, we note that the best response function of the second
rm's high{cost type is at at its stand{alone level when the order quantities of
the rst rm's two types exceed their respective stand{alone levels:
Lemma 7.5. For c1H  c2H , Q2H(x; y) = Qo2H for all (x; y)  (Qo1L; Qo1H).
7.4.3 Structure of the Equilibrium
Summarizing the observations in the previous sub{section, under the player la-
beling with c1H  c2H , the conditions for equilibrium can be stated as follows:
q Pr(R1(s^(G
 1
(c2H)))  Q1L) + (1  q)Pr(R1(Q2L)  Q1L) = c1L;
q Pr(R1(s^(G
 1
(c2H)))  Q1H) + (1  q)Pr(R1(Q2L)  Q1H) = c1H ;
p Pr(R2(Q

1H)  Q2L) + (1  p)Pr(R2(Q1L)  Q2L) = c2L;
Q2H = s^(G
 1
(c2H)):
We can now state the main theorem of this chapter that characterizes the
structure of equilibrium order quantities.
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Theorem 7.2. Assume, without loss of generality, that c1H  c2H .
(Q1L; Q

1H ; Q

2L; Q

2H) is a Bayesian{Nash equilibrium if and only if
1) Q2H = s^(G
 1
(c2H))
2) Q1L,Q

1H and Q

2L satisfy one of the following sets of conditions:
(i) q G(Q1L + s^(G
 1
(c2H))) + (1  q) G(s 1(Q1L)) = c1L (i1)
q G(Q1H + s^(G
 1
(c2H))) + (1  q) G(s 1(Q1H)) = c1H (i2)
p G(Q2L +Q

1H) + (1  p) G(Q2L +Q1L) = c2L (i3)
s^ 1(Q2L)  s 1(Q1L) (i4)
(ii) q G(Q1L + s^(G
 1
(c2H))) + (1  q) G(Q2L +Q1L) = c1L (ii1)
q G(Q1H + s^(G
 1
(c2H))) + (1  q) G(s 1(Q1H)) = c1H (ii2)
p G(Q2L +Q

1H) + (1  p) G(s^ 1(Q2L)) = c2L (ii3)
s 1(Q1L) > s^
 1(Q2L)  (s 1(Q1H) (ii4)
(iii) q G(Q1L + s^(G
 1
(c2H))) + (1  q) G(Q1L + s^(G
 1
(c2L))) = c1L (iii1)
q G(Q1H + s^(G
 1
(c2H))) + (1  q) G(Q1H + s^(G
 1
(c2L))) = c1H (iii2)
Q2L = s^(G
 1
(c2L)) (iii3)
s 1(Q1H) > s^
 1(Q2L) (iii4)
Before we proceed with discussion of properties of the equilibrium, we rst
show that it is unique.
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Theorem 7.3. The vector of order quantities (Q1L; Q

1H ; Q

2L; Q

2H) in Theorem
7.2 is unique.
Uniqueness of solutions for each block of equations is a straightforward con-
sequence of the continuity of the demand distribution. To establish uniqueness
of the equilibrium, we rule out the possibility that the two or more blocks of
equations may have solutions that also satisfy the corresponding inequality. This
is done in the Appendix E.4.
A notable pattern in the equilibria across the model space is the recursive
structure of the order quantities. This pattern greatly simplies the computation
of equilibrium order quantities. The order quantity of the player type with highest
unit cost is determined based on the demand distribution, the split function and
his unit cost, independently of other parameters of the game. The remaining
equilibrium quantities are obtained recursively. At each step, substituting for the
previously computed equilibrium values, a single equation is solved for a single
unknown equilibrium quantity. For example if an equilibrium satisfying the rst
block can be solved recursively by solving rst Q1L from (i1) and Q

1H from (i2),
since they are the only variables in those equations, and then solving Q2L from
(i3) using the values of Q

1L and Q

1H .
The recursive pattern of the equilibrium quantities reect the fact that the
equilibrium is partially dominance{solvable, which in turn is a consequence of
the supermodular structure of the game. By Claim 4 above, any quantity strictly
less than the stand{alone order quantity is strictly dominated by the stand{alone
order quantity for every type. Given this fact and Lemma 5, order quantities
strictly greater than the stand{alone order quantity are also dominated by the
stand{alone order quantity for the highest cost type (c2H): Thus, a two{step
reasoning pins the equilibrium behavior of the highest cost type.
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7.4.4 Special Cases
In this sub{section we consider several corollaries of Theorem 7.2 for special cases
of the general model. Corollary 7.1 considers a model with ex ante symmetric
cost structures without restricting the initial market shares. Corollary 7.2, we
impose a restriction on the initial market share function so that one of the rms
has larger initial market share for all demand realizations. Corollary 7.3 presents
the equilibrium for the case with fully symmetric rms where both initial market
shares and ex ante cost structures are identical. In Corollary 7.4, we remove the
restrictions on the initial market shares and consider an extreme form of ex ante
cost asymmetry: one rm's unit costs are uniformly higher than the other rm's
unit costs for all type realizations. Finally, in Corollary 7.5, we consider a model
with symmetric initial market shares and unrestricted ex ante asymmetries in
the cost structures. As these corollaries are obtained through straightforward
substitutions, we omit the proofs.
Corollary 7.1. Assume that the two rms are ex ante symmetric with respect
to costs. That is, c1H = c2H = cH ; c1L = c2L = cL, and p = q. Then
(Q1L; Q

1H ; Q

2L; Q

2H) is a Bayesian{Nash equilibrium if and only if
1) Q2H = s^(G
 1
(cH)) and Q

1H = s(G
 1
(cH))
2) Q1L and Q

2L satisfy one of the following sets of conditions:
(i) q G(Q1L + s^(G
 1
(cH))) + (1  q) G(s 1(Q1L)) = cL (i1)
p G(Q2L + s(G
 1
(cH))) + (1  p) G(Q2L +Q1L) = cL (i2)
s^(Q2L)  s 1(Q1L) (i3)
(ii) q G(Q1L + s^(G
 1
(cH))) + (1  q) G(Q2L +Q1L) = cL (ii1)
p G(Q2L + s(G
 1
(cH))) + (1  p) G(s^ 1(Q2L)) = cL (ii2)
s 1(Q1L) > s^(Q

2L) (ii3)
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Further simplication is possible under the assumption that initial market
shares of the two rms are uniformly ranked, i.e., one rm's initial market share
is higher than the other's for all demand realizations. By relabeling rms if
necessary, we can take initial market shares to favor rm 1: s(d)  d=2:
Corollary 7.2. Assume that the two rms are ex ante symmetric with respect
to costs. That is, c1H = c2H = cH ; c1L = c2L = cL, and p = q. Furthermore,
assume s(d)  d=2 for all demand levels d. Then (Q1L; Q1H ; Q2L; Q2H) is a
Bayesian{Nash equilibrium if and only if
Q2H = s^(G
 1
(cH)); Q

1H = s(G
 1
(cH)) and (Q

1L; Q

2L) solves:
q G(Q1L + s^(G
 1
(cH))) + (1  q) G(s 1(Q1L)) = cL;
p G(Q2L + s(G
 1
(cH))) + (1  p) G(Q2L +Q1L) = cL:
When the two rms are fully symmetric in terms of cost structures and initial
market shares, we get a fully symmetric equilibrium.
Corollary 7.3. Assume that the two rms are ex ante symmetric with respect
to costs. That is, c1H = c2H = cH ; c1L = c2L = cL, and p = q. Furthermore,
let s(d) = s^(d) = d=2 for all demand levels d. Then (Q1L; Q

1H ; Q

2L; Q

2H) is a
Bayesian{Nash equilibrium if and only if
Q1H = Q

2H = Q

H = (1=2)(G
 1
(cH)) and Q

1L = Q

2L = Q

L where Q

L solves
q G(QL + (1=2)G
 1
(cH)) + (1  q) G(2QL) = cL:
The next corollary looks at the case where one rm has a cost disadvantage
for all cost realizations.
Corollary 7.4. Assume that c1H  c2L. Then (Q1L; Q1H ; Q2L; Q2H) is a
Bayesian{Nash equilibrium if and only if
Q2H = s^(G
 1
(c2H))
Q2L = s^(G
 1
(c2L))
q G(Q1L + s^(G
 1
(c2H))) + (1  q) G(Q1L + s^(G
 1
(c2L))) = c1L
q G(Q1H + s^(G
 1
(c2H))) + (1  q) G(Q1H + s^(G
 1
(c2L))) = c1H :
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As a nal corollary, we present the equilibrium order quantities for symmetric
initial market shares. In this special case, the equilibrium conditions can be
stated explicitly in terms of the exogenous cost parameters, in contrast to the
implicit characterization in Theorem 7.2. For each of the three possible orderings
of the unit cost parameters, we have a dierent set of equilibrium conditions.
Corollary 7.5. Assume that s(d) = s^(d) = d=2 and, without loss of generality,
that c1H  c2H . Then (Q1L; Q1H ; Q2L; Q2H) is a Bayesian{Nash equilibrium if
and only if
1) Q2H = (1=2)G
 1
(c2H)
2) Q1L,Q

1H and Q

2L satisfy one of the following sets of conditions:
(i) If c2L  c1L  c1H  c2H
q G(Q1L + (1=2)G
 1
(c2H)) + (1  q) G(2Q1L) = c1L (i1)
q G(Q1H + (1=2)G
 1
(c2H)) + (1  q) G(2Q1H) = c1H (i2)
p G(Q2L +Q

1H) + (1  p) G(Q2L +Q1L) = c2L (i3)
(ii) If c1L  c2L  c1H  c2H
q G(Q1L + (1=2)G
 1
(c2H))) + (1  q) G(Q2L +Q1L) = c1L (ii1)
q G(Q1H + (1=2)G
 1
(c2H)) + (1  q) G(2Q1H) = c1H (ii2)
p G(Q2L +Q

1H) + (1  p) G(2Q2L) = c2L (ii3)
(iii) If c1L  c1H  c2L  c2H
q G(Q1L + (1=2)G
 1
(c2H)) + (1  q) G(Q1L + (1=2)G
 1
(c2L)) = c1L (iii1)
q G(Q1H + (1=2)G
 1
(c2H)) + (1  q) G(Q1H + (1=2)G
 1
(c2L)) = c1H (iii2)
Q2L = (1=2)G
 1
(c2L) (iii3)
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7.4.5 Intra{equilibrium Comparisons
As noted in Claim 3 above, equilibrium is monotone: low{cost type of a rm
orders a larger quantity than his high{cost type. Without further restrictions on
the initial market shares and the level of unit costs, this is about the extent of what
can be said regarding intra{equilibrium comparisons. That is, no general ranking
of order quantities across rms is possible without imposing further structure on
the model. Furthermore, even under normalization an analog of Claim 2 does
not hold for equilibrium order quantities. The only possible ranking is the one
provided in Lemma 3 that ranks the normalized equilibrium order quantities of
the high{cost types of the two rms.
An interesting observation can be made using the characterization in Corol-
lary 4 in the previous section to illustrate a general phenomenon of inter{type
externality. The equilibrium characterization there remains valid for a range of
unit costs with c2L < c1H < c2H . In this equilibrium, both types of rm 2 choose
an order quantity equal to his stand{alone quantity while it is common knowl-
edge that rm 1 may have larger unit cost. That is, low{cost type rm 2 ignores
spillover from the less ecient type of the rival rm. This is due to the fact that
high{cost type of rm 1, while less ecient than the low{cost type rm 2, selects
a large order quantity expecting spillover demand from the high cost type of rm
2. The increased order quantity of the rm 1H forces rm 2L to stick to Qo2L.
7.4.6 Comparative Statics
Comparative static analysis of the equilibrium and payos with respect to the
exogenous parameters of the model is done in two parts. We rst establish general
comparative statics results with respect to two exogenous functions in the model,
namely, the demand and the market share function. Then we derive explicit
comparative static expressions for the scalar parameters.
Theorem 7.4. Let DA and DB be two positive random variables such that DA
dominates DB under rst order stochastic dominance. Then, the equilibrium
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order quantities with industry demand DA are larger than the equilibrium order
quantities with industry demand DB.
Theorem 7.5. If sA(d) > sB(d) for all positive real numbers d, then the equi-
librium order quantities of both types of rm 1 (rm 2) are larger (respectively,
smaller) under the split function sA than the order quantities under sB.
In Table 7.1, we provide the signs of all rst order derivatives of equilibrium
order quantities with respect to the exogenous scalar parameters, c1L, c1H , p,
c2L, c2H and q. The explicit expressions for the comparative statics derivatives
themselves are provided in Appendix E.7. Cases (i), (ii) and (iii) correspond to
the cases in Theorem 7.2.
Table 7.1: Comparative Statics
Cases Quantities Conditions c1L c1H p c2L c2H q
Q2H 0 0 0 0   0
Q1L   0 0 0 + +
(i) Q1H 0   0 0 + +
Q2L G(Q

1L +Q

2L) > 0 + + +      
Q2L G(Q

1L +Q

2L) = 0 0 + +      
Q1L G(Q

1L +Q

2L) > 0       + + +
(ii) Q1L G(Q

1L +Q

2L) = 0   0 0 0 + +
Q1H 0   0 0 + +
Q2L 0 + +      
Q1L G(Q

1L +Q

2L) > 0   0 0 + + +
Q1L G(Q

1L +Q

2L) = 0   0 0 0 + +
(iii) Q1H G(Q

1H +Q

2L) > 0 0   0 + + +
Q1H G(Q

1H +Q

2L) = 0 0   0 0 + +
Q2L 0 0 0   0 0
As expected, the equilibrium order quantities for both players are non{
increasing with respect to their own costs and non{decreasing with respect to
their rival's costs. In equilibrium, each player orders more as his rival's prob-
ability of being high type increases. Conversely, each player orders less as his
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own probability of being high type increases. This is due to information asym-
metry between players and can be explained as follows. Suppose the probability
of being high type for rm 1 is increasing. In this case, rm 2 will be ordering
more since he will anticipate a higher chance of low order quantity from rm 1.
This will lead rm 1 to expect less spillover from rm 2 and hence order less
himself. Whether these monotonicities are strict or not depend on specic cases
and conditions as given in Table 7.1. The only exception to these results is that
rm 2's (the rm with larger high cost) equilibrium order quantity when his type
is high only depends on its own cost as shown in Theorem 7.2.
7.5 A Special Case: Uniform Demand and Lin-
ear Market Shares
In this section, we present the full explicit characterization of the equilibrium and
the corresponding payo functions for uniformly distributed demand and linear
market share functions: D  Uniform(0; 1), and s(D) = sD and s^(D) = (1 s)D.
Under uniform demand and linear market shares, an instance of the model is
represented by 7 parameters: (c1L; c1H ; c2L; c2H ; p; q; s).
As shown in Section 7.4, while Q2H = (1  s)(1  c2H), solution to Q1L, Q1H
and Q2L (and the corresponding payos) requires a detailed analysis.
7.5.1 A Partition of the Parameter Space
Detailed analysis, provided in Appendix E.8, lead to 8 regions in the parameter
space. In each of the 8 regions, dierent equilibrium quantities and payo func-
tions are valid. In other words, in each of these regions the equilibrium structure
(functional form) of at least one of endogenous variable is dierent from its from
in other regions. The conditions that determine the partition of the parameter
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space are as follows: Denoting p^ = sp and q^ = (1  s)q,
(1  q^) c2L < c1H  q^ c2H (CA)
c1L < q^ c2H (CB)
(1  q^) c2L < p^ c1H  p^ q^ c2H (CC)
q^ c2L <  c1H + q^ c2H (CD)
 (1  p^) c1L +(1  q^) c2L < p^ c1H  q^ c2H (CE)
p^ c1L +(1  q^) c2L < p^ c1H (CF )
(1  p^) (1  q^) c1L + q^ (1  q^) c2L < p^ q^ c1H +q^ (1  p^  q^) c2H (CG)
c1L + q^ c2L < q^ c2H (CH)
The 8 dierent regions that these equilibrium conditions lead to are given in
Figure 1.
Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4 Region 5 Region 6 Region 7 Region 8
C
A
C
B      
C
C
C
B      
C
C
C
A
C
D
C
H
C
F
C
G
C
F
C
G
C
E
C
H
C
D
C
E
Figure 7.1: Conditions characterizing the partition of the parameter space
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7.5.2 Equilibrium Order Quantities
Q1L,Q

1H and Q

2L and payos 1(c1L; c2L), 1(c1H ; c2L), 2(c1L; c2L) and
2(c1H ; c2L) in these regions can be found using the following table:
Table 7.2: Functional forms of endogenous variables by parameter region
Region Q1L Q1H Q2L 1(c1L; c2L) 1(c1H; c2L) 2(c1L; c2L) 2(c1H; c2L)
1 Q1L Q

1H Q

2L 

1 (c1L; c2L) 

1 (c1H ; c2L) 

2 (c1L; c2L) 

2 (c1H ; c2L)
2 Q1L Q

1H Q

2L 

1 (c1L; c2L) 

1 (c1H ; c2L) 

2 (c1L; c2L) 

2 (c1H ; c2L)
3 Q1L Q

1H Q

2L 

1 (c1L; c2L) 

1 (c1H ; c2L) 

2 (c1L; c2L) 

2 (c1H ; c2L)
4 Q1L Q

1H Q

2L 

1 (c1L; c2L) 

1 (c1H ; c2L) 

2(c1L; c2L) 

2 (c1H ; c2L)
5 Q1L Q

1H Q

2L 

1(c1L; c2L) 

1 (c1H ; c2L) 

2(c1L; c2L) 

2 (c1H ; c2L)
6 Q1L Q

1H Q

2L 

1 (c1L; c2L) 

1 (c1H ; c2L) 

2(c1L; c2L) 

2 (c1H ; c2L)
7 Q1L Q

1H Q

2L 

1 (c1L; c2L) 

1 (c1H ; c2L) 

2(c1L; c2L) 

2 (c1H ; c2L)
8 Q1L Q

1H Q

2L 

1(c1L; c2L) 

1 (c1H ; c2L) 

2(c1L; c2L) 

2 (c1H ; c2L)
The equilibrium order quantity for rm 1 when his type is low takes four dierent
functional forms:
Q1L = 1 
c1L
q
  (1  s)(1  c2H);
Q1L =
(1  c1L   q(1  s)(1  c2H))
(q + (1  q)=s) ;
Q1L = 1  c1L   q(1  s)(1  c2H) 
(1  q)(1  c2L)
(p+ (1  p)=(1  s))
+
(1  q)p(1  c1H   q(1  s)(1  c2H))
(q + (1  q)=s)(p+ (1  p)=(1  s)) ;
Q1L = 1  c1L   q(1  s)(1  c2H)  (1  q)(1  s)(1  c2L):
When rms 1's type is high, his equilibrium order quantity takes three possible
forms:
Q1H =
(1  c1H   q(1  s)(1  c2H))
(q + (1  q)=s) ;
Q1H = 1 
c1H
q
  (1  s)(1  c2H);
Q1H = 1  c1H   q(1  s)(1  c2H)  (1  q)(1  s)(1  c2L):
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Finally, the low type of rm 2 has four dierent functional forms for his equilib-
rium order quantity:
Q2L = 1 
c2L
p
  (1  c1H   q(1  s)(1  c2H))
(q + (1  q)=s) ;
Q2L = 1  c2L  
p (1  c1H   q (1  s)(1  c2H))
(q + (1  q)=s)  
(1  p)(1  c1L   q(1  s)(1  c2H))
(q + (1  q)=s) ;
Q2L =
(1  c2L)
(p+ (1  p)=(1  s))  
p (1  c1H   q(1  s)(1  c2H))
(q + (1  q)=s)(p+ (1  p)=(1  s)) ;
Q2L = (1  s)(1  c2L):
7.5.3 Equilibrium Payos
When both rms have low costs, Firm 1's ex post payo can take four dierent
functional forms:
1 (c1L; c2L) =
1
2
s  c1LQ1L;
1 (c1L; c2L) = Q1L(1  c1L) 
(Q1L)
2
2s
;
1 (c1L; c2L) =
1
2
+
(Q2L)
2
2(1  s)  Q2L   c1LQ1L;
1(c1L; c2L) = Q1L(1  c1L) +
(Q2L)
2
2(1  s)  
(Q1L +Q2L)
2
2
:
Firm 2's payo, similarly, has four possible functional forms when both rms have
low cost:
2 (c1L; c2L) =
1
2
(1  s)  c2LQ2L;
2 (c1L; c2L) =
1
2
+
(Q1L)
2
2s
 Q1L   c2LQ2L;
2 (c1L; c2L) = Q2L(1  c2L) +
(Q1L)
2
2s
  (Q1L +Q2L)
2
2
;
2(c1L; c2L) = Q2L(1  c2L) 
(Q2L)
2
2(1  s) :
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When rms 1 and 2 have low and high costs, respectively, we have three possi-
bilities for the payo for rm 1's payo:
1 (c1H ; c2L) = Q1H(1  c1H) 
(Q1H)
2
2s
;
1 (c1H ; c2L) =
1
2
+
(Q2L)
2
2(1  s)  Q2L   c1HQ1H ;
1 (c1H ; c2L) = Q1H(1  c1H) +
(Q2L)
2
2(1  s)  
(Q1H +Q2L)
2
2
;
and two possible forms for the payo for rm 2:
2 (c1H ; c2L) = Q2L(1  c2L) +
(Q1H)
2
2s
  (Q1H +Q2L)
2
2
;
2 (c1H ; c2L) = Q2L(1  c2L) 
(Q2L)
2
2(1  s) :
When rm 2 has a high cost, the payos of the two players are same in all regions:
1(c1L; c2H) = Q1L(1  c1L) + Q
2
2H
2(1  s)  
(Q1L +Q2H)
2
2
;
1(c1H ; c2H) = Q1H(1  c1H) + Q
2
2H
2(1  s)  
(Q1H +Q2H)
2
2
;
2(c1L; c2H) = 2(c1H ; c2H) = (1  s)(1  c2H)2=2:
7.5.4 Comparative Statics
We present the explicit expressions for comparative static derivatives for the equi-
librium order quantities for the uniform demand and linear split case in Appendix
E.9. Comparative static sign patterns are summarized in Table 7.3. This is a
specic version of Table 7.1 for the uniform demand and linear split function.
Since s characterize the whole split function in this case, we also provide the
comparative statics with respect to s in this table.
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Table 7.3: Comparative Statics for Uniform Demand Case
Q1L Q

1L Q

1L Q

1L Q

2L Q

2L Q

2L Q

2L Q

1H Q

1H Q

1H Q2H
c1L         0 + 0 0 0 0 0 0
c1H 0 0   0 + + + 0       0
p 0 0   0 + + + 0 0     0
c2L 0 0 + +         0 0 + 0
c2H + + + +       0 + + +  
q + + + +       0 + + + 0
s + + + +         + + +  
7.6 Concluding Remarks
We studied a model of inventory competition in a newsboy duopoly under asym-
metric cost information. We showed that a pure strategy Bayesian{Nash equilib-
rium exists under fairly general assumptions. We characterized the equilibrium
for the case where the industry demand is allocated between two rms using a
deterministic split function and show its uniqueness. We showed that presence
of strategic interactions creates incentives to increase order quantities for all rm
types except the type that has the highest possible unit cost, who orders the same
quantity as he would as a monopolist newsboy facing scaled version of the market
demand. Therefore, competition leads to higher total inventory in the industry.
The equilibrium conditions have an interesting recursive structure that enables
an easy computation of the equilibrium order quantities. Comparative statics
analysis shows that a stochastic increase in market demand or an increase in one
rm's initial allocation of the total industry demand lead to higher inventory for
that rm. We nally derived a complete characterization of the equilibrium and
its comparative statics for the case of uniform demand and linear split rule.
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Chapter 8
CONCLUSIONS
It is imperative to consider the eect of non{cooperative behavior on inventory
games since it may lead to results not foreseen by the classical inventory models.
In this thesis we investigate the impact of non{cooperative behavior in joint
replenishment games and the eect of asymmetric information in newsvendor
duopolies. We consider various models through the thesis.
In Chapter 3, we study a non{cooperative private contributions game for
multiple rm. The rms contribute to the ordering cost and an intermediary
determines the order cycle time as the minimum cycle time that can be nanced
with these contributions. Our results show that for both the single{stage and two{
stage variant of this game the rm or group of rms with the highest adjusted
demand rate nance most of the joint replenishment and the other rms just pay
the minimum entree fee.
In Chapter 4, we extend the private contributions game to an asymmetric
information counterpart to investigate whether asymmetric information would
lead the rms with low adjusted demand rates to contribute more. We show
the existence of a pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium for the asymmetric
information game and provide the equilibrium conditions. Finally, we conduct
some numerical study to examine the impact of information asymmetry on ex-
pected and interim values of total contributions, cycle times and total costs. The
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results show that rms with low adjusted demand rates contribute more under
asymmetric information. However full information case performs better.
In Chapter 5, we study a three-stage joint replenishment game. In this model,
we assume that the intermediary is also a decision maker. We analyze each
stage and give the conditions for equilibrium. We show that the subgame-perfect
equilibrium cycle time is not unique. We nd the minimum and maximum cycle
times attainable under equilibrium. Even though ecient cycle time is in between
minimum and maximum equilibrium cycle time, it is not always an equilibrium
outcome. For symmetric joint replenishment environments, we show that whether
ecient cycle time is a subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome depends only on the
number of rms and is independent of all other parameters of the environment.
In Chapter 6, we consider nding a mechanism that would allocate the joint or-
dering costs to multiple rms based on their reported independent order frequen-
cies. We rst show that there is no direct mechanism that simultaneously achieves
eciency, incentive compatibility, individual rationality and budget-balance. We
then propose a two{parameter mechanism that would take the reported frequen-
cies of the rms and determine the joint replenishment frequency using the rst
parameter and allocate the order cost using the second parameter. We show
that unless the parameter governing the cost allocation is zero eciency cannot
be achieved. For the single parameter mechanism, we nd the equilibrium share
levels and corresponding total cost. We nally investigate the eect of this param-
eter on equilibrium behavior. We show that properly adjusting this parameter
leads to mechanisms that are better than suggested earlier in the literature in
terms of fairness and eciency.
In Chapter 7, we examine the Lippman and McCardle (1997) model of com-
petitive newsboys under private cost information. The stochastic market demand
is initially allocated between two rms and any unsatised demand is reallocated
to the rival rm. We show the existence and uniqueness of pure strategy Bayesian
Nash equilibrium and characterize its structure. The equilibrium conditions have
an interesting recursive structure that enables an easy computation of the equi-
librium order quantities. A rm's equilibrium order quantity increases with a
118
stochastic increase in the total industry demand or with an increase in his initial
allocation of the total industry demand. Finally, for a special case with uni-
form demand and linear market shares, we provide full characterization of the
equilibrium, corresponding payos and comparative statics.
For Chapters 3 to 6, a number of important research directions remain to be
explored to build an analytical foundation that captures the details of realistic
operational management settings. First group of research directions include ex-
plorations of alternative mechanisms such as sequential contributions, alternative
message spaces (e.g. contribution schedules r(T ) stating a rm's contribution as
a function of joint cycle time), and alternative outcome functions mapping the
rms' messages to the joint cycle time and cost allocation decisions. A second
group includes extensions along the environment dimension include models that
allow minor setup costs, and models that incorporate uncertainty. Also, consid-
ering dierent coalition structures for the rms is also an interesting dimension
since we can have models where rms with similar attributes can form coalitions
for better performance.
For Chapter 7, the newsvendor duopoly with asymmetric information, certain
extensions of the current model are relatively straightforward and not likely to
change the structure of the equilibrium qualitatively. For instance, allowing more
than two levels for the unit costs, will lead to more complicated but qualitatively
similar equilibrium characterization in that many of the claims, the recursive
structure of the equilibrium order quantities, and, particularly, the behavior of
the highest{cost type will remain valid with this extension. However, continuous
type distributions may also be considered. Alternative specications for the key
structural elements of the current model { e.g., the the nature of information
asymmetry, and the structure of the market and rm demands { span a num-
ber of interesting classes of models we intend to explore in the future. Among
these are models of newsboy oligopoly, and models that allow arbitrary statistical
dependence in rm demands, and in cost structures.
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APPENDIX A
A Private Contributions Game
For Joint Replenishment
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.2:
For part 1 we provide detailed arguments. Parts 2-5 of the proposition are ob-
tained by straightforward algebraic manipulations. For part 1 we provide detailed
arguments. Parts 2-5 of the proposition are obtained by straightforward algebraic
manipulations.
1. Given other rms' contributions, each rm j's optimization problem is
min
rj
rj +
j
2
P
k2N rk
subject to rj  : (A.1)
Karush{Kuhn{Tucker conditions for optimality are given by
1  j
2(
P
k2N rk)
2
  j = 0; (A.2)
j(rj   ) = 0; (A.3)
j  0; (A.4)
rj  : (A.5)
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By denition, any strategy prole r = (r1; : : : ; r

n) is a Nash equilibrium
if and only if it is a solution to (A.2)-(A.5) for j = 1; : : : ; n. Conditions
(A.2)-(A.5) ensure that there is at least one rm i such that ri >  and
i = 0. Because, if r

j =  for all j, we would have j = 1   j2n22 for all
j. Since j  0 for all j, this requires that  
p
j=2=n for all j, which
contradicts with the fact that  <
p
=2=n, as   j for all j. Using
(A.2),
i = 1  i
2(
P
k2N r

k)
2
= 0: (A.6)
Now rm i that satises (A.6) has to belong to the set L(N). Otherwise, for
any k with k > i, we have k < 0 violating condition (A.4). Conditions
(A.6) and (A.2) also show that j > 0 for all j 2 N n L(N). Therefore,
using (A.3), we have, for j 2 N n L(N),
rj = ;
and, for j 2 L(N);
rj   and
X
i2L(N)
rj =
r
n
2
  (n  `):
The following chain of inequalities show that the conditions on the vector
(rn `+1; : : : r

n) are consistent:
 <
p
=2
n

p
1=2
n

p
n=2
n
<
p
n=2
n  1 
p
n=2
n  ` : (A.7)
2. Straightforward from 1.(b).
3. In equilibrium, aggregate contributions from the n rms is
P
i2N r

i =P
i2NnL(N) r

i +
P
i2L(N) r

i = (n `)+
p
n=2 (n `) =
p
n=2 = R
d
n.
The resulting cycle time is T gN = N(r
) = =
P
i2N r

i = 
p
n=2 =p
2=n = T
d
n .
4. Since equilibrium total replenishment cost for the n rms is equal to the
aggregate contributions, the claim in 4.(a) follows from 3.(a) above. The
claim in 4.(b) results from straightforward substitution and summing over
n rms. Part 4.(c) is obtained by summing the results in parts (a) and (b)
and combining terms.
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5. Part 5.(a) follows from 1.(a) directly for j 2 N nL(N). For a rm j 2 L(N),
we note that his maximum equilibrium contribution is obtained when other
rms in N each contribute . Part 5.(b) follows from substituting the
equilibrium cycle time in the expression for j's holding cost rate. Part 5.(c)
follows from adding the replenishment and holding costs in parts 5.(a) and
5.(b). 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.4:
In order to show that the strategy \out" is weakly dominated by the strategy
\in" for all rms, we re{write (3.20) separating the replenishment and holding
cost components in j(z)
j(zj;z j) =8>>><>>>:
p
j=2 +
p
j=2 if zj = \out" or M(z) = fjg
 + (
p
j=im)
p
j=2 if j 2M(z) n L(M(z))
R^ +
p
im=2; such that R^ 2 [R;R] if j 2 L(M(z)):
(A.8)
where [R;R] with R =  and R =
p
im=2 (m 1) denotes the closed interval
for the replenishment cost of the players in L(M(z)).
First, from the rst line of (A.8), the strategy \out" yields a payo indepen-
dent of other rms' participation strategies. Also from the rst line, the two
strategies give the same payo when zk = \out" for all k 2 N n fjg. To see that
participation yields a strictly better total cost for player j in all other cases, we
compare lines 2 and 3 to line 1. Take any z with zj =\in". If zj is such that
j 2 M(z) n L(M(z)), then j < im . In this case, both components of rm
j's total cost in line 2 are strictly less than their counterparts in line 1, because
 <
p
j=2 by (A.7), and
p
j=im < 1. If zj is such that j 2 L(M(z)), then
j = im . In this case, holding cost component of rm j's total cost is
p
im=2
for both strategies. However, the worst possible replenishment cost from partici-
pating,
p
im=2  (m 1), is strictly lower than the stand{alone replenishment
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cost,
p
im=2. Thus, zj =\in" weakly dominates strategy zj =\out". Since this
is true for all rms, the claim follows. 
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APPENDIX B
Private Contributions Game For
Joint Replenishment with
Asymmetric Information
B.1 Proof of Proposition 4.2
In order to prove the existence we invoke the following proposition by Meirowitz
[36]:
Proposition B.1. A Bayesian game has a pure strategy BNE if for each j 2 N
1. A and  are nonempty, convex and compact subsets of Euclidean space.
2. uj(r;) =  j(r;) is continuous.
3. For every  and measurable function f n 1( j)
Uj(rj(j); r

 j) =  j(rj(j); r j) =
Z
An 1
uj(rj; r

 j; j; j)f
n 1( j)d j
is strictly quasi{concave in rj.
4. For every "j > 0 there exists some constant j s.t. if
rj (j) 2 arg max
rj2Rj
Z
An 1
uj(rj; r

 j; j; j)f
n 1( j)d j

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for some ; r j( j) then supf(j ;0j)2A:jj 0j j<jgjrj (j)  rj (0j)j < "j.
5. f n 1( j) is continuous.
Now, A and  are both closed, bounded and consists of a single interval by
assumption. Thus, they are nonempty, convex and compact. Thus, condition (1)
is satised. Similarly, the belief function f n 1( j) is continuous since it is the
multiplication of continuous probability density functions f() by assumption so
condition (5) is satised.
Assume that
uj(r;) =  j(r;) =  1
2
j
1
rj +
P
i6=j ri
  rj
which is the negative of our cost function. This assumption is necessary for a
utility maximization model.
uj(r;) is obviously continuous.
The rst order condition for Uj(rj(j); r

 j) =  j(rj(j); r j) is:
@Uj
@rj
=  @j
@rj
=
1
2
j
Z
An 1
1
(rj +
P
i6=j r

i (i))
2
f n 1( j)d j   1 for all j:
and the second order condition is:
@2Uj
@r2j
=  @
2j
@r2j
=  j
Z
An 1
1
(rj +
P
i6=j r

i (i))
3
f n 1( j)d j < 0 for all j:
Thus, Uj is strictly concave in rj which implies Uj is strictly quasi{concave in rj
which shows that condition (3) is satised.
The only remaining condition is (4). In order to prove it, we take two dierent
types j and 
0
j for rm j and use the dierence between their respective rst
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order conditions:
2
j
  2
0j
=
Z
An 1
1
(rj (j) +
P
i6=j r

i (i))
2
f n 1( j)d j
 
Z
An 1
1
(rj (
0
j) +
P
i6=j r

i (i))
2
f n 1( j)d j
=
Z
An 1
1
(rj (j) +
P
i6=j r

i (i))
2
  1
(rj (
0
j) +
P
i 6=j r

i (i))
2
f n 1( j)d j
=
Z
An 1
(rj (
0
j) +
P
i6=j r

i (i))
2   (rj (j) +
P
i 6=j r

i (i))
2
(rj (j) +
P
i 6=j r

i (i))
2(rj (
0
j) +
P
i 6=j r

i (i))
2
f n 1( j)d j
= [rj (
0
j)  rj (j)]
Z
An 1
rj (j) + r

j (
0
j) + 2
P
i 6=j r

i (i)
(rj (j) +
P
i 6=j r

i (i))
2(rj (
0
j) +
P
i6=j r

i (i))
2
f n 1( j)d j
= [rj (
0
j)  rj (j)]
Z
An 1
1
(rj (j) +
P
i 6=j r

i (i))(r

j (
0
j) +
P
i6=j r

i (i))
2
+
1
(rj (j) +
P
i 6=j r

i (i))
2(rj (
0
j) +
P
i 6=j r

i (i))
f n 1( j)d j
Using the rst order conditions and rj(j)  r for all j 2 N , we can writeZ
An 1
1
(rj (
0
j) +
P
i 6=j r

i (i))(r

j (j) +
P
i6=j r

i (i))
2
f n 1( j)d j Z
An 1
1
2r(rj (j) +
P
i6=j r

i (i))
2
f n 1( j)d j =
1
rj
A similar result can be obtained for 0j. Taking the absolute values on both sides,
we have
j 2
j
  2
0j
j  jrj (0j)  rj (j)j

1
rj
+
1
r0j

Rearranging the terms and using j   > 0 and 0j   > 0, we obtain:
j0j   jj  jrj (0j)  rj (j)j

1
2r
(0j + j)

 jrj (0j)  rj (j)j

r

Now, assume that "j > 0 and let  = "(=r). Then j0j   jj < j implies
jrj (0j) rj (j)j(=r) < j or jrj (0j) rj (j)j < "j. This is true for all j and 0j
so condition (4) is satised which shows that all the conditions of the proposition
are met. 
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B.2 Proof of Proposition 4.3
A given rm j's optimization problem can be formulated as follows, if the rm is
type j
min
rj
j(rj(j); r j) =
Z
An 1
P
j2N rj(j)
f n 1( j)d j + rj(j)(B.1)
subject to rj(j)  0: (B.2)
Following the same arguments in the proof of Proposition 3.2, one gets (4.6) as
a necessary condition. It can easily be veried that the function j is convex in
rj which shows that these conditions are also sucient. 
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APPENDIX C
A Three-Stage Game for Joint
Replenishment With Private
Contributions
C.1 Proof of Proposition 5.1:
The rst and second conditions are necessary and sucient for equilibrium in
stages 3 and 2, respectively, as shown in (5.2) and (5.7). The third condition
concerns the equilibrium in stage 1. First consider condition iii (a). In equilib-
rium, each rm's price bid should be his best response to others' price bids, i.e.,
a rm cannot decrease his costs by unilaterally changing his price. First, note
that no rm will change his bid price to induce the RSP to select his threshold
cycle time as the new replenishment cycle time because inducing his threshold
cycle time would lead to a cost equal to his stand{alone cost and he may achieve
a lower cost level if the threshold cycle time of another rm is chosen. Moreover,
for any i with ri = 0, rm j cannot force the RSP to select T
 =  i (0) since
the RSP cannot improve his payo by doing so. Similarly, if  i (r

i ) > 2T
d
j then
rm j has no incentive to induce  i (r

i ), as this will lead to higher costs than his
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stand{alone cost. Now consider a rm j and the case in which he is served by the
RSP ( j (r

j )  T (r)). His cost is therefore rj + 12jT (r). First, since T (r)
is optimal for RSP we haveX
kjk (rk)i (ri )
rkk   = i (ri ) 
X
kjk (rk)T (r)
rk   =T (r) 8i 2 N: (C.1)
Thus there does not exist a r0j that will lead to T
(r0j; r

 j) = 

i (r

i ) for which
T (r)   i (ri ) <  j (rj ).
In order for rm j not to deviate from rj , each r
0
j should lead to a higher cost,
so we should have
r0j +
1
2
jT
(r0j; r

 j)  rj  
1
2
jT
(r)  0; for all r0j 6= rj : (C.2)
However, T (r0j; r

 j) is equal to a threshold cycle time i.e., 

i (r

i ) for some i 2
N n fjg as stated in condition ii. This implies that,
T (r0j; r

 j) = 

i (r

i )) r0j +
X
k 6=j;k (rk)i (ri )
rk  = i (ri ): (C.3)
Combining (C.2) and (C.3), we have
rj +
X
k 6=j;k (rk)j (ri
rk 
1
2
j(

i (r

i )  T (r)) + = i (ri ); (C.4)
for all i; j for which  i (r

i )   j (rj )  T (r) or  j (rj )  T (r)   i (ri ).
Now consider a rm which is not served by the RSP ( j (r

j ) < T
(r)). His
cost is
p
2j. Since r

j is a best response to r

 j, we have,
r0j +
1
2
jT
(r0j; r

 j) 
p
2j  0; for all r0j 6= rj : (C.5)
Combining (C.5) and (C.3), we have,X
k 6=j;k (rk)i (ri )
rk 
1
2
j

i (r

i ) 
p
2j + =

i (r

i ) 8i; j :  j (rj ) < T (r):
(C.6)
Combining (C.4) and (C.6) yields condition iii (a). Now consider condition iii
(b). If T (r) =  n+1(r

n+1) = 1 then condition iii.(b) is trivially satised.
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Now, let T (r) =  ` (r

` ) for some ` 2 N . Then, !k = 1 for all k 2 N
with  k (r

k)   ` (r` ). In this case,
P
j2N r

j !

j (r
; T (r))  =T (r) should
be satised since otherwise, the RSP would not select  ` (r

` ) as T
(r). How-
ever,
P
j2N r

j !

j (r
; T (r)) > =T (r) cannot be true, since any rm k with
 k (r

k)   ` (r` ) and rk > 0 can decrease his price without changing the cycle
time and incur a smaller cost. 
C.2 Proof of Proposition 5.2:
We rst show (5.9). The minimum cycle time for coalition S can be found by
solving the following optimization problem:
min T (C.7)
subject to T   P
j2S rj
= 0; (C.8)
T   2
q
2
j
+ 2
rj
j
 0; 8j 2 S (C.9)
 rj  0; 8j 2 S (C.10)
If we relax the constraint (C.10), the Karush{Kuhn{Tucker conditions for opti-
mality are given as follows:
1 +  +
X
j2S
j = 0; (C.11)

(
P
j2S rj)
2
+ 2
j
j
= 0; 8j 2 S (C.12)
T   P
j2S rj
= 0; (C.13)
T   2
s
2
j
+ 2
rj
j
 0; 8j 2 S (C.14)
j
 
T   2
s
2
j
+ 2
rj
j
!
= 0; 8j 2 S (C.15)
j  0; 8j 2 S (C.16)
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Due to (C.11) and since j  0, we have    1. Since  < 0,  > 0 and j > 0
we have j > 0 due to (C.12). This shows that the constraint (C.9) in the relaxed
problem is always binding in an optimal solution. Therefore it suces to solve
T   P
j2S rj
= 0; (C.17)
T   2
s
2
j
+ 2
rj
j
= 0; 8j 2 S (C.18)
to nd the minimum equilibrium cycle time for the relaxed problem. The system
(C.17-C.18) leads to a quadratic equation for T . The smaller root of this equation
is
~TminS =
p
2
P
j2S
p
j  
q
(
P
j2S
p
j)2  
P
j2S jP
j2S j
: (C.19)
Now, denote aj =
p
j. We can rewrite ~T
min
S as
~TminS =
p
2
P
j2S aj  
q
2
P
i;j2S; i6=j aiaj
(
P
j2S aj)
2   2Pi;j2S; i 6=j aiaj
=
p
2
1P
j2S aj +
q
2
P
i;j2S; i 6=j aiaj
; (C.20)
which is clearly smaller than 2
q
2
j
= 2
p
2
aj
for all j 2 S and thus, ~TminS also
satises the constraint (C.10). This shows that ~TminS is also the optimal solution
of the original problem as given in (5.9).
We now turn to proving (5.10). The maximum cycle time for coalition S can
be found by solving the same optimization problem in (C.7-C.10), but this time
using a maximization objective. Again, if we relax the constraint (C.10), we now
have the same Karush{Kuhn{Tucker conditions (C.12{C.16), but now (C.11) is
replaced with
  1 +  +
X
j2S
j = 0: (C.21)
Using (C.21) and (C.12) and denoting cj =

(
P
j2S rj)2
, we have
cj(1 
X
i2S
i) + 2
j
j
= 0; 8j 2 S: (C.22)
131
Summing (C.22) over the set S, we get
X
j2S
cj
 
1 
X
j2S
j
!
+ 2
X
j2S
j
j
= 0; (C.23)
which shows that
P
j2S j > 1 since hj > 0 and j  0; 8j 2 S. Using this and
(C.22), we have j > 0; 8j 2 S which shows that the constraint (C.8) in the
relaxed maximization problem is also binding for all j 2 S. Thus, the maximum
cycle time for the relaxed problem is the larger root of the system (C.17{C.18)
which is given by
~TmaxS =
p
2
P
j2S
p
j +
q
(
P
j2S
p
j)2  
P
j2S jP
j2S j
: (C.24)
The solution in (C.24) satises the constraint (C.10) if ~TmaxS  2
q
2
j
for all
j 2 S. Otherwise, minj2S 2
q
2
j
is the maximum cycle time for coalition S as
(C.9) with j = argminj2S
q
2
j
is the tightest constraint for the maximization
problem. Then the solution in (5.10) follows. 
C.3 Proof of Proposition 5.3:
For (5.11), we need to show that Tmin = minSN TminS = T
min
N . Denoting aj =p
j, we have the expression (C.20) which is clearly minimized when S = N ,
which results in (5.11).
In order to nd the maximum cycle time, we need to solve Tmax =
maxSN TmaxS which potentially requires to search over 2
n 1 subsets of N . How-
ever, we next show that it suces to search over the subsets Pk, k = 1; 2; : : : ; n.
This is equivalent to showing
TmaxPk = maxSN;jSj=k
TmaxS : (C.25)
132
We will show (C.25) by induction. First TmaxS can be shown to be equal to
TmaxS = min
8<:minj2S
(
2
p
2
aj
)
;
p
2
1P
j2S aj  
q
2
P
i;j2S; i6=j aiaj
9=; : (C.26)
The statement (C.25) is certainly true for k = 1. Assume (C.25) is true for k.
Denoting  (Pk) =
P
i;j2Pk; i 6=j aiaj, we can write the maximum cycle time for the
set Pk [ f`g as
TmaxPk[f`g = min
8<:2
p
2
a`
;
p
2
1P
j2Pk aj + a`  
q
2  (Pk) + 2a`
P
j2Pk aj
9=; :
(C.27)
Now let us consider the two cases: ` = k + 1 and ` = h for some h > k + 1. If
TmaxPk[fk+1g = T
max
Pk+1 = 2
p
2
ak+1
. Then, TmaxPk+1  TmaxPk[fhg since 2
p
2
ak+1
 2
p
2
ah
 TmaxPk[fhg.
If TmaxPk+1 is realized at the second part of the minimum expression in (C.26), then
we can write the dierence of denominators of the second parts of the minimum
expression in (C.26) for ` = k + 1 and ` = h > k + 1 as
ak+1   ah +
s
2  (Pk) + 2ah
X
j2Pk
aj  
s
2  (Pk) + 2ak+1
X
j2Pk
aj: (C.28)
Multiplying with
q
2  (Pk) + 2ah
P
j2Pk aj +
q
2  (Pk) + ak+1
P
j2Pk aj), we get
(ak+1 ah)
0@s2  (Pk) + 2ah X
j2Pk
aj) +
s
2  (Pk) + 2ak+1
X
j2Pk
aj
1A+2(ah ak+1)X
j2Pk
aj;
(C.29)
which is non{positive since ah  ak+1  maxj2Pk aj and 2 (Pk)+2ah
P
j2Pk aj 
2  (Pk) + 2ak+1
P
j2Pk aj  (
P
j2Pk aj)
2. This also leads to TmaxPk[fk+1g  TmaxPk[f`g,
for all ` > k + 1 which completes the induction.
Now consider the case where TmaxPk = 2
p
2
ak
. This means that pk = 0, and the
constraint (C.9) for rm k sets an upper bound for TmaxPk . Since pk = 0, removing
rm k will only result in a larger maximum cycle time as this would remove the
upper bound. Thus TmaxPk  TmaxPk 1 . Thus it is sucient to search over ~TmaxPk for
Tmax. However, since ~TmaxPk is not monotone in k, one needs to nd the k value
that maximizes ~TmaxPk which leads to (5.12). 
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C.4 Proof of Proposition 5.4:
Let r = (r1; :::; r

n) be the rst{stage contributions that yield the ecient cycle
time T cN =
q
2
n
as a SPE outcome. By part (iii.b) of Proposition 5.1,
P
j2N r

j =

T cN
. By part (ii) of Proposition 5.1, there should be at least one rm j with
 j (r

j ) = T
c
N . Let M be the set of rms j such that 

j (r

j ) = T
c
N . For each j 2M ,
rm j's rst{stage bid rj must be such that his contribution to the order cost is
rj =
p
2(1  1=2pn).
For a rm in N nM , say rm i, his rst stage contribution ri must be such
that  i (r

i ) > T
c
N , i.e., rm i selects "In" in stage 3. If this is not the case, that is,
if  i (r

i ) < T
c
N , rm i's optimal action in stage 3 is "Out" and, thus, his total cost
is his stand{alone cost. But this cannot be part of a SPE since rm i can improve
his payo by bidding 0 in stage 1 and selecting "In" in stage 3, getting a better
cycle time T cN < T
d
i than his stand{alone cycle time at a lower replenishment
cost. Therefore, in a SPE outcome that yields T cN , all rms must be served.
In summary, by relabeling rm indices, we have
T (r) = T cN = 

1 (r

1) = ::: = 

m(r

m) < 

m+1(r

m+1)  :::   n(rn); (C.30)
and
RSP (r
; T cN ;!
(r; T cN)) = 0  (C.31)
RSP (r
;  m+1(r

m+1);!
(r;  m+1(r

m+1)))  (C.32)
:::  RSP (p;  n(rn);!(r;  n(rn))): (C.33)
Second, no rm i 2 N has any incentive to deviate from ri to a higher bid.
This is because, for a rm i 2 M , a bid r^i > ri (hence a lower  i (r^i) leads the
RSP to select  i (r^i) or a strictly higher cycle time than T
c
N since the contributions
from other rms are no longer sucient to cover the cost of T cN . In either case,
rm i's total cost is unaected. Thus, no rm i 2M can improve his total cost by
increasing his bid above ri . For a rm i 2 N nM , deviating to higher bid r^i > ri ,
can lead to one of two possible cases depending on r^i: the RSP's stage{two cycle
time response may be  i (r^i) or T
c
N . In either case, rm i's total cost becomes
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worse. Therefore, no rm in N nM has an incentive to deviate to a higher bid
either.
As the RSP's revenue just covers the order cost in a SPE outcome, we can also
rule out protable deviations to a lower price for rm n since the RSP's response
to a lower bid r^n < r

n by rm n would be to select n+1 =1.
We start with identifying the conditions for ruling out possible deviations to
lower bids for rms in M . Dene NnM = minj2NnM  j (r

j ). For a rm j 2 M
inducing NnM is better than inducing any  i (ri) for i 2 N nM by lemma C.1.
Thus, maximizing NnM minimizes the deviation possibility of rms in M . To
obtain the maximum possible NnM value, we must assign as many rms j 2 N
as possible to setM and distribute the remaining payment equally to the rms in
N nM . The former follows since increasing the number of rms in M decreases
the remaining payment to rms in N nM thus increases NnM and latter follows
since dividing the remaining payment equally leads to equal  values for all rms
in N nM thus maximizes NnM .
Dene b(n) as the solution to

T cN
  b(n) p2(1  1
2
p
n
)

= 0: (C.34)
Straightforward substitutions yield b(n) = n=(2
p
n   1). Since b(n) is not
necessarily an integer, the maximum possible number of rms in set M is
bb(n)c, that is, M = f1; ::; bb(n)cg. Since bb(n)c rms in M each contributep
2(1   1=2pn), the rms in N n M need to contribute a total payment of
(
p
n
2
  bb(n)c(p2(1  1=2pn)))c) to satisfy condition (iii)-b in Proposition
5.1. Dividing this total payment equally, each of the n  bb(n)c rms in N nM ,
contributes rj = (
p
n
2
  bb(n)c(p2(1  1=2pn)))=(n  bb(n)c) and the cor-
responding threshold cycle time is
 j (r

j ) = NnM = 2
r
2

  2
(
p
n
2
  bb(n)c(p2(1  1
2
p
n
))
(n  bb(n)c) : (C.35)
For any rm j 2 M a deviation to NnM is not protable if and only if
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condition (iii)-a of Proposition 5.1 is satised, i.e.,
rj +
X
k2NnM
rk 
1
2
(NnM   T cN) +

NnM
: (C.36)
Substituting for rj and r

k on the left{hand side of (C.36) and rearranging, we get
p
2 +
r
n
2
  bb(n)c(
p
2(1  1
2
p
n
))  1
2
NnM   
NnM
 0: (C.37)
Plugging the value of NnM from (C.35) in (C.37) and rearranging terms, we
obtain
(
r
n
2
  bb(n)c
p
2(1  1
2
p
n
))(1 +
1
n  bb(n)c)
  
2
q
2

  2 (
p
n
2
 bb(n)c(p2(1  1
2
p
n
))
(n bb(n)c)
 0:
Finally, using
p
n
2
= b(n)(
p
2(1 1=2pn)) and dividing both sides by p2
we obtain
(b(n)  bb(n)c)(1  1
2
p
n
))(1 +
1
n  bb(n)c) 
1
4(1  b(n) bb(n)c
n bb(n)c (1  12pn))
 0:
(C.38)

Lemma C.1. For a rm j 2M inducing NnM is better than inducing any  i (ri)
for i 2 N nM .
Proof: In order to prove the lemma we only need to show that deviating to the
rm with the smallest cycle time is always better than deviating to the others.
Assume that rms k; ` 2 N nM satisfy k(rk) < `(r`) so rk > r` and further
assume that k = NnM and ` < i for all i 2 N n (M
S
k). Thus,X
i2NnM ji (ri)k
ri = (
r
n
2
  bb(n)c(
p
2(1  1=2pn)))c) (C.39)
and X
i2NnM ji (ri)`
ri = (
r
n
2
  bb(n)c(
p
2(1  1=2pn)))c)  rk (C.40)
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If we can show that deviating to k is always better than deviating to ` we are
done. For k > T
d
k this is denitely true since the cost function is increasing in
cycle time.
Consider the deviation of rm j 2 M and let r0j and r00j be the necessary
contributions of rm j for the RSP to select k and ` respectively. For the rm
j to prefer ` we must have:
r00j +
1
2
` < r
0
j +
1
2
k
using rk =
p
2  1
2
k and r` =
p
2  1
2
` we obtain
0 < rk   r` < r0j   r00j (C.41)
Now, for the RSP to select ` we should have
r00j +
X
i6=jji (ri)`
ri   
 ` (r`)
 0
and
r0j +
X
i 6=jji (ri)k
ri   
 k (rk)
< r00j +
X
i6=jji (ri)`
ri   
 ` (r`)
By plugging (C.39) and (C.40) and making the obvious simplications we obtain:
r0j  

 k (rk)
< r00j   rk  

 ` (r`)
Rearranging the terms and adding (C.41) yield:
rk   r` < r0j   r00j <

 k (rk)
  rk   
 ` (r`)
Further rearranging yields:
2rk   
 k (rk)
< r`   
 ` (r`)
which forms a contradiction. 
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APPENDIX D
Design and Analysis of
Mechanisms for Decentralized
Joint Replenishment
D.1 Proof of Proposition 6.1
In order for rm i to be truth telling its cost should be minimized at ^i = i
when all other rms are truth telling, i.e, ^j = j for j 2 N n fig. The rst order
condition in this case is:
dCdmi (^i; i)
d^i

^i=i
=  1
2
r

2
i(
X
j2N
j)
 3=2 +
r
1
2
0(i; i)(
X
j2N
j)
1=2
+
1
2
r
1
2
(i; i)(
X
j2N
j)
 1=2 = 0
where 0(i; i) =
d(^i; i)
d^i
j^i=i .
Rearranging the terms yieldr
1
2
0(i; i)(
X
j2N
j)
1=2 +
1
2
r
1
2
(i; i)(
X
j2N
j)
 1=2 =
1
2
r

2
i(
X
j2N
j)
 3=2:
138
Multiplying both sides by
p
2, we get
0(i; i)(
X
j2N
j)
1=2 +
1
2
(i; i)(
X
j2N
j)
 1=2 =

2
i(
X
j2N
j)
 3=2: (D.1)
The left hand side of the equation (D.1) is the derivative of (i; i)(
P
j2N j)
1=2
with respect to i. Thus the rst order condition takes the form
d[(i; i)(
P
j2N j)
1=2]
di
=

2
i(
X
j2N
j)
 3=2:
Solving the dierential equation gives
(i; i)(i +
X
j 6=i
j)
1=2 =

2
Z i
t=0
t(t+
X
j 6=i
j)
 3=2dt+ c =
(t+ 2
P
j 6=i j)
(t+
P
j 6=i j)
1=2

t=i
t=0
+ c:
The cost share function a is then given by
(i; i) =
(i + 2
P
j 6=i j)
(i +
P
j 6=i j)
  2(
P
j 6=i j)
1=2
(i +
P
j 6=i j)
1=2
+ c:
The integration constant c can be found by using the fact (0; i) = 0.
(0; i) =
(0 + 2
P
j 6=i j)
(0 +
P
j 6=i j)
  2(
P
j 6=i j)
1=2
(0 +
P
j 6=i j)
1=2
+ c = c;
which shows that the constant c = 0. Therefore, the cost share function is given
by
(i; i) =
(i + 2
P
j 6=i j)
(i +
P
j 6=i j)
  2(
P
j 6=i j)
1=2
(i +
P
j 6=i j)
1=2
:
Using the share function (^i; i) we can nd the cost of rm i as
Cdmi (^i; i) =
r

2
(i + ^i + 2
P
j 6=i j)
(^i +
P
j 6=i j)
1=2
 
p
2(
X
j 6=i
j)
1=2:
In order to show that incentive compatibility constraint is globally satised, we
rst need to prove that the cost function is strictly quasi{convex. By denition,
Cdmi (^i; i) is quasi{convex in ^i if the set Q(b) = f^i : Cdmi (^i; i)  bg is a
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convex set for any b 2 R. Now, take any f0i; 00i g 2 Q(b). First, since 0i 2 Q(b),
we have Cdmi (
0
i; i)  b, orr

2
(i + 
0
i + 2
P
j 6=i j)
(0i +
P
j 6=i j)
1=2
 
p
2(
X
j 6=i
j)
1=2  b
)
r

2
(i + 
0
i + 2
P
j 6=i j)
(0i +
P
j 6=i j)
1=2
 b+
p
2(
X
j 6=i
j)
1=2
) (i + 
0
i + 2
P
j 6=i j)
(0i +
P
j 6=i j)
1=2

r
2

 
b+
p
2(
X
j 6=i
j)
1=2
!
:
Denoting
q
2


b+
p
2(
P
j 6=i j)
1=2

= b we have
(i + 
0
i + 2
P
j 6=i j)
(0i +
P
j 6=i j)
1=2
 b: (D.2)
Similarly, Cdmi (
00
i ; i) < b and using the same steps we obtain:
(i + 
00
i + 2
P
j 6=i j)
(00i +
P
j 6=i j)
1=2
 b: (D.3)
For Q(b) to be a convex set, for any  2 [ 0; 1], 0i + (1   )00i 2 Q(b) should
be satised, i.e., we must have
(i + 
0
i + (1  )00i + 2
P
j 6=i j)
(0i + (1  )00i +
P
j 6=i j)
1=2
 b: (D.4)
Now, we rst take the square of (D.2) and (D.3) and then multiply the rst one
with  and second one with 1  . Finally we sum them up to get:
(i + 
0
i + 2
X
j 6=i
j)
2 + (1  )(i + 00i + 2
X
j 6=i
j)
2  (b)2(0i + (1  )00i +
X
j 6=i
j):
Simplifying the left hand side yields
( + 0i + (1  )00i + 2
X
j 6=i
j)
2 + (0i   00i )2(1  )  (b)2(0i + (1  )00i +
X
j 6=i
j);
which can be written as:
( + 0i + (1  )00i + 2
P
j 6=i j)
2
(0i + (1  )00i +
P
j 6=i j)
+
(0i   00i )2(1  )
(0i + (1  )00i +
P
j 6=i j)
 (b)2:(D.5)
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Since the second term on the left hand side of equation (D.5) is non{negative we
have
( + 0i + (1  )00i + 2
P
j 6=i j)
2
(0i + (1  )00i +
P
j 6=i j)
 (b)2:
This shows that (D.4) is satised and 0i + (1   )00i 2 Q(b). Thus, Q(b) is a
convex set and Cdmi (^i;  i) is a quasi{convex function.
The second order derivative of Cdmi (^i; i) at the point ^i = i is
d2Cdmi (^i; i)
d^2i

^i=i
=
1
2
r

2
(i +
X
j 6=i
j)
 3=2
which is always positive. Therefore Cdmi (^i; i) is convex at i. Since
Cdmi (^i; i) is also strictly quasi{convex, it has a global minimum at ^i = i.
Thus, global incentive compatibility is satised.
Next, we show that the individual rationality constraint is satised. For this
purpose, we need to show that a rm should not have a better payo if it rejects
the mechanism. In other words, its decentralized cost should be higher that the
cost it would obtain through the mechanism. At the point ^i = i the cost
function takes the form
Cdmi (i; i) =
r

2
i(i +
X
j 6=i
j)
 1=2 +
r

2
(i + 2
P
j 6=i j)
(i +
P
j 6=i j)
1=2
 
p
2(
X
j 6=i
j)
1=2:
Further manipulation yields:
Cdmi (i; i) =
p
2(i +
X
j 6=i
j)
1=2  
p
2(
X
j 6=i
j)
1=2;
which is denitely less than Cdi =
p
2i by the concavity of the square root
function. Thus, individual rationality is satised.
Our nal step is to determine whether the budget{balance condition is sat-
ised, i.e., whether the sum of the contributions determined through the direct
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mechanism is enough to nance the xed order cost . Total contributions col-
lected from the rms isX
i2N
(i; i) =
X
i2N
(i + 2
P
j 6=i j)
(
P
j2N j)
 
X
i2N
2(
P
j 6=i j)
1=2
(
P
j2N j)
1=2
= (2n  1) 
X
i2N
2(
P
j 6=i j)
1=2
(
P
j2N j)
1=2
= (2n  1) 
X
i2N
2(
P
j 6=i j)
1=2(
P
j2N j)
1=2
(
P
j2N j)
< (2n  1) 
X
i2N
2(
P
j 6=i j)
(
P
j2N j)
= (2n  1)  2(n  1) = ;
which shows that sum of the allocations is smaller than  so budget{balance con-
straint is not satised. 
D.2 Proof of Proposition 6.2
Summing (6.3) over all i 2 N yields:
X
i2N
f2i =
 X
i2N
si
! 1 X
i2N
si
!2=0@X
i2N
si
X
i2N
s i +
X
i2N
si   
X
i2N
s2 i
X
i2N
si
 X
i2N
si
! 11A
=
 X
i2N
si
! 2 X
i2N
si
!2=0@X
i2N
si
X
i2N
s i
X
i2N
si +
 X
i2N
si
!2
  
X
i2N
s2 i
X
i2N
si
1A
=
 X
i2N
si
! 2 X
i2N
si
!2=0@
0@2X
i 6=j
si s

j +
X
i 6=j
s+i s
 
j +
X
i 6=j;j 6=k
si s

js
 
k
1A+ X
i2N
si
!21A
=
 X
i2N
si
!2=0@ X
i2N
si
! 2

0@2X
i 6=j
si s

j +
X
i 6=j
s+i s
 
j +
X
i 6=j;j 6=k
si s

js
 
k
1A+ 1
1A :
Dividing both sides by
P
i2N s

i
2=
leads to the desired result. 
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D.3 Proof of Proposition 6.4
For the single parameter case the second derivative of the payo function is as
follows:
@C1pi (s^)
@s^i

s^=s
=  f2i (   1)s 2i
0@X
j2N
sj
1A  1 1   f2i ( 1  )s2 2i
0@X
j2N
sj
1A  1 2
+(   1)s 2i
0@X
j2N
sj
1A 1 1 + (1  )s2 2i
0@X
j2N
sj
1A 1 2
+(1  )(2   1)s2 2i
0@X
j2N
sj
1A 1 2 + (1  )(1  2)s3 2i
0@X
j2N
sj
1A 1 3 :
Factoring the expression, we obtain
@C1pi (s^)
@s^i

s^=s
= s 2i
0@X
j2N
sj
1A  1 3
0B@f2i
0@X
j2N
sj
1A0@(1  )
0@X
j2N
sj
1A+ (1 + )si
1A+ (   1)
0@X
j2N
sj
1A 2 0@X
j 6=i
sj
1A0@
0@X
j2N
sj
1A  (2   1)si
1A
1CA :
For convexity, the argument above should be non{negative. Using this, we get
the following condition:
(   1)
0@X
j2N
sj
1A 2 10@X
j 6=i
sj
1A0@
0@X
j2N
sj
1A  (2   1)si
1A  f2i
0@(   1)
0@X
j2N
sj
1A  (1 + )si
1A :
Using (6.8) and (6.10) in the inequality, we get
(   1)
0@ Pj2N f2j
(n  1) + 1
! 
2
1A
2

 10@ Pj2N f2j
(n  1) + 1
! 
2
 

P
j2N f
2
j   ((n  1) + 1) f2i
((n  1) + 1) (   1)
 P
j2N f
2
j
(n  1) + 1
!=2 11A
0@ Pj2N f2j
(n  1) + 1
! 
2
  (2   1)

P
j2N f
2
j   ((n  1) + 1) f2i
((n  1) + 1) (   1)
 P
j2N f
2
j
(n  1) + 1
!=2 11A
 f2i
0@(   1) Pj2N f2j
(n  1) + 1
! 
2
  (1 + )

P
j2N f
2
j   ((n  1) + 1) f2i
((n  1) + 1) (   1)
 P
j2N f
2
j
(n  1) + 1
!=2 11A :
Simplifying the terms yields
(   1)
 
((n  1) + 1) f2i  
P
j2N f
2
j
((n  1) + 1) (   1)
! 
(2   1) ((n  1) + 1) f2i   2
P
j2N f
2
j
((n  1) + 1) (   1)
!
 f2i
 
( + 1) ((n  1) + 1) f2i   (3   1)
P
j2N f
2
j
((n  1) + 1) (   1)
!
:
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Next, we consider the cases for  > 1 and  < 1 separately since the equilib-
rium conditions for both cases are dierent. For  > 1 the condition is: 
((n  1) + 1) f 2i  
X
j2N
f 2j
! 
(2   1) ((n  1) + 1) f 2i   2
X
j2N
f 2j
!
 f 2i ((n  1) + 1)
 
( + 1) ((n  1) + 1) f 2i   (3   1)
X
j2N
f 2j
!
:
Denote E = ((n  1) + 1) f 2i and F =
P
j2N f
2
j and the condition simplies to:
(E   F )  (2   1)E   2F  E (( + 1)E   (3   1)F )
) (2   1)E2   2EF   (2   1)EF + 2F 2  ( + 1)E2   (3   1)EF
) (   2)E2   (2   )EF + 2F 2  0
) (F   (   2)E)(F   E)  0:
By Proposition 6.3, F   E > 0. Thus we must have:

X
j2N
f 2j   (   2) ((n  1) + 1) f 2i  0:
For  < 1,
(E   F )  (2   1)E   2F  E (( + 1)E   (3   1)F )
) (2   1)E2   2EF   (2   1)EF + 2F 2  ( + 1)E2   (3   1)EF
) (   2)E2   (2   )EF + 2F 2  0
) (F   (   2)E)(F   E)  0:
Again by Proposition 6.3, F   E < 0. Thus we must have:

X
j2N
f 2j   (   2) ((n  1) + 1) f 2i  0;
which is same as what get for  > 1. 
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APPENDIX E
Newsvendor Duopoly With
Asymmetric Information
E.1 Proof of Theorem 7.1
First, dene Y2 =  Q2 so that Q1Y2 is a lattice (This order change is necessary
to form a supermodular game). Moreover, let t1 =  c1, t2 = c2 and dene
eective demand functions as Ri : tj ! <. Then for
1(Q1; y2; t1; t2) = E[minfR1(t2); Q1g] + t1Q1;
2(Q1; y2; t1; t2) = E[minfR2(t1); y2g] + t2y2:
The supermodularity and continuity of these functions and the increasing dif-
ferences in (Q1; y2) are proved in [30]. The only thing remains is to show
that 1 has increasing dierences in (Q1; t1) and 2 has increasing dierences
in (y2; t2) (Again, i is not directly dependent on the type of rm j. Hence,
increasing dierences for (Q1; t2) and (y2; t1) are trivially satised.). Let &1(t1) =
1(Q
0
1; y2; t1; t2)  1(Q1; y2; t1; t2) where Q01  Q1 for given y2; t2. Then
&1(t1) = E[minfR1(t2); Q01g]  E[minfR1(t2); Q1g] + t1[Q01  Q1]:
Dene t01 such that t
0
1  t1. It follows that &(t01)  &(t1) = [t01   t1][Q01  Q1]  0.
Thus 1 has increasing dierences in (Q1; t1). Similarly, &2(t2) = 2(Q1; y
0
2; t1; t2) 
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2(Q1; y2; t1; t2) where y
0
2  y2 for given Q1; t1. Then
&2(t2) = E[minfR2(t1); y02g]  E[minfR2(t1); y2g] + t2[y02   y2]:
Dene t02 such that t
0
2  t2. It follows that &(t02)   &(t2) = [t02   t2][y02   y2]  0.
Thus 2 has increasing dierences in (y2; t2). Since our priors over the types
are independent, the condition for priors to be increasing with respect to types
is trivially satised. The existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium follows. 
E.2 Proof of Claims 7.1{7.4 and Lemmas 7.2{
7.5
Proof of Claim 7.1: Let minfs 1(x); s^ 1(y)g = s^ 1(y), i.e., s 1(x)  s^ 1(y).
Suppose, to get a contradiction, that s 1(x) < x + y: Then x < s(x + y) =
x+ y   s^(x+ y); since s^(x) = x  s(x): Thus, s^(x+ y) < y; and x+ y < s^ 1(y):
Therefore, s 1(x) < s^ 1(y); yielding a contradiction. The second inequality is
established similarly. 
Proof of Claim 7.2: Pr(D1  Qo1H) = Pr(D  s 1(Qo1H)) = c1H  c2H =
Pr(D  s^ 1(Qo2H)).
Hence, s 1(Qo1H)  s^ 1(Qo2H). 
Proof of Claim 7.3: (i) (1) evaluated at Q1L = Q

1H is positive.
(ii) Similar argument with (i). 
Proof of Claim 7.4: We will only show (i). Other cases are established
similarly. Evaluating the left hand side of (1) at Q1L = Q
o
1L gives:
q Pr(D1 + (D2  Q2H)+  Qo1L) + (1  q)Pr(D1 + (D2  Q2L)+  Qo1L)  c1L
 q Pr(D1  Qo1L) + (1  q)Pr(D1  Qo1L)  c1L = Pr(D1  Qo1L)  c1L = 0
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Thus, Q1L  Qo1L. 
Proof of Lemma 7.2: Assume that s 1(Q1H) > s^
 1(Q2H). First note that,
Pr(D2 + (D1  Q1)+  Q2)
= Pr(D  s 1(Q1); D  Q1 +Q2) + Pr(D  s 1(Q1); D  s^ 1(Q2)):
By substituting this in (4) we obtain:
pPr(D  s 1(Q1H); D  Q2H +Q1H) + pPr(D  s 1(Q1H); D  s^ 1(Q2H))
+(1  p)Pr(D  s 1(Q1L); D  Q2H +Q1L)
+(1  p)Pr(D  s 1(Q1L); D  s^ 1(Q2H))  c2H = 0
Since s 1(Q1H) > s^
 1(Q2H), s
 1(Q1L) > s^
 1(Q2H) by Claim 3. By Claim 1,
Pr(D  s 1(Q1H); D  Q2H +Q1H) = Pr(D  s 1(Q1H). In addition, Pr(D 
s 1(Q1H)) + Pr(s^
 1(Q2H)  D  s 1(Q1H)) = Pr(D  s^ 1(Q2H)). Therefore,
pPr(D  s^ 1(Q2H)) + (1  p)Pr(D  s^ 1(Q2H))  c2H = Pr(D  s^ 1(Q2H))  c2H = 0:
Thus, Q2H = Q
o
2H . Using s
 1(Q1H)  s^ 1(Q2H) < s^ 1(Q2L) in (2) in a similar
fashion gives the result Q1H = Q
o
1H . 
Proof of Lemma 7.3: Assume to the contrary that for c1H  c2H ,
s 1(Q1H) < s^
 1(Q2H). Then, by Lemma 1, Q

1H = Q
o
1H . By Claims 2 and
3, we get s 1(Q1H)  s 1(Qo1H)  s^ 1(Qo2H) and
Pr(D  Q2H +Q1H)  Pr(D  Qo2H +Qo1H)
< Pr(D  Qo2H + s^(s 1(Qo2H))) = Pr(s^(D)  Qo2H) = c2H : ()
Now, we have either s 1(Q1L) > s^
 1(Q2H) or s
 1(Q1L)  s^ 1(Q2H). In the
rst case equilibrium condition (4) simplies to:
c2H = pPr(D  Q2H +Q1H) + (1  p)Pr(s^(D)  Q2H)
 pPr(D  Q2H +Q1H) + (1  p)c2H ;
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since Pr(s^(D)  Q2H)  Pr(s^(D)  Qo2H) by Claim 4 and Pr(s^(D)  Qo2H) =
c2H by denition. This leads to
c2H  pPr(D  Q2H +Q1H) + (1  p)c2H
 Pr(D  Q2H +Q1H);
which is a contradiction to ().
For the second case, the equilibrium condition (4) simplies to:
c2H = pPr(D  Q2H +Q1H) + (1  p)Pr(D  Q2H +Q1L)
< Pr(D  Q2H +Q1H);
since Q1L > Q

1H by Claim 3. Again this contradicts (). 
Proof of Lemma 7.4: By Lemma 2, c1H  c2H implies s 1(Q1H) 
s^ 1(Q2H). Using this condition in Lemma 1 yields the desired result. 
Proof of Lemma 7.5: First note that QoiL and Q
o
iH are stand-alone order
levels for rms i = 1; 2. It is important to notice that each rm will at least play
his stand-alone order quantity in the equilibrium. Now, dene Q12H as the order
level of high type of rm 2 when rm 1 plays his stand-alone quantities for both
his types in the equilibrium i.e.,
pPr(s^(D) + (s(D) Qo1H)+
 Q12H) + (1  p)Pr(s^(D) + (s(D) Qo1L)+  Q12H)  c2H = 0:
and Q12H  Qo2H since rm 2 will play at least his stand-alone order level. Rewrit-
ing the equilibrium condition gives,
pPr(D  s 1(Qo1); D  Qo1H +Q12H) + pPr(D  s 1(Qo1H); D  s^ 1(Q12H))
+(1  p)Pr(D  s 1(Qo1L); D  Qo1L +Q12H)
+(1  p)Pr(D  s 1(Qo1L); D  s^ 1(Q12H))  c2H = 0:
For this equilibrium condition, we have three possibilities: s^ 1(Q12H)  s 1(Qo1H),
s 1(Qo1H) < s^
 1(Q12H)  s 1(Qo1L) and s 1(Qo1L) < s^ 1(Q12H). First assume
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s^ 1(Q12H)  s 1(Qo1H), then the equilibrium condition becomes:
pPr(D  s^ 1(Q12H)) + (1  p)Pr(D  s^ 1(Q12H))  c2H = Pr(D  s^ 1(Q12H))  c2H = 0:
Thus, Q12H = Q
o
2H . Now, we assume that s
 1(Qo1H) < s^
 1(Q12H) < s
 1(Qo1L).
Moreover, if we use the fact that s 1(Qo1H) < Q
o
1H + Q
1
2H (by Claim 1), the
condition becomes
0 = pPr(D  Qo1H +Q12H) + (1  p)Pr(D  s^ 1(Q12H))  c2H
< pPr(D  s 1(Qo1H)) + (1  p)Pr(D  s 1(Qo1H))  c2H
= Pr(D  s 1(Qo1H))  c2H = c1H   c2H
Thus, c1H > c2H which is a contradiction to our assumption that c1H  c2H .
A similar proof can be obtained for s 1(Qo1L)  s^ 1(Q12H). Hence, Q12H = Qo2H
which implies that any order quantity of high type of rm 2 satises Q2H  Qo2H .
Combining this with the fact that Q2H  Qo2H , we obtain Q2H = Qo2H . 
E.3 Proof of Theorem 7.2
Under an increasing and deterministic split function, we know that there is a
unique Bayesian{Nash equilibrium and using Lemma 3, our unique equilibrium
conditions take the form:
q Pr(D  Q1L + s^(G
 1
(c2H))) + (1  q)Pr(D1 + (D2  Q2L)+  Q1L) = c1L;
q Pr(D  Q1H + s^(G
 1
(c2H))) + (1  q)Pr(D1 + (D2  Q2L)+  Q1H) = c1H ;
p Pr(D2 + (D1  Q1H)+  Q2L) + (1  p)Pr(D2 + (D1  Q1L)+  Q2L) = c2L;
Q2H = s^(G
 1
(c2H)):
Now, if we use D1 = s(D) and D2 = s^(D) and use the fact that,
Pr(D1 + (D2  Q2)+  Q1)
= Pr(D  s^ 1(Q2); D  Q2 +Q1) + Pr(D  s^ 1(Q2); D  s 1(Q1));
P r(D2 + (D1  Q1)+  Q2)
= Pr(D  s 1(Q1); D  Q1 +Q2) + Pr(D  s 1(Q1); D  s^ 1(Q2));
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which can be obtained using a simple conditional probability argument, equilib-
rium conditions will become:
q Pr(D  Q1L + s^(G
 1
(c2H))) + (1  q)Pr(D  s^ 1(Q2L); D  Q2L +Q1L)
+(1  q)Pr(D  s^ 1(Q2L); D  s 1(Q1L)) = c1L; (A1)
q Pr(D  Q1H + s^(G
 1
(c2H))) + (1  q)Pr(D  s^ 1(Q2L); D  Q2L +Q1H)
+(1  q)Pr(D  s^ 1(Q2L); D  s 1(Q1H)) = c1H ; (A2)
pPr(D  s 1(Q1H); D  Q2L +Q1H) + pPr(D  s 1(Q1H); D  s^ 1(Q2L))
+(1  p)Pr(D  s 1(Q1L); D  Q2L +Q1L)
+(1  p)Pr(D  s 1(Q1L); D  s^ 1(Q2L)) = c2L; (A3)
Q2H = s^(G
 1
(c2H)): (A4)
The proof of part 1 follows since Q2H = s^(G
 1
(c2H)) is obviously an equilibrium
condition.
Part 2 has three separate subsets. To prove (i), let s^ 1(Q2L)  s 1(Q1L).
(A1) becomes (i1):
qG(Q1L + s^(G
 1
(c2H))) + (1  q)Pr(D  s^ 1(Q2L); D  Q2L +Q1L)
+(1  q)Pr(D  s^ 1(Q2L); D  s 1(Q1L))
= qG(Q1L + s^(G
 1
(c2H))) + (1  q)Pr(D  s 1(Q1L))
= qG(Q1L + s^(G
 1
(c2H))) + (1  q)G 1(s 1(Q1L)) = c1L:
Similarly, using the fact that s^ 1(Q2L)  s 1(Q1L) implies s^ 1(Q2L)  s 1(Q1H),
(A2) becomes (i2):
qG(Q1H + s^(G
 1
(c2H))) + (1  q)Pr(D  s^ 1(Q2L); D  Q2L +Q1H)
+(1  q)Pr(D  s^ 1(Q2L); D  s 1(Q1H))
= qG(Q1L + s^(G
 1
(c2H))) + (1  q)Pr(D  s 1(Q1H))
= qG(Q1H + s^(G
 1
(c2H))) + (1  q)G 1(s 1(Q1H)) = c1H :
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And combining two inequalities, (A3) becomes (i3):
pPr(D  s 1(Q1H); D  Q2L +Q1H) + pPr(D  s 1(Q1H); D  s^ 1(Q2L))
+(1  p)Pr(D  s 1(Q1L); D  Q2L +Q1L) + (1  p)Pr(D  s 1(Q1L); D  s^ 1(Q2L))
= pPr(D  Q2L +Q1H) + (1  p)Pr(D  Q2L +Q1L)
= pG
 1
(D  Q2L +Q1H) + (1  p)G 1(D  Q2L +Q1L) = c2L:
The proof for (ii) and (iii) follows similarly under s 1(Q1L) > s^
 1(Q2L) 
s 1(Q1H) and s
 1(Q1H) > s^
 1(Q2L). 
E.4 Proof of Theorem 7.3
First, since the demand has a continuous distribution, the inverse of distribution
function G and G are well-dened. Only one of the (i),(ii) or (iii) given in
Theorem 7.2 can be satised since a vector of order quantities satisfying one of
the inequality conditions (i4),(ii4) or (iii4) cannot satisfy others.
Take the region (i). There can be only one Q1L satisfying condition (i1) which
is:
qG(Q1L + s^(G
 1
(c2H))) + (1  q)G(s 1(Q1L)) = c1L;
since s 1, s^ 1 and G
 1
gives unique results and it does not depend on any other
variables. Similarly, only one Q1H satises (i2):
qG(Q1H + s^(G
 1
(c2H))) + (1  q)G(s 1(Q1H)) = c1H :
Since both Q1L and Q

1H are unique, (i3) i.e.,
pG(Q2L +Q

1H) + (1  p)G(Q2L +Q1L) = c2L;
also gives a unique Q2L. Thus, the set of order quantities satisfying region (i) is
unique.
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Similar arguments are valid for regions (ii) and (iii). The argument so far
does not rule out multiple equilibria each of which is the unique solution of one
of three blocks of equalities. Finally, we need to show that only one of that three
cases can arise.
Assume to the contrary that case (i) and (ii) gives dierent solutions. Now, let
(Q1L; Q

1H ; Q

2L; Q

2H) and (Q^1L; Q^1H ; Q^2L; Q^2H) be the solutions of cases (i) and
(ii) respectively. First notice that Q1H = Q^1H = Q1H and Q

2H = Q^2H = Q2H
since they require the same conditions. However, low type quantities should
satisfy:
q G(Q1L +Q2H) + (1  q) G(s 1(Q1L)) = q G(Q^1L +Q2H) + (1  q) G(Q^2L + Q^1L)
p G(Q2L +Q1H) + (1  p) G(Q2L +Q1L) = p G(Q^2L +Q1H) + (1  p) G(s^ 1(Q^2L))
s^ 1(Q2L)  Q1L + Q2L  s 1(Q1L)
s^ 1(Q^2L) < Q^1L + Q^2L < s 1(Q^1L)
where inequalities come from Claim 4. Thus, we have
q G(Q1L +Q2H) + (1  q) G(s 1(Q1L)) > qG(Q^1L +Q2H) + (1  q) G(s 1(Q^1L))
p G(Q2L +Q1H) + (1  p) G(s^ 1(Q2L)) < p G(Q^2L +Q1H) + (1  p) G(s^ 1(Q^2L))
which implies Q1L < Q^1L and Q

2L > Q^2L (Remember that G is a decreasing
function.). If we use this in equilibrium conditions,
G(s 1(Q1L)) < G(Q^2L + Q^1L)
G(Q2L +Q

1L) > G(s^
 1(Q^2L))
meaning that both Q1L + Q

2L > s
 1(Q1L) > Q^2L + Q^1L and Q^2L + Q^1L >
s^ 1(Q^2L) > Q2L + Q

1L should be true, which is a contradiction. The proof for
other cases are similar.
Thus, the solution given by Theorem 7.2 is unique. 
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E.5 Proof of Theorem 7.4
Let GA and GB be the distribution functions of DA and DB, respectively. DA
stochastically dominates DB. Thus, GA(x)  GB(x) and GA(x)  GB(x) for all
x. Since GA and GB are decreasing functions, G
 1
A (y)  G  1B (y) for all y. We
dene (QA1L; Q
A
1H ; Q
A
2L; Q
A
2H) and (Q
B
1L; Q
B
1H ; Q
B
2L; Q
B
2H) as the equilibrium order
quantities for DA and DB, respectively.
Returning to the result of Theorem 7.2, we have three possible cases. Consider
the equilibrium conditions in case (i). Now, since s^ is an increasing function,
there exists 2H = Q
A
2H  QB2H = s^(G
 1
A (c2H))  s^(G  1B (c2H))  0. Note that, the
stock{out probability of rm 2 under high type does not change.
Now, by (i2),
q GA(Q
A
1L+Q
A
2H)+(1 q) GA(s 1(QA1L)) = q GB(QB1L+QB2H)+(1 q) GB(s 1(QB1L)):
Since the stock{out probability of rm 2 under high type does not change and
low type of rm 1 gets spillover only from high type of rm 2, the probability of
rm 1's getting a spillover should not change.
Let 1L = Q
A
1L  QB1L. We can rewrite the equilibrium condition as,
q GA(Q
A
1L +Q
A
2H) + (1  q) GA(s 1(QA1L))
= q GB(Q
A
1L +Q
A
2H   1L   2H) + (1  q) GB(s 1(QA1L   1L)):
We know that for any fx1; x2g, if GA(x1) = GB(x2) then x1  x2. Moreover,
since the spillover probability does not change, GA(s
 1(QA1L))  GB(s 1(QA1L))
should be satised. Thus, the dierence between order quantities is positive, i.e.,
1L  0 and QA1L  QB1L.
By a similar argument for (i2), 1H = Q
A
1H  QB1H  0.
For (i3), we have
p GA(Q
A
2L +Q
A
1H) + (1  p) GA(QA2L +Q1L)
= p GB(Q
B
2L +Q
A
1H   1H) + (1  p) GB(QB2L +QA1L   1L):
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From previous argument, we know that the stock{out probability of rm 1 does
not change with a stochastic increase in demand distribution. (Equilibrium order
quantities increase to compensate the change in demand distribution.) Using a
similar argument for (i3), 2L = Q
A
2L   QB2L  0. Thus all the equilibrium order
quantities increase.
Similar proof for cases (ii) and (iii). 
E.6 Proof of Theorem 7.5
As s increases uniformly, s^ 1 increase, s^ and s 1 decreases. From Theorem 7.2,
as s increases, Q2H decreases.
From (i1),
q G
A
(Q1L +Q

2H) + (1  q) GA(s 1(Q1L)) = c1L:
If s increases uniformly, s 1 decreases. Hence, Q1L should increase to satisfy the
equilibrium condition. Similarly, Q1H increases as s increases.
From (i3),
p G
A
(Q2L +Q

1H) + (1  p) GA(Q2L +Q1L) = c2L:
Since Q1L and Q

1H increase, Q

2L should decrease to compensate. Similar argu-
ment applies for cases (ii) and (iii). 
E.7 Comparative Statics
This section summarizes the comparative statics results for general demand dis-
tributions. But we need the following results.
154
First note that s0 = @s(D)=@D > 0 and s^0 = @s^(D)=@D > 0 since we assume
both s and s^ are increasing and deterministic functions. Then the derivative of
the inverses of the split functions can be found by
(s 1)0 =
@s 1(Q)
@Q
=
1
s0(s 1())
> 0
(s^ 1)0 =
@s^ 1(Q)
@Q
=
1
s^0(s^ 1())
> 0
We use these results to nd the signs of derivatives of order quantities with
respect to each parameter in the model.
Table E.1: Derivatives of equilibrium order quantities w.r.t. c1L
Q Conditions c1L Sign
Q2H 0
Q1L G(s
 1(Q1L)) > 0   1
qg(Q1L+s^(G
 1
(c2H )))+(1 q)(s 1)0g(s 1(Q1L))
< 0
G(s 1(Q1L)) = 0   1
qg(Q1L+s^(G
 1
(c2H )))
< 0
(i) Q1H 0
Q2L G(Q1L +Q2L) > 0   (1 p)g(Q1L+Q2L)pg(Q1H+Q2L)+(1 p)g(Q1L+Q2L) (
@Q1L
@c1L
) > 0
G(Q1L +Q2L) = 0 0
Q1L G(Q1L +Q2L) > 0   1
qg(Q1L+s^(G
 1
(c2H )))+(1 q)g(Q1L+Q2L)
< 0
G(Q1L +Q2L) = 0   1
qg(Q1L+s^(G
 1
(c2H )))
< 0
(ii) Q1H 0
Q2L 0
Q1L G(Q1L +Q2L) > 0   1
qg(Q1L+s^(G
 1
(c2H )))+(1 q)g(Q1L+s^(G 1(c2L)))
< 0
(iii) G(Q1L +Q2L) = 0   1
qg(Q1L+s^(G
 1
(c2H )))
< 0
Q1H 0
Q2L 0
.
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Table E.2: Derivatives of equilibrium order quantities w.r.t. c1H
Q Conditions c1H Sign
Q2H 0
Q1L 0
(i) Q1H   1
qg(Q1H+s^(G
 1
(c2H )))+(1 q)(s 1)0g(s 1(Q1H ))
< 0
Q2L G(Q1L +Q2L) > 0   pg(Q1H+Q2L)pg(Q1H+Q2L)+(1 p)g(Q1L+Q2L) (
@Q1H
@c1H
) > 0
G(Q1L +Q2L) = 0   @Q1H@c1H > 0
Q1L G(Q1L +Q2L) > 0   (1 q)g(Q1L+Q2L)
qg(Q1L+s^(G
 1
(c2H )))+(1 q)g(Q1L+Q2L)
( @Q2L
@c1H
) < 0
G(Q1L +Q2L) = 0 0
(ii) Q1H   1
qg(Q1H+s^(G
 1
(c2H )))+(1 q)(s 1)0g(s 1(Q1H ))
< 0
Q2L G(s^
 1(Q2L)) > 0   pg(Q1H+Q2L)pg(Q1H+Q2L)+(1 p)(s^ 1)0g(s^ 1(Q2L)) (
@Q1H
@c1H
) > 0
G(s^ 1(Q2L)) = 0   @Q1H@c1H > 0
Q1L 0
(iii) Q1H G(Q1H +Q2L) > 0   1
qg(Q1H+s^(G
 1
(c2H)))+(1 q)g(Q1H+s^(G 1(c2L)))
< 0
G(Q1H +Q2L) = 0   1
qg(Q1H+s^(G
 1
(c2H )))
< 0
Q2L 0
.
156
Table E.3: Derivatives of equilibrium order quantities w.r.t. c2L
Q Conditions c2L Sign
Q2H 0
Q1L 0
(i) Q1H 0
Q2L G(Q1L +Q2L) > 0   1pg(Q1H+Q2L)+(1 p)g(Q1L+Q2L) < 0
G(Q1L +Q2L) = 0   1pg(Q1H+Q2L) < 0
Q1L G(Q1L +Q2L) > 0   (1 q)g(Q1L+Q2L)
qg(Q1L+s^(G
 1
(c2H )))+(1 q)g(Q1L+Q2L)
( @Q2L
@c2L
) > 0
G(Q1L +Q2L) = 0 0
(ii) Q1H 0
Q2L G(s^
 1(Q2L)) > 0   1
qg(Q1H+s^(G
 1
(c2H )))+(1 q)(s 1)0g(s 1(Q1H ))
< 0
G(s^ 1(Q2L)) = 0   1pg(Q1H+Q2L) < 0
Q1L G(Q1L +Q2L) > 0
(1 q)s^0g(Q1L+Q2L)=g(G 1(c2L))
qg(Q1L+s^(G
 1
(c2H )))+(1 q)g(Q1L+s^(G 1(c2L)))
> 0
G(Q1L +Q2L) = 0 0
(iii) Q1H G(Q1H +Q2L) > 0
(1 q)s^0g(Q1H+Q2L)=g(G 1(c2L))
qg(Q1H+s^(G
 1
(c2H )))+(1 q)g(Q1H+s^(G 1(c2L)))
> 0
G(Q1H +Q2L) = 0 0
Q2L   s^
0
g(G
 1
(c2L))
< 0
.
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Table E.4: Derivatives of equilibrium order quantities w.r.t. c2H
Q Conditions c2H Sign
Q2H   s^
0
g(G
 1
(c2H ))
< 0
Q1L G(s
 1(Q1L)) > 0
s^0g(Q1L+s^(G
 1
(c2H )))=g(G
 1
(c2H ))
qg(Q1L+s^(G
 1
(c2H)))+(1 q)(s 1)0g(s 1(Q1L))
> 0
G(s 1(Q1L)) = 0 s^
0
qg(G
 1
(c2H ))
> 0
(i) Q1H
s^0g(Q1H+s^(G
 1
(c2H )))=g(G
 1
(c2H ))
qg(Q1H+s^(G
 1
(c2H)))+(1 q)(s 1)0g(s 1(Q1H ))
> 0
Q2L G(Q1L +Q2L) > 0   pg(Q1H+Q2L)@Q1H=@c2H+(1 p)g(Q1L+Q2L)@Q1L=@c2Hpg(Q1H+Q2L)+(1 p)g(Q1L+Q2L) < 0
G(Q1L +Q2L) = 0   @Q1H@c1H < 0
Q1L G(Q1L +Q2L) > 0
qs^0g(Q1L+s^(G
 1
(c2H )))=g(G
 1
(c2H ))+(1 q)g(Q1L+Q2L)(@Q2L=@c2H )
qg(Q1L+s^(G
 1
(c2H )))+(1 q)g(Q1L+Q2L)
> 0
G(Q1L +Q2L) = 0
s^0
g(G
 1
(c2H ))
> 0
(ii) Q1H
s^0g(Q1H+s^(G
 1
(c2H )))=g(G
 1
(c2H ))
qg(Q1H+s^(G
 1
(c2H)))+(1 q)(s 1)0g(s 1(Q1H ))
> 0
Q2L G(s^
 1(Q2L)) > 0   pg(Q1H+Q2L)pg(Q1H+Q2L)+(1 p)(s^ 1)0g(s^ 1(Q2L)) (
@Q1H
@c2H
) < 0
G(s^ 1(Q2L)) = 0   @Q1H@c2H < 0
Q1L G(Q1L +Q2L) > 0
qs^0g(Q1L+Q2H )=g(G
 1
(c2H ))
qg(Q1L+s^(G
 1
(c2H )))+(1 q)g(Q1L+s^(G 1(c2L)))
> 0
G(Q1L +Q2L) = 0
s^0
g(G
 1
(c2H ))
> 0
(iii) Q1H G(Q1H +Q2L) > 0
qs^0g(Q1H+Q2H )=g(G
 1
(c2H))
qg(Q1H+s^(G
 1
(c2H )))+(1 q)g(Q1H+s^(G 1(c2L)))
> 0
G(Q1H +Q2L) = 0
s^0
g(G
 1
(c2H ))
> 0
Q2L 0
.
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Table E.5: Derivatives of equilibrium order quantities w.r.t. p
Q Conditions p Sign
Q2H 0
Q1L 0
(i) Q1H 0
Q2L G(Q1L +Q2L) > 0
G(Q1H+Q2L) G(Q1L+Q2L)
pg(Q1H+Q2L)+(1 p)g(Q1L+Q2L) > 0
G(Q1L +Q2L) = 0
G(Q1H+Q2L)
pg(Q1H+Q2L)
> 0
Q1L G(Q1L +Q2L) > 0   (1 q)g(Q1L+Q2L)
qg(Q1L+s^(G
 1
(c2H )))+(1 q)g(Q1L+Q2L)
( @Q2L
@p
) < 0
G(Q1L +Q2L) = 0 0
(ii) Q1H 0
Q2L G(s^
 1(Q2L)) > 0
G(Q1H+Q2L) G(s^ 1(Q2L))
pg(Q1H+Q2L)+(1 p)(s^ 1)0g(s^ 1(Q2L)) > 0
G(s^ 1(Q2L)) = 0
G(Q1H+Q2L)
pg(Q1H+Q2L)
> 0
Q1L 0
(iii) Q1H 0
Q2L 0
E.8 Equilibrium under Uniform Demand and
Linear Market Shares
The equilibrium conditions under the assumption D  Uniform(0; 1) are as fol-
lows:
q(1 minf1; Q1H +Q2Hg) + (1  q)(1 minf1;maxfQ2L=(1  s); Q1H +Q2Lgg)
+(1  q)(maxfminf1; Q2L=(1  s)g  minf1; Q1H=sg; 0g) = c1H
q(1 minf1; Q1L +Q2Hg) + (1  q)(1 minf1;maxfQ2L=(1  s); Q1L +Q2Lg)
+(1  q)(maxfminf1; Q2L=(1  s)g  minf1; Q1L=sg; 0g) = c1L
Q2H=(1  s) = 1  c2H
p(1 minf1;maxfQ1H=s;Q1H +Q2Lgg+maxfminf1; Q1H=sg  minf1; Q2L=(1  s)g; 0g)
+(1  p)(1 minf1;maxfQ1L=s;Q1L +Q2Lgg)
+(1  p)(maxfminf1; Q1L=sg  minf1; Q2L=(1  s)g; 0g) = c2L
Solution for Q2H = (1   s)(1   c2H) is straight forward. However in order
to obtain the solutions for Q1L,Q1H and Q2L we have to know the ordering for
Q1L=s, Q1H=s, Q2L=(1  s), 1 and whether Q1L+Q2L, Q1H +Q2L,Q1L+Q2H and
Q1H +Q2H are greater than 1 or not. We can summarize all the possibilities as:
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Table E.6: Derivatives of equilibrium order quantities w.r.t. q
Q Conditions q Sign
Q2H 0
Q1L G(s
 1(Q1L)) > 0
G(Q1L+s^(G
 1
(c2H ))) G(s 1(Q1L))
qg(Q1L+s^(G
 1
(c2H )))+(1 q)(s 1)0g(s 1(Q1L))
> 0
G(s 1(Q1L)) = 0
G(Q1L+s^(G
 1
(c2H )))
qg(Q1L+s^(G
 1
(c2H )))
> 0
(i) Q1H
G(Q1H+s^(G
 1
(c2H ))) G(s 1(Q1H ))
qg(Q1H+s^(G
 1
(c2H )))+(1 q)(s 1)0g(s 1(Q1H ))
> 0
Q2L G(Q1L +Q2L) > 0   pg(Q1H+Q2L)@Q1H=@q+(1 p)g(Q1L+Q2L)@Q1L=@qpg(Q1H+Q2L)+(1 p)g(Q1L+Q2L) < 0
G(Q1L +Q2L) = 0   @Q1H@q < 0
Q1L G(Q1L +Q2L) > 0
G(Q1L+s^(G(c2H ))) G(Q1L+Q2L) (1 q)g(Q1L+Q2L)(@Q2L=@q)
qg(Q1L+s^(G
 1
(c2H )))+(1 q)g(Q1L+Q2L)
> 0
G(Q1L +Q2L) = 0
G(Q1L+s^(G(c2H )))
qg(Q1L+s^(G
 1
(c2H )))
> 0
(ii) Q1H
G(Q1H+s^(G
 1
(c2H ))) G(s 1(Q1H ))
qg(Q1H+s^(G
 1
(c2H )))+(1 q)(s 1)0g(s 1(Q1H ))
> 0
Q2L G(s^
 1(Q2L)) > 0   pg(Q1H+Q2L)pg(Q1H+Q2L)+(1 p)(s^ 1)0g(s^ 1(Q2L)) (
@Q1H
@q
) < 0
G(s^ 1(Q2L)) = 0   @Q1H@q < 0
Q1L G(Q1L +Q2L) > 0
G(Q1L+s^(G(c2H ))) G(Q1L+s^(G(c2L)))
qg(Q1L+s^(G
 1
(c2H )))+(1 q)g(Q1L+s^(G 1(c2L)))
> 0
G(Q1L +Q2L) = 0
G(Q1L+s^(G(c2H )))
qg(Q1L+s^(G
 1
(c2H )))
> 0
(iii) Q1H G(Q1H +Q2L) > 0
G(Q1H+s^(G(c2H ))) G(Q1H+s^(G(c2L)))
qg(Q1H+s^(G
 1
(c2H )))+(1 q)g(Q1H+s^(G 1(c2L)))
> 0
G(Q1H +Q2L) = 0
G(Q1H+s^(G(c2H )))
qg(Q1H+s^(G
 1
(c2H )))
> 0
Q2L 0
fQ1Ls > 1; Q1Ls  1g fQ1Hs > 1; Q1Hs  1g f Q2L(1 s) > 1; Q2L(1 s)  1g
fQ1Ls > Q2L(1 s) ; Q1Ls  Q2L(1 s)g fQ1Hs > Q2L(1 s) ; Q1Hs  Q2L(1 s)g
fQ1L +Q2L > 1; Q1L +Q2L  1g fQ1H +Q2L > 1; Q1H +Q2L  1g
fQ1L +Q2H > 1; Q1L +Q2H  1g fQ1H +Q2H > 1; Q1H +Q2H  1:g
We have 512 dierent possibilities for Q1L,Q1H and Q2L each leading to a
dierent region in the 7 dimensional space. However, the number of regions can
be reduced to 8 regions as shown below.
First, if both of the players have a high type, then the total inventory cannot
exceed 1 and if second rm has high type since he does not expect any spillover.
This is simply due to the suboptimality of all values greater than 1. Second, some
of the conditions imply the others. For example, if Q1L=s > 1 and Q2L=(1  s) >
1 then Q1L + Q2L > 1. Third, Q2L=(1   s) > Q1L=s implies Q2L=(1   s) >
Q1H=s since low type of a rm orders as much as high type of the rm due to
submodularity. Similarly, Q2L=(1  s)  Q1H=s implies Q2L=(1  s)  Q1L=s.
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Using these kind of arguments we reduce the conditions to form 8 dierent
regions. It can be shown that it is not possible to reduce the conditions further
without making additional assumptions on the parameters.
Region Conditions
1 Q1L
s
> 1 , Q2L
(1 s) > 1
2 Q1L +Q2L > 1 ,
Q1L
s
 1
3 Q1L +Q2L  1 , Q1Ls  Q2L(1 s)
4 Q1L +Q2L > 1 ,
Q2L
(1 s)  1 , Q1Hs  Q2L(1 s)
5 Q1L +Q2L  1 , Q1Ls >
Q2L
(1 s) ,
Q1H
s
 Q2L
(1 s)
6 Q1H +Q2L > 1 ,
Q1H
s
> Q2L
(1 s)
7 Q1L +Q2L > 1 , Q1H +Q2L  1 , Q1Hs >
Q2L
(1 s)
8 Q1L +Q2L  1 , Q1Hs >
Q2L
(1 s)
In each of the regions, the given inequalities simplify the equilibrium condi-
tions leading to an easy computation of the equilibrium order quantities.
For Region 1, we reduce the equilibrium conditions to the following form:
q(1 Q1H  Q2H) + (1  q)(1 Q1H=s) = c1H ;
q(1 Q1L  Q2H) = c1L;
Q2H=(1  s) = 1  c2H ;
p(1 Q1H  Q2L) = c2L:
It is straightforward to nd the order quantities for this region:
Q1H =
(1 c1H q(1 s)(1 c2H))
(q+(1 q)=s) Q1L = 1  c1Lq   (1  s)(1  c2H);
Q2H = (1  s)(1  c2H) Q2L = 1  c2Lp   (1 c1H q(1 s)(1 c2H))(q+(1 q)=s) :
Now, by plugging these quantities into necessary inequalities, we obtain:
Q1L
s
> 1 ) 1  c1L
q
  (1  s)(1  c2H) > s
) c1L
q
  (1  s)(1  c2H) < 1  s ) c1L
q
  (1  s)c2H < 0
) c1L < q(1  s)c2H
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Q2L
(1  s) > 1 ) 1 
c2L
p
  (1  c1H   q(1  s)(1  c2H))
(q + (1  q)=s) > 1  s
) c2L
p
+
s(1  c1H   q(1  s)(1  c2H))
(1  (1  s)q) < s )
c2L
p
  s(c1H   q(1  s)(c2H))
(1  (1  s)q) < 0
) c2L < sp(c1H   q(1  s)c2H)
1  (1  s)q
Thus, Region 1 can be characterized by two inequalities:
c1L < q(1  s)c2H ;
c2L <
sp(c1H   q(1  s)c2H)
1  (1  s)q :
These conditions are necessary and sucient, i.e., if these inequalities are satised,
then equilibrium order quantities take the values in Region 1.
In a similar fashion, we can obtain the conditions for all 8 regions. This is
summarized in Figure 1.
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